[PATCH] x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address

Kees Cook
2014-02-21T20:22:58Z

From: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>

Randomize the load address of modules in the kernel to make kASLR
effective for modules. Modules can only be loaded within a particular
range of virtual address space. This patch adds 10 bits of entropy to
the load address by adding 1-1024 * PAGE_SIZE to the beginning range
where modules are loaded.

Example kASLR boot without this change, with a single module loaded:
---[ Modules ]---
0xffffffffc0000000-0xffffffffc0001000 4K ro GLB x pte
0xffffffffc0001000-0xffffffffc0002000 4K ro GLB NX pte
0xffffffffc0002000-0xffffffffc0004000 8K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffffc0004000-0xffffffffc0200000 2032K pte
0xffffffffc0200000-0xffffffffff000000 1006M pmd
---[ End Modules ]---

Example kASLR boot after this change, same module loaded:
---[ Modules ]---
0xffffffffc0000000-0xffffffffc0200000 2M pmd
0xffffffffc0200000-0xffffffffc03bf000 1788K pte
0xffffffffc03bf000-0xffffffffc03c0000 4K ro GLB x pte
0xffffffffc03c0000-0xffffffffc03c1000 4K ro GLB NX pte
0xffffffffc03c1000-0xffffffffc03c3000 8K RW GLB NX pte
0xffffffffc03c3000-0xffffffffc0400000 244K pte
0xffffffffc0400000-0xffffffffff000000 1004M pmd
---[ End Modules ]---

Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
index 18be189368bb..49483137371f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>

#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -43,13 +44,49 @@ do { \
} while (0)
#endif

+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+static unsigned long module_load_offset;
+static int randomize_modules = 1;
+
+static int __init parse_nokaslr(char *p)
+{
+ randomize_modules = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nokaslr", parse_nokaslr);
+
+static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
+{
+ if (randomize_modules) {
+ mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+ /*
+ * Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this
+ * code is called. Once calculated it stays the same until
+ * reboot.
+ */
+ if (module_load_offset == 0)
+ module_load_offset =
+ (get_random_int() % 1024 + 1) * PAGE_SIZE;
+ mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+ }
+ return module_load_offset;
+}
+#else
+static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
{
if (PAGE_ALIGN(size) > MODULES_LEN)
return NULL;
- return __vmalloc_node_range(size, 1, MODULES_VADDR, MODULES_END,
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC,
- NUMA_NO_NODE, __builtin_return_address(0));
+ return __vmalloc_node_range(size, 1,
+ MODULES_VADDR + get_module_load_offset(),
+ MODULES_END, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM,
+ PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, NUMA_NO_NODE,
+ __builtin_return_address(0));
}

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--
1.7.9.5

--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security