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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explicit individual LSM associations
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 18:48:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <51F71B65.5060205@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLEd8vt0d7aEecP7BMCduTyeFs56wv07TCCXbRr001B+Q@mail.gmail.com>

On 7/29/2013 1:51 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:32 AM, Casey Schaufler
> <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explicit individual LSM associations
>> [...]
>> Introduce feature specific security operation vectors
>> for NetLabel, XFRM, secmark and presentation in the
>> traditional /proc/.../attr interfaces. This allows
>> proper handling of secids.
>> [...]
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm.h
>> @@ -164,9 +164,18 @@ static inline void lsm_init_secid(struct secids *secid, u32 lsecid, int order)
>>  {
>>         memset(secid, 0, sizeof(*secid));
>>
>> -       if (lsecid != 0)
>> +       if (lsecid == 0)
>> +               return;
>> +       /*
>> +        * An order of -1 means set it for all LSMs.
>> +        */
>> +       if (order < 0) {
>> +               secid->si_lsm[0] = lsecid;
>> +               secid->si_count++;
>> +       } else {
>> +               secid->si_lsm[order] = lsecid;
>>                 secid->si_count = 1;
>> -       secid->si_lsm[order] = lsecid;
>> +       }
>>  }
>>
>>  static inline int lsm_zero_secid(struct secids *secid)
>> @@ -178,39 +187,64 @@ static inline int lsm_zero_secid(struct secids *secid)
>>
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>>
>> +extern struct security_operations *present_ops;
>>  static inline struct security_operations *lsm_present_ops(void)
>>  {
>> -       return security_ops;
>> +       return present_ops;
>>  }
>>
>>  static inline int lsm_present_order(void)
>>  {
>> -       return 0;
>> +       return present_ops->order;
>>  }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
>> +extern struct security_operations *netlbl_ops;
>> +
>>  static inline struct security_operations *lsm_netlbl_ops(void)
>>  {
>> -       return security_ops;
>> +       return netlbl_ops;
>>  }
>>
>>  static inline int lsm_netlbl_order(void)
>>  {
>> -       return 0;
>> +       return netlbl_ops->order;
>>  }
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
>> +extern struct security_operations *xfrm_ops;
>>
>>  static inline struct security_operations *lsm_xfrm_ops(void)
>>  {
>> -       return security_ops;
>> +       return xfrm_ops;
>>  }
>>
>>  static inline int lsm_xfrm_order(void)
>>  {
>> -       return 0;
>> +       return xfrm_ops->order;
>>  }
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
>> +extern struct security_operations *secmark_ops;
>>
>>  static inline struct security_operations *lsm_secmark_ops(void)
>>  {
>> -       return security_ops;
>> +       return secmark_ops;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline int lsm_secmark_order(void)
>> +{
>> +       return secmark_ops->order;
>> +}
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK */
>> +
>> +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>> +
>> +static inline int lsm_xfrm_order(void)
>> +{
>> +       return 0;
>>  }
>>
>>  static inline int lsm_secmark_order(void)
>> @@ -218,6 +252,11 @@ static inline int lsm_secmark_order(void)
>>         return 0;
>>  }
>>
>> +static inline struct security_operations *lsm_secmark_ops(void)
>> +{
>> +       return NULL;
>> +}
>> +
>>  #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>>
>>  #endif /* ! _LINUX_LSM_H */
> Something went wrong here with the #ifdef/#else stuff here. I built
> without CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM and it fails, missing
> lsm_xfrm_order().
>
> If I added an #else to the CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM check and made
> lsm_xfrm_order() return 0 there too, it built fine.

Yup, I missed that configuration iteration at the end.
I've incorporated a fix.

>
> -Kees
>


  reply	other threads:[~2013-07-30  1:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-07-25 18:22 [PATCH v14 0/6] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 1/6] LSM: Security blob abstraction Casey Schaufler
2013-07-29 21:15   ` Kees Cook
2013-07-30  1:49     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 2/6] LSM: Move the capability LSM into the hook handlers Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explicit individual LSM associations Casey Schaufler
2013-07-29 20:51   ` Kees Cook
2013-07-30  1:48     ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2013-07-30 22:08   ` Paul Moore
2013-07-31 16:22     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-31 19:39       ` Paul Moore
2013-07-31 21:21         ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 18:35           ` Paul Moore
2013-08-01 18:52             ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 21:30               ` Paul Moore
2013-08-01 22:15                 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 22:18                   ` Paul Moore
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 4/6] LSM: List based multiple LSM hooks Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 5/6] LSM: SO_PEERSEC configuration options Casey Schaufler
2013-07-30 21:47   ` Paul Moore
2013-07-31 15:45     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-31 17:56       ` Paul Moore
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 6/6] LSM: Multiple LSM Documentation and cleanup Casey Schaufler
2013-07-26 23:17   ` Randy Dunlap
2013-07-28 18:46     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01  2:48 ` [PATCH v14 0/6] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs Balbir Singh
2013-08-01 17:21   ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-06  3:28     ` Balbir Singh
2013-08-06  6:30 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-06 22:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-06 22:36     ` Kees Cook
2013-08-27  2:29       ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-28 15:55         ` Kees Cook
2013-09-05 18:48         ` Kees Cook
2013-09-06  6:44           ` Casey Schaufler

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