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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>,
	Zhang Yang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] KVM: nVMX: introduce apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 12:50:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53F47D7E.1080306@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1408527905-11705-2-git-send-email-wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>

Il 20/08/2014 11:45, Wanpeng Li ha scritto:
> Introduce apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid() to check the valid 
> of nested apic access page and virtual apic page earlier.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
>  1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index caf239d..02bc07d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -7838,6 +7838,50 @@ static void vmx_inject_page_fault_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  		kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
>  }
>  
> +static bool apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> +						struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
> +{
> +	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> +
> +	if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
> +		if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(vmcs12->apic_access_addr))
> +			/*TODO: Also verify bits beyond physical address width are 0*/
> +			return false;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Translate L1 physical address to host physical
> +		 * address for vmcs02. Keep the page pinned, so this
> +		 * physical address remains valid. We keep a reference
> +		 * to it so we can release it later.
> +		 */
> +		if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) /* shouldn't happen */
> +			nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
> +		vmx->nested.apic_access_page =
> +			nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->apic_access_addr);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) {
> +		if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page) /* shouldn't happen */
> +			nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
> +		vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page =
> +			nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Failing the vm entry is _not_ what the processor does
> +		 * but it's basically the only possibility we have.
> +		 * We could still enter the guest if CR8 load exits are
> +		 * enabled, CR8 store exits are enabled, and virtualize APIC
> +		 * access is disabled; in this case the processor would never
> +		 * use the TPR shadow and we could simply clear the bit from
> +		 * the execution control.  But such a configuration is useless,
> +		 * so let's keep the code simple.
> +		 */
> +		if (!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
> +			return false;
> +	}
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
>  static void vmx_start_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
>  	u64 preemption_timeout = get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vmx_preemption_timer_value;
> @@ -7984,16 +8028,6 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>  
>  		if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) {
>  			/*
> -			 * Translate L1 physical address to host physical
> -			 * address for vmcs02. Keep the page pinned, so this
> -			 * physical address remains valid. We keep a reference
> -			 * to it so we can release it later.
> -			 */
> -			if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) /* shouldn't happen */
> -				nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
> -			vmx->nested.apic_access_page =
> -				nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->apic_access_addr);
> -			/*
>  			 * If translation failed, no matter: This feature asks
>  			 * to exit when accessing the given address, and if it
>  			 * can never be accessed, this feature won't do
> @@ -8040,30 +8074,8 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>  	exec_control |= vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
>  
>  	if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
> -		if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
> -			nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
> -		vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page =
> -		   nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr);
> -		if (!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
> -			exec_control &=
> -				~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
> -		else
> -			vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
> +		vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
>  				page_to_phys(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page));
> -
> -		/*
> -		 * Failing the vm entry is _not_ what the processor does
> -		 * but it's basically the only possibility we have.
> -		 * We could still enter the guest if CR8 load exits are
> -		 * enabled, CR8 store exits are enabled, and virtualize APIC
> -		 * access is disabled; in this case the processor would never
> -		 * use the TPR shadow and we could simply clear the bit from
> -		 * the execution control.  But such a configuration is useless,
> -		 * so let's keep the code simple.
> -		 */
> -		if (!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
> -			nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
> -
>  		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, vmcs12->tpr_threshold);
>  	} else if (vm_need_tpr_shadow(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
>  		vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
> @@ -8230,9 +8242,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
>  		return 1;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) &&
> -			!PAGE_ALIGNED(vmcs12->apic_access_addr)) {
> -		/*TODO: Also verify bits beyond physical address width are 0*/
> +	if (!apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
>  		nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
>  		return 1;
>  	}
> 

Thanks Wanpeng.  The code now looks good.  Just one thing: please swap
them, so that the series remains bisectable.

Also, I think nested_get_vmcs12_pages would be a better name for the
function.  apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid doesn't hint at the side
effects of the function (for example calling nested_get_page).

The way I swap patches is by using "git checkout -p" like this:

 git branch  tpr-shadow-old
 git reset --hard HEAD^^
 git checkout -p tpr-shadow-old
     ... pick hunks related to the second patch ...
 git commit -c tpr-shadow-old
     ... edit commit message if needed ...
 git checkout -p tpr-shadow-old
     ... pick hunks related to the first patch ...
 git commit -C tpr-shadow-old^
     ... edit commit message if needed ...
 git diff tpr-shadow-old HEAD

Paolo

  reply	other threads:[~2014-08-20 10:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-08-20  9:45 [PATCH v5 1/2] KVM: nVMX: nested TPR shadow/threshold emulation Wanpeng Li
2014-08-20  9:45 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] KVM: nVMX: introduce apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid Wanpeng Li
2014-08-20 10:50   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2014-08-21  8:08     ` Wanpeng Li
2014-08-21  9:31       ` Paolo Bonzini

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