Re: [PATCH] X.509: Remove validity check of certificate date

[Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de>]

(I've resend this message, because the one I've replied to contained 
contained kernel@vger... and not linux-kernel@vger... as addressee)

I've already sent exactly the same patch here:

http://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/27/449

and here:

https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/6/6/207

but for some unspoken reason it always got ignored.

It would make wonder if it would be accepted this time, just because of
another author name.

Regards,

Alexander Holler


Am 25.09.2013 08:20, schrieb Lee, Chun-Yi:
> The check of valid_from and valid_to fields on X.509 certificate is a
> time bomb to MODSIGN function, It causes kernel module could not be
> load because the RTC on system may messed by user action (e.g. refresh
> BIOS) that should not be trusted.
>
> Base on the discussion of David Howells's "[PATCH] X.509: Remove
> certificate date checks":
>   https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/14/257
>
> This patch removed the validity check of certificate date but still keep
> the valid_from and valid_to fields for future usage.
>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
> cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
> cc: Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de>
> cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
> cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
> ---
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |   38 ------------------------------
>  1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> index 06007f0..52222a2 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> @@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ error_no_sig:
>  static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  {
>  	struct x509_certificate *cert;
> -	struct tm now;
>  	size_t srlen, sulen;
>  	char *desc = NULL;
>  	int ret;
> @@ -137,43 +136,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  		goto error_free_cert;
>  	}
>
> -	time_to_tm(CURRENT_TIME.tv_sec, 0, &now);
> -	pr_devel("Now: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
> -		 now.tm_year + 1900, now.tm_mon + 1, now.tm_mday,
> -		 now.tm_hour, now.tm_min,  now.tm_sec);
> -	if (now.tm_year < cert->valid_from.tm_year ||
> -	    (now.tm_year == cert->valid_from.tm_year &&
> -	     (now.tm_mon < cert->valid_from.tm_mon ||
> -	      (now.tm_mon == cert->valid_from.tm_mon &&
> -	       (now.tm_mday < cert->valid_from.tm_mday ||
> -		(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_from.tm_mday &&
> -		 (now.tm_hour < cert->valid_from.tm_hour ||
> -		  (now.tm_hour == cert->valid_from.tm_hour &&
> -		   (now.tm_min < cert->valid_from.tm_min ||
> -		    (now.tm_min == cert->valid_from.tm_min &&
> -		     (now.tm_sec < cert->valid_from.tm_sec
> -		      ))))))))))) {
> -		pr_warn("Cert %s is not yet valid\n", cert->fingerprint);
> -		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
> -		goto error_free_cert;
> -	}
> -	if (now.tm_year > cert->valid_to.tm_year ||
> -	    (now.tm_year == cert->valid_to.tm_year &&
> -	     (now.tm_mon > cert->valid_to.tm_mon ||
> -	      (now.tm_mon == cert->valid_to.tm_mon &&
> -	       (now.tm_mday > cert->valid_to.tm_mday ||
> -		(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_to.tm_mday &&
> -		 (now.tm_hour > cert->valid_to.tm_hour ||
> -		  (now.tm_hour == cert->valid_to.tm_hour &&
> -		   (now.tm_min > cert->valid_to.tm_min ||
> -		    (now.tm_min == cert->valid_to.tm_min &&
> -		     (now.tm_sec > cert->valid_to.tm_sec
> -		      ))))))))))) {
> -		pr_warn("Cert %s has expired\n", cert->fingerprint);
> -		ret = -EKEYEXPIRED;
> -		goto error_free_cert;
> -	}
> -
>  	cert->pub->algo = x509_public_key_algorithms[cert->pkey_algo];
>  	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
>
>