From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
To: vegard.nossum@oracle.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2013 00:17:55 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52AE8D03.2040808@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1386867152-24072-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Hi Vegard,
On 12/12/2013 11:52 AM, vegard.nossum@oracle.com wrote:
> +#ifdef CONFIG_EXPLOIT_DETECTION
> +extern void _exploit(const char *id);
So right now the on/off switch is a kernel config option. I suggest we should add another
dynamic switch (maybe in the form of jump labels) to add an additional level of control:
- It will allow having an opt-in option. Right now users are forced into
having this feature if the distro maintainers enable it.
- Which means that distro maintainers are less likely to enable it.
- If the SHTF and there's something wrong we would want a way to disable it
without having to re-compile the kernel.
<bikeshedding>
Also,
Maybe in the future we could enable/disable specific exploits based on severity or certainty
(how likely that this specific activity is an exploit attempt).
</bikeshedding>
On 12/12/2013 11:52 AM, vegard.nossum@oracle.com wrote:
> +#define exploit_on(cond, id) \
> + do { \
> + if (unlikely(cond)) \
> + _exploit(id); \
> + } while (0)
What if we make exploit_on() something like this:
#define exploit_on(cond, id) ({ \
int __ret_exploit_on = !!(cond); \
if (unlikely(__ret_exploit_on)) \
_exploit(id); \
unlikely(__ret_exploit_on); \
})
That way we can use it within if() conditionals similar to WARN_ON:
if (exploit_on(srclen > HFS_NAMELEN, "CVE-2011-4330"))
srclen = HFS_NAMELEN;
Thanks,
Sasha
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-12-16 5:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-12-12 16:52 [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/9] exploit: report to audit subsystem when available vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/9] hfs: Known exploit detection for CVE-2011-4330 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13 8:00 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/9] net: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2136 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 5/9] hfsplus: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2319 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13 1:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 11:14 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0268 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 7/9] drm/i915: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0913 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 8/9] userns: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-1959 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 9/9] perf: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-2094 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-12 21:13 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-12 23:50 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-12 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 11:10 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-13 14:21 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 9:20 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 22:49 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 13:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 15:55 ` Jason Cooper
2013-12-13 23:07 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 0:25 ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-12-13 1:42 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 1:44 ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13 5:09 ` James Morris
2013-12-13 5:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 13:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 10:21 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 10:31 ` Alexander Holler
2013-12-13 11:48 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-13 11:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 13:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 17:58 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 18:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-12-13 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 5:27 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 9:32 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 18:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 9:12 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 13:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 8:20 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-14 23:59 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 12:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-16 5:17 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2013-12-19 6:14 ` David Rientjes
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