From: Waiman Long <waiman.long@hp.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid()
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 10:30:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53A83A01.2070402@hp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53A81ECD.1010001@tycho.nsa.gov>
On 06/23/2014 08:34 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 06/20/2014 08:30 PM, Waiman Long wrote:
>> v1->v2:
>> - Add an internal helper to switch on/off lock acquisition instead
>> of modifying the external API.
>>
>> With introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock() may hang
>> the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere in between.
>>
>> With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
>> reported:
>>
>> =============================================
>> [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
>> 3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G E
>> ---------------------------------------------
>> load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
>> (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
>> security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170
>>
>> but task is already holding lock:
>> (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
>> security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110
>>
>> other info that might help us debug this:
>> Possible unsafe locking scenario:
>>
>> CPU0
>> ----
>> lock(policy_rwlock);
>> lock(policy_rwlock);
>>
>> This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
>> policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() by adding a helper function
>> which has a 5th argument to indicate if the rwlock has been taken.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long<Waiman.Long@hp.com>
>> ---
>> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>> 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>> index 4bca494..5f4c1f3 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>> @@ -2277,20 +2277,22 @@ out:
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> - * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
>> + * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
>> * @fstype: filesystem type
>> * @path: path from root of mount
>> * @sclass: file security class
>> * @sid: SID for path
>> + * @locked: true if policy_rwlock taken
>> *
>> * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
>> * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
>> * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
>> */
>> -int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
>> - char *path,
>> - u16 orig_sclass,
>> - u32 *sid)
>> +static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
>> + char *path,
>> + u16 orig_sclass,
>> + u32 *sid,
>> + int locked)
>> {
>> int len;
>> u16 sclass;
>> @@ -2301,7 +2303,8 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
>> while (path[0] == '/'&& path[1] == '/')
>> path++;
>>
>> - read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
>> + if (!locked)
>> + read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> I believe that this kind of conditional lock-taking is frowned upon in
> the kernel, although I could be wrong. I think it would be cleaner to
> instead just unconditionally take and release the lock around the call
> to this helper in security_genfs_sid(), and not do so around the call to
> it from security_fs_use().
Thank for the comments. Will send out a new patch with the suggested change.
-Longman
prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-23 14:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-21 0:30 [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() Waiman Long
2014-06-23 12:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-06-23 14:30 ` Waiman Long [this message]
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