From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86: Add support for rd/wr fs/gs base
Date: Thu, 01 May 2014 14:58:22 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5362C37E.2090603@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140501211554.GH2382@two.firstfloor.org>
On 05/01/2014 02:15 PM, Andi Kleen wrote:
>> If usergs == kernelgs, then ebx will always be 1 and we'll never end
>> up in paranoid_userspace.
>
> You may miss a reschedule in this obscure case. It shouldn't really
> happen because loading a kernel pointer is not useful for user space.
>
> Doesn't seem like a real issue to me.
>
> We only happen need to handle it to avoid crashing.
>
No, it would be a rootable security hole, not just a crash.
>> Alternatively, what if the paranoid entry checked whether we're coming
>> from userspace at the very beginning and, if so, just jumped to the
>> non-paranoid entry?
>
> That would work, but I doubt it would be worth it.
If that would solve the problem it is simple enough, but the tricky part
is when we end up in a "crack" where we are in kernel mode with the user GS.
I haven't looked through the flows (I'm at LCE so I have limited screen
bandwidth) to see how that would be handled in this case, but in the
general paranoid case it comes down to the fact that in this particular
subcase we don't necessarily know exactly how many SWAPGS are between us
and userspace after we IRET.
-hpa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-05-01 21:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-04-28 22:12 Add support for RD/WR FS/GSBASE Andi Kleen
2014-04-28 22:12 ` [PATCH 1/7] percpu: Add a DEFINE_PER_CPU_2PAGE_ALIGNED Andi Kleen
2014-05-02 15:18 ` Tejun Heo
2014-04-28 22:12 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: Naturally align the debug IST stack Andi Kleen
2014-04-28 22:12 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86: Add C intrinsics for new rd/wr fs/gs base instructions Andi Kleen
2014-04-29 14:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-04-28 22:12 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86: Add support for rd/wr fs/gs base Andi Kleen
2014-04-29 18:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-29 23:39 ` Andi Kleen
2014-04-30 4:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-04-30 4:57 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-04-30 23:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-30 23:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-01 21:15 ` Andi Kleen
2014-05-01 21:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-01 21:51 ` Andi Kleen
2014-05-01 21:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-01 21:58 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2014-05-01 22:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-05-01 22:18 ` Andi Kleen
2014-05-01 22:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-04-28 22:12 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86: Make old K8 swapgs workaround conditional Andi Kleen
2014-04-30 4:57 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-04-28 22:12 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86: Enumerate kernel FSGS capability in AT_HWCAP2 Andi Kleen
2014-04-28 22:12 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86: Add documentation for rd/wr fs/gs base Andi Kleen
2014-04-29 2:23 ` Randy Dunlap
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