From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"khaliidcaliy@gmail.com" <khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"khaliidcaly@gmail.com" <khaliidcaly@gmail.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8] x86/boot: Don't return encryption mask from __startup_64()
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 11:33:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <51aad9762bca3678f0d79adf72728e54c67973ce.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250716091332.737-1-khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>
On Wed, 2025-07-16 at 09:11 +0000, Khalid Ali wrote:
> From: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaly@gmail.com>
>
> Avoid returning encryption mask to callers of __startup_64().
>
> The encryption mask is available to callers and canbe accessed
^
can be
> sme_get_me_mask() in C code and sme_me_mask symbol in assembly code.
>
> This change aligns the way the mask is retrieved in
> secondary_startup_64_no_verify().
>
> No functionality change intended, only consistency improvement, so the
> code becomes cleaner.
>
> On intel processors sme_me_mask is zero. So, it is safe to add mask only
> if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaly@gmail.com>
> Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v8:
> * Improve commit message for clarity.
Apparently not jut commit message change, since ...
> /*
> * Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt
> - * the kernel and retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME
> - * is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be
> - * programmed into CR3.
> - */
> + * the kernel.
> + */
... the indent of this comment is broken. Your v7 was fine.
And ...
> movq %r15, %rsi
> call __startup_64
>
> /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
> - leaq early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx
> - addq %rcx, %rax
> + leaq early_top_pgt(%rip), %rax
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> + /* Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME
> + * is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be
> + * programmed into CR3.
> + */
... this comment style is broken too. Again, your v7 was fine:
+ /*
+ * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME
+ * is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be
+ * programmed into CR3.
+ */
I am not sure how you ended up with those random broken changes, because
they are quite unusual to me.
Could you please remove my Acked-by?
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-16 11:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-16 9:11 [PATCH v8] x86/boot: Don't return encryption mask from __startup_64() Khalid Ali
2025-07-16 11:33 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
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