From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nikunj@amd.com,
Santosh.Shukla@amd.com, Vasant.Hegde@amd.com,
Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com, bp@alien8.de,
David.Kaplan@amd.com, huibo.wang@amd.com, naveen.rao@amd.com,
tiala@microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 13/17] KVM: SVM: Add IOAPIC EOI support for Secure AVIC guests
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 11:15:51 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5305bd63-a393-ad9a-56a9-8eeb167e1b66@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250923050317.205482-14-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
On 9/23/25 00:03, Neeraj Upadhyay wrote:
> While Secure AVIC hardware accelerates End-of-Interrupt (EOI) processing
> for edge-triggered interrupts, it requires hypervisor assistance for
> level-triggered interrupts originating from the IOAPIC. For these
> interrupts, a guest write to the EOI MSR triggers a VM-Exit.
>
> The primary challenge in handling this exit is that the guest's real
> In-Service Register (ISR) is not visible to KVM. When KVM receives an EOI,
> it has no direct way of knowing which interrupt vector is being
> acknowledged.
>
> To solve this, use KVM's software vAPIC state as a shadow tracking
> mechanism for active, level-triggered interrupts.
>
> The implementation follows this flow:
>
> 1. On interrupt injection (sev_savic_set_requested_irr), check KVM's
> software vAPIC Trigger Mode Register (TMR) to identify if the
> interrupt is level-triggered.
>
> 2. If it is, set the corresponding vector in KVM's software shadow ISR.
> This marks the interrupt as "in-service" from KVM's perspective.
>
> 3. When the guest later issues an EOI, the APIC_EOI MSR write exit
> handler finds the highest vector set in this shadow ISR.
>
> 4. The handler then clears the vector from the shadow ISR and calls
> kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated() to propagate the EOI to the virtual
> IOAPIC, allowing it to de-assert the interrupt line.
>
> This enables correct EOI handling for level-triggered interrupts in
> Secure AVIC guests, despite the hardware-enforced opacity of the guest's
> APIC state.
>
> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 3e9cc50f2705..5be2956fb812 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -4474,7 +4474,9 @@ static void savic_handle_icr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_vcpu, u64 icr)
>
> static bool savic_handle_msr_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> + struct kvm_lapic *apic;
> u32 msr, reg;
> + int vec;
>
> msr = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
> reg = (msr - APIC_BASE_MSR) << 4;
> @@ -4492,6 +4494,12 @@ static bool savic_handle_msr_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return true;
> }
> break;
> + case APIC_EOI:
> + apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
> + vec = apic_find_highest_vector(apic->regs + APIC_ISR);
> + apic_clear_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_ISR);
> + kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated(vcpu, vec);
> + return true;
Do you need to ensure that this is truly a WRMSR being done vs a RDMSR?
Or are you guaranteed that it is a WRMSR at this point?
Thanks,
Tom
> default:
> break;
> }
> @@ -5379,6 +5387,8 @@ void sev_savic_set_requested_irr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool reinjected)
> vec = vec_start + vec_pos;
> apic_clear_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_IRR);
> val = val & ~BIT(vec_pos);
> + if (apic_test_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_TMR))
> + apic_set_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_ISR);
> } while (val);
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-23 16:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-23 5:03 [RFC PATCH v2 00/17] AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/17] KVM: x86/lapic: Differentiate protected APIC interrupt mechanisms Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/17] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU feature Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/17] KVM: SVM: Add support for Secure AVIC capability in KVM Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/17] KVM: SVM: Set guest APIC protection flags for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 13:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-25 5:16 ` Upadhyay, Neeraj
2025-09-25 13:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/17] KVM: SVM: Implement interrupt injection for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 14:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/17] KVM: SVM: Add IPI Delivery Support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/17] KVM: SVM: Do not inject exception " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/17] KVM: SVM: Set VGIF in VMSA area " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/17] KVM: SVM: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:25 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/17] KVM: SVM: Add VMGEXIT handler for Secure AVIC backing page Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/17] KVM: SVM: Add IOAPIC EOI support for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:15 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/17] KVM: x86/ioapic: Disable RTC EOI tracking for protected APIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/17] KVM: SVM: Check injected timers for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/17] KVM: x86/cpuid: Disable paravirt APIC features for protected APIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/17] KVM: SVM: Advertise Secure AVIC support for SNP guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 10:02 ` [syzbot ci] Re: AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support syzbot ci
2025-09-23 10:17 ` Upadhyay, Neeraj
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