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From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	satoru.takeuchi@gmail.com, shuah.kh@samsung.com,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3.4 00/22] 3.4.99-stable review
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 21:23:51 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53C5FE57.9010404@roeck-us.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140715231622.121816073@linuxfoundation.org>

On 07/15/2014 04:17 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.99 release.
> There are 22 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu Jul 17 23:16:04 UTC 2014.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>

Build results:
	total: 117 pass: 111 fail: 6
Failed builds:
	alpha:allmodconfig
	arm:spear6xx_defconfig
	score:defconfig
	sparc64:allmodconfig
	unicore32:defconfig
	xtensa:allmodconfig

Qemu tests all passed.

Results are as expected.

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

A note on the above link and its accessibility: I have seen relentless attacks
from various sources recently. All but one of those attacks originated from
IP addresses allocated to Chinese service providers (the one exception was
an attack from an Amazon virtual host). Attacks have become more sophisticated
over time, to a point where I no longer trust my firewalls.
For this reason, I now permanently block the entire IP address range of a
service provider if an attack originates from an address range allocated
to that provider. I understand that this may bve considered a bit drastic,
but this is my server, the information on it is provided free of charge,
for the benefit of everyone, and there should be no reason to attack it.
Blame the attackers, not me.

If you have reason to believe that your address has been blocked,
I will be happy to selectively unblock it if you can show me legitimate
interest in accessing the information.

Guenter


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-07-16  4:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-15 23:17 [PATCH 3.4 00/22] 3.4.99-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 01/22] usb: option: Add ID for Telewell TW-LTE 4G v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 02/22] USB: cp210x: add support for Corsair usb dongle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 03/22] USB: ftdi_sio: Add extra PID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 04/22] cpuset,mempolicy: fix sleeping function called from invalid context Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 05/22] hwmon: (amc6821) Fix permissions for temp2_input Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 06/22] hwmon: (adm1029) Ensure the fan_div cache is updated in set_fan_div Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 07/22] powerpc/perf: Never program book3s PMCs with values >= 0x80000000 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 08/22] ext4: clarify error count warning messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 10/22] tracing: Remove ftrace_stop/start() from reading the trace file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 11/22] rtmutex: Fix deadlock detector for real Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 12/22] rtmutex: Detect changes in the pi lock chain Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 13/22] rtmutex: Handle deadlock detection smarter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 14/22] rtmutex: Plug slow unlock race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 15/22] Revert "x86-64, modify_ldt: Make support for 16-bit segments a runtime option" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 16/22] x86-64, espfix: Dont leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 17/22] x86, espfix: Move espfix definitions into a separate header file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 18/22] x86, espfix: Fix broken header guard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 19/22] x86, espfix: Make espfix64 a Kconfig option, fix UML Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 20/22] x86, espfix: Make it possible to disable 16-bit support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 21/22] x86, ioremap: Speed up check for RAM pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-15 23:17 ` [PATCH 3.4 22/22] ACPI / battery: Retry to get battery information if failed during probing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-16  4:23 ` Guenter Roeck [this message]
2014-07-16 23:10 ` [PATCH 3.4 00/22] 3.4.99-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-07-17 13:25 ` Shuah Khan

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