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From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
To: vegard.nossum@oracle.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2013 00:17:55 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52AE8D03.2040808@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1386867152-24072-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com>

Hi Vegard,

On 12/12/2013 11:52 AM, vegard.nossum@oracle.com wrote:
 > +#ifdef CONFIG_EXPLOIT_DETECTION
 > +extern void _exploit(const char *id);

So right now the on/off switch is a kernel config option. I suggest we should add another
dynamic switch (maybe in the form of jump labels) to add an additional level of control:

  - It will allow having an opt-in option. Right now users are forced into
having this feature if the distro maintainers enable it.
	- Which means that distro maintainers are less likely to enable it.

  - If the SHTF and there's something wrong we would want a way to disable it
without having to re-compile the kernel.


<bikeshedding>
Also,

Maybe in the future we could enable/disable specific exploits based on severity or certainty
(how likely that this specific activity is an exploit attempt).

</bikeshedding>

On 12/12/2013 11:52 AM, vegard.nossum@oracle.com wrote:
> +#define exploit_on(cond, id) \
> +	do { \
> +		if (unlikely(cond)) \
> +			_exploit(id); \
> +	} while (0)

What if we make exploit_on() something like this:

	#define exploit_on(cond, id) ({			\
		int __ret_exploit_on = !!(cond);	\
		if (unlikely(__ret_exploit_on))		\
			_exploit(id);			\
		unlikely(__ret_exploit_on);		\
	})

That way we can use it within if() conditionals similar to WARN_ON:

	if (exploit_on(srclen > HFS_NAMELEN, "CVE-2011-4330"))
		srclen = HFS_NAMELEN;



Thanks,
Sasha

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-12-16  5:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-12-12 16:52 [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/9] exploit: report to audit subsystem when available vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/9] hfs: Known exploit detection for CVE-2011-4330 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13  8:00   ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/9] net: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2136 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 5/9] hfsplus: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2319 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13  1:40   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 11:14   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0268 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 7/9] drm/i915: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0913 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 8/9] userns: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-1959 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 9/9] perf: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-2094 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-12 21:13   ` Kees Cook
2013-12-12 23:50     ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-12 23:55       ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 11:10         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-13 14:21           ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13  9:20       ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 22:49         ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 13:06       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 15:55         ` Jason Cooper
2013-12-13 23:07         ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13  0:25     ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13  0:45       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-12-13  1:42       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13  1:44         ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13  5:09         ` James Morris
2013-12-13  5:46           ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 13:19             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 10:21           ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 10:31         ` Alexander Holler
2013-12-13 11:48           ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-13 11:57             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 13:23             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 18:00               ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 17:58         ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 18:14           ` Linus Torvalds
2013-12-13 18:37             ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13  5:27     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13  9:32       ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 18:07       ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13  9:12     ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 13:27       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13  8:20   ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-14 23:59   ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 12:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-16  5:17 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2013-12-19  6:14 ` David Rientjes

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