From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid()
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 08:34:21 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53A81ECD.1010001@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1403310623-37002-1-git-send-email-Waiman.Long@hp.com>
On 06/20/2014 08:30 PM, Waiman Long wrote:
> v1->v2:
> - Add an internal helper to switch on/off lock acquisition instead
> of modifying the external API.
>
> With introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock() may hang
> the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere in between.
>
> With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
> reported:
>
> =============================================
> [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
> 3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G E
> ---------------------------------------------
> load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
> (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
> security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170
>
> but task is already holding lock:
> (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
> security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
> Possible unsafe locking scenario:
>
> CPU0
> ----
> lock(policy_rwlock);
> lock(policy_rwlock);
>
> This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
> policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() by adding a helper function
> which has a 5th argument to indicate if the rwlock has been taken.
>
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 4bca494..5f4c1f3 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -2277,20 +2277,22 @@ out:
> }
>
> /**
> - * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
> + * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
> * @fstype: filesystem type
> * @path: path from root of mount
> * @sclass: file security class
> * @sid: SID for path
> + * @locked: true if policy_rwlock taken
> *
> * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
> * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
> * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
> */
> -int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
> - char *path,
> - u16 orig_sclass,
> - u32 *sid)
> +static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
> + char *path,
> + u16 orig_sclass,
> + u32 *sid,
> + int locked)
> {
> int len;
> u16 sclass;
> @@ -2301,7 +2303,8 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
> while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
> path++;
>
> - read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> + if (!locked)
> + read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
I believe that this kind of conditional lock-taking is frowned upon in
the kernel, although I could be wrong. I think it would be cleaner to
instead just unconditionally take and release the lock around the call
to this helper in security_genfs_sid(), and not do so around the call to
it from security_fs_use().
>
> sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
> *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> @@ -2336,11 +2339,27 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
> *sid = c->sid[0];
> rc = 0;
> out:
> - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> + if (!locked)
> + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> return rc;
> }
>
> /**
> + * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
> + * @fstype: filesystem type
> + * @path: path from root of mount
> + * @sclass: file security class
> + * @sid: SID for path
> + */
> +int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
> + char *path,
> + u16 orig_sclass,
> + u32 *sid)
> +{
> + return __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid, false);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
> * @sb: superblock in question
> */
> @@ -2370,7 +2389,8 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
> }
> sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
> } else {
> - rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
> + rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
> + &sbsec->sid, true);
> if (rc) {
> sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
> rc = 0;
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-23 12:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-21 0:30 [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() Waiman Long
2014-06-23 12:34 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2014-06-23 14:30 ` Waiman Long
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