From: Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
vegard.nossum@oracle.com, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>, Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 11:31:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52AAE214.7020109@ahsoftware.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131213014220.GB11068@kroah.com>
Am 13.12.2013 02:42, schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 07:25:23PM -0500, Dave Jones wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 01:13:41PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> > - who will keep adding these triggers going forward?
>>
>> also..
>>
>> - Who will test the existing triggers are doing the right thing when related code changes.
>
> And:
> - how do you determine an "expoit attempt" from "userspace program
> doing something stupid" / "corrupted filesytem mounted"?
>
And what makes a bug marked as exploit more serious than the all the
other bugs? I assume there exists many, many more serious (fixed or not)
bugs than just those which found there way into the CVE database. And I
think most bugs are getting fixed without such a number and often even
those for which CVEs do exist, the CVE is unknown to the dev(s).
So people might be think they are safe if they call some tool which
tests for existing CVEs which are marked as such inside the kernel,
which just isn't the reality.
And, as already mentioned, those CVE marks might block refactoring, as
devs might become careful to remove such a CVE marker when code changed.
I've never seen a comment inside the kernel sources which does point to
a CVE, so I assume there already does exists some agreement about not
doing so.
Regards,
Alexander Holler
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-12-13 10:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-12-12 16:52 [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/9] exploit: report to audit subsystem when available vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/9] hfs: Known exploit detection for CVE-2011-4330 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13 8:00 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/9] net: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2136 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 5/9] hfsplus: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2319 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13 1:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 11:14 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0268 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 7/9] drm/i915: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0913 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 8/9] userns: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-1959 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 9/9] perf: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-2094 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-12 21:13 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-12 23:50 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-12 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 11:10 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-13 14:21 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 9:20 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 22:49 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 13:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 15:55 ` Jason Cooper
2013-12-13 23:07 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 0:25 ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-12-13 1:42 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 1:44 ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13 5:09 ` James Morris
2013-12-13 5:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 13:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 10:21 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 10:31 ` Alexander Holler [this message]
2013-12-13 11:48 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-13 11:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 13:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 17:58 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 18:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-12-13 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 5:27 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 9:32 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 18:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 9:12 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 13:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 8:20 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-14 23:59 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 12:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-16 5:17 ` Sasha Levin
2013-12-19 6:14 ` David Rientjes
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