public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: fs: proc: lockdep spew and questions
Date: Sun, 08 Dec 2013 15:57:53 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52A4DD51.6090709@oracle.com> (raw)

Hi all,

I've been looking at permissions in procfs, and noticed that directories are usually added with 
execute permission.

As far as I know, there's nothing executable by default inside procfs, and on top of that, many of 
the files there don't deal well with being executed so it's easy to cause lockdep spews (one below).

Is there a reason execute bit is set for directories?


sh-4.1# chmod +x /proc/10/net/igmp
sh-4.1# /proc/10/net/igmp
/proc/10/net/igmp: line 1: Idx: command not found
sh-4.1# cat /proc/10/maps
[   64.535651]
[   64.535898] ======================================================
[   64.536674] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
[   64.537288] 3.13.0-rc2-next-20131206-sasha-00005-g8be2375-dirty #4052 Not tainted
[   64.538211] -------------------------------------------------------
[   64.538831] cat/7896 is trying to acquire lock:
[   64.539307]  (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8112e684>] mm_access+0x34/0xb0
[   64.540349]
[   64.540349] but task is already holding lock:
[   64.540906]  (&p->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813000df>] seq_read+0x3f/0x430
[   64.541877]
[   64.541877] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[   64.541877]
[   64.542449]
[   64.542449] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   64.542449]
-> #1 (&p->lock){+.+.+.}:
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff81194833>] validate_chain+0x6c3/0x7b0
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff81194dcd>] __lock_acquire+0x4ad/0x580
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff81195022>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff8439825f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x6f/0x520
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff813000df>] seq_read+0x3f/0x430
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff8134e62f>] proc_reg_read+0x5f/0x80
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff812d7177>] vfs_read+0xc7/0x180
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff812dce66>] kernel_read+0x46/0x60
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff812dcfd3>] prepare_binprm+0x153/0x170
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff812de2d5>] do_execve_common+0x1a5/0x360
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff812de557>] do_execve+0x37/0x40
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff812de5a6>] SyS_execve+0x46/0x70
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff843a6c19>] stub_execve+0x69/0xa0
[   64.542449]
-> #0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff81193d5f>] check_prev_add+0x13f/0x550
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff81194833>] validate_chain+0x6c3/0x7b0
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff81194dcd>] __lock_acquire+0x4ad/0x580
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff81195022>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff8439967f>] mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x6f/0x620
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff8112e684>] mm_access+0x34/0xb0
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff8134bf49>] m_start+0x79/0x1d0
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff81300228>] seq_read+0x188/0x430
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff812d7177>] vfs_read+0xc7/0x180
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff812d7332>] SyS_read+0x62/0xa0
[   64.542449]        [<ffffffff843a6810>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[   64.542449]
[   64.542449] other info that might help us debug this:
[   64.542449]
[   64.542449]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   64.542449]
[   64.542449]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   64.542449]        ----                    ----
[   64.542449]   lock(&p->lock);
[   64.542449]                                lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
[   64.542449]                                lock(&p->lock);
[   64.542449]   lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
[   64.542449]
[   64.542449]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   64.542449]
[   64.542449] 1 lock held by cat/7896:
[   64.542449]  #0:  (&p->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff813000df>] seq_read+0x3f/0x430
[   64.542449]
[   64.542449] stack backtrace:
[   64.542449] CPU: 0 PID: 7896 Comm: cat Not tainted 
3.13.0-rc2-next-20131206-sasha-00005-g8be2375-dirty #4052
[   64.542449]  0000000000000000 ffff880fbc169af8 ffffffff843956f7 0000000000000000
[   64.542449]  0000000000000000 ffff880fbc169b48 ffffffff81191909 ffff880fbc169b68
[   64.542449]  ffff880fbc169b68 ffff880fbc169b48 ffff880fb89fbbd8 ffff880fb89fbc10
[   64.542449] Call Trace:
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff843956f7>] dump_stack+0x52/0x7f
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff81191909>] print_circular_bug+0x129/0x160
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff81193d5f>] check_prev_add+0x13f/0x550
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff812aec6f>] ? deactivate_slab+0x8cf/0x920
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff81194833>] validate_chain+0x6c3/0x7b0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff811755b8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x108/0x120
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff81194dcd>] __lock_acquire+0x4ad/0x580
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff81195022>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff8112e684>] ? mm_access+0x34/0xb0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff8439967f>] mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x6f/0x620
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff8112e684>] ? mm_access+0x34/0xb0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff81159480>] ? get_pid_task+0xd0/0x100
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff8112e684>] ? mm_access+0x34/0xb0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff8112e684>] mm_access+0x34/0xb0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff811593b0>] ? alloc_pid+0x260/0x260
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff8134bf49>] m_start+0x79/0x1d0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff81176376>] ? vtime_account_user+0x96/0xb0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff81300228>] seq_read+0x188/0x430
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff812d7177>] vfs_read+0xc7/0x180
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff812d7332>] SyS_read+0x62/0xa0
[   64.542449]  [<ffffffff843a6810>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

             reply	other threads:[~2013-12-08 20:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-12-08 20:57 Sasha Levin [this message]
2013-12-08 22:10 ` fs: proc: lockdep spew and questions Al Viro
2013-12-09  3:14   ` Sasha Levin
2013-12-09 11:46     ` Christian Kujau

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=52A4DD51.6090709@oracle.com \
    --to=sasha.levin@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox