linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: <peterz@infradead.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tj@kernel.org>,
	<akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <cgroups@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <fernando_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Subject: Re: Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics
Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2014 13:55:54 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <541D16EA.70407@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201409192053.IHJ35462.JLOMOSOFFVtQFH@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

> Then, what made current->flags to unexpectedly preserve PF_USED_MATH flag?
> The user is running cgrulesengd process in order to utilize cpuset cgroup.
> Thus, cpuset_update_task_spread_flag() is called when cgrulesengd process
> writes someone's pid to /cgroup/cpuset/$group/tasks interface.
> 
> cpuset_update_task_spread_flag() is updating other thread's
> "struct task_struct"->flags without exclusion control or atomic
> operations!
> 
> ---------- linux-2.6.32-358.23.2.el6/kernel/cpuset.c ----------
> 300:/*
> 301: * update task's spread flag if cpuset's page/slab spread flag is set
> 302: *
> 303: * Called with callback_mutex/cgroup_mutex held
> 304: */
> 305:static void cpuset_update_task_spread_flag(struct cpuset *cs,
> 306:                                    struct task_struct *tsk)
> 307:{
> 308:    if (is_spread_page(cs))
> 309:            tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
> 310:    else
> 311:            tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
> 312:    if (is_spread_slab(cs))
> 313:            tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
> 314:    else
> 315:            tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
> 316:}

We should make the updating of this flag atomic.

diff --git a/include/linux/cpuset.h b/include/linux/cpuset.h
index 0d4e067..2f073db 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpuset.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpuset.h
@@ -94,12 +94,12 @@ extern int cpuset_slab_spread_node(void);
 
 static inline int cpuset_do_page_mem_spread(void)
 {
-	return current->flags & PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
+	return task_spread_page(current);
 }
 
 static inline int cpuset_do_slab_mem_spread(void)
 {
-	return current->flags & PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
+	return task_spread_slab(current);
 }
 
 extern int current_cpuset_is_being_rebound(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 5c2c885..1e448a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1903,8 +1903,6 @@ extern void thread_group_cputime_adjusted(struct task_struct *p, cputime_t *ut,
 #define PF_KTHREAD	0x00200000	/* I am a kernel thread */
 #define PF_RANDOMIZE	0x00400000	/* randomize virtual address space */
 #define PF_SWAPWRITE	0x00800000	/* Allowed to write to swap */
-#define PF_SPREAD_PAGE	0x01000000	/* Spread page cache over cpuset */
-#define PF_SPREAD_SLAB	0x02000000	/* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
 #define PF_NO_SETAFFINITY 0x04000000	/* Userland is not allowed to meddle with cpus_allowed */
 #define PF_MCE_EARLY    0x08000000      /* Early kill for mce process policy */
 #define PF_MUTEX_TESTER	0x20000000	/* Thread belongs to the rt mutex tester */
@@ -1958,6 +1956,8 @@ static inline void memalloc_noio_restore(unsigned int flags)
 
 /* Per-process atomic flags. */
 #define PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS 0x00000001	/* May not gain new privileges. */
+#define PFA_SPREAD_PAGE  0x00000002	/* Spread page cache over cpuset */
+#define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB  0x00000004	/* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
 
 static inline bool task_no_new_privs(struct task_struct *p)
 {
@@ -1969,6 +1969,36 @@ static inline void task_set_no_new_privs(struct task_struct *p)
 	set_bit(PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS, &p->atomic_flags);
 }
 
+static inline bool task_spread_page(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return test_bit(PFA_SPREAD_PAGE, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_set_spread_page(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	set_bit(PFA_SPREAD_PAGE, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_clear_spread_page(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	clear_bit(PFA_SPREAD_PAGE, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline bool task_spread_slab(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return test_bit(PFA_SPREAD_SLAB, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_set_spread_slab(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	set_bit(PFA_SPREAD_SLAB, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_clear_spread_slab(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	clear_bit(PFA_SPREAD_SLAB, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
 /*
  * task->jobctl flags
  */
diff --git a/kernel/cpuset.c b/kernel/cpuset.c
index a37f4ed..1f107c7 100644
--- a/kernel/cpuset.c
+++ b/kernel/cpuset.c
@@ -365,13 +365,14 @@ static void cpuset_update_task_spread_flag(struct cpuset *cs,
 					struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	if (is_spread_page(cs))
-		tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
+		task_set_spread_page(tsk);
 	else
-		tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
+		task_clear_spread_page(tsk);
+
 	if (is_spread_slab(cs))
-		tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
+		task_set_spread_slab(tsk);
 	else
-		tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
+		task_clear_spread_slab(tsk);
 }
 
 /*



  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-09-20  5:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-19 11:53 Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-19 22:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-09-20  5:55 ` Zefan Li [this message]
2014-09-20 10:40   ` [PATCH 3.17-rc5] Fix confusing PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS constant Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-20 17:19     ` Kees Cook
2014-09-20 14:30   ` Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics Peter Zijlstra
2014-09-20 17:15     ` Kees Cook
2014-09-20 18:04       ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-09-20 17:28   ` Tejun Heo
2014-09-21  5:15     ` Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-22  2:15       ` Zefan Li

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=541D16EA.70407@huawei.com \
    --to=lizefan@huawei.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=cgroups@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=fernando_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=tj@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).