From: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: <peterz@infradead.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tj@kernel.org>,
<akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <cgroups@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <fernando_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Subject: Re: Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics
Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2014 13:55:54 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <541D16EA.70407@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201409192053.IHJ35462.JLOMOSOFFVtQFH@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> Then, what made current->flags to unexpectedly preserve PF_USED_MATH flag?
> The user is running cgrulesengd process in order to utilize cpuset cgroup.
> Thus, cpuset_update_task_spread_flag() is called when cgrulesengd process
> writes someone's pid to /cgroup/cpuset/$group/tasks interface.
>
> cpuset_update_task_spread_flag() is updating other thread's
> "struct task_struct"->flags without exclusion control or atomic
> operations!
>
> ---------- linux-2.6.32-358.23.2.el6/kernel/cpuset.c ----------
> 300:/*
> 301: * update task's spread flag if cpuset's page/slab spread flag is set
> 302: *
> 303: * Called with callback_mutex/cgroup_mutex held
> 304: */
> 305:static void cpuset_update_task_spread_flag(struct cpuset *cs,
> 306: struct task_struct *tsk)
> 307:{
> 308: if (is_spread_page(cs))
> 309: tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
> 310: else
> 311: tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
> 312: if (is_spread_slab(cs))
> 313: tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
> 314: else
> 315: tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
> 316:}
We should make the updating of this flag atomic.
diff --git a/include/linux/cpuset.h b/include/linux/cpuset.h
index 0d4e067..2f073db 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpuset.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpuset.h
@@ -94,12 +94,12 @@ extern int cpuset_slab_spread_node(void);
static inline int cpuset_do_page_mem_spread(void)
{
- return current->flags & PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
+ return task_spread_page(current);
}
static inline int cpuset_do_slab_mem_spread(void)
{
- return current->flags & PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
+ return task_spread_slab(current);
}
extern int current_cpuset_is_being_rebound(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 5c2c885..1e448a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1903,8 +1903,6 @@ extern void thread_group_cputime_adjusted(struct task_struct *p, cputime_t *ut,
#define PF_KTHREAD 0x00200000 /* I am a kernel thread */
#define PF_RANDOMIZE 0x00400000 /* randomize virtual address space */
#define PF_SWAPWRITE 0x00800000 /* Allowed to write to swap */
-#define PF_SPREAD_PAGE 0x01000000 /* Spread page cache over cpuset */
-#define PF_SPREAD_SLAB 0x02000000 /* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
#define PF_NO_SETAFFINITY 0x04000000 /* Userland is not allowed to meddle with cpus_allowed */
#define PF_MCE_EARLY 0x08000000 /* Early kill for mce process policy */
#define PF_MUTEX_TESTER 0x20000000 /* Thread belongs to the rt mutex tester */
@@ -1958,6 +1956,8 @@ static inline void memalloc_noio_restore(unsigned int flags)
/* Per-process atomic flags. */
#define PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS 0x00000001 /* May not gain new privileges. */
+#define PFA_SPREAD_PAGE 0x00000002 /* Spread page cache over cpuset */
+#define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB 0x00000004 /* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
static inline bool task_no_new_privs(struct task_struct *p)
{
@@ -1969,6 +1969,36 @@ static inline void task_set_no_new_privs(struct task_struct *p)
set_bit(PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS, &p->atomic_flags);
}
+static inline bool task_spread_page(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return test_bit(PFA_SPREAD_PAGE, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_set_spread_page(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ set_bit(PFA_SPREAD_PAGE, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_clear_spread_page(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ clear_bit(PFA_SPREAD_PAGE, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline bool task_spread_slab(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return test_bit(PFA_SPREAD_SLAB, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_set_spread_slab(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ set_bit(PFA_SPREAD_SLAB, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_clear_spread_slab(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ clear_bit(PFA_SPREAD_SLAB, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
/*
* task->jobctl flags
*/
diff --git a/kernel/cpuset.c b/kernel/cpuset.c
index a37f4ed..1f107c7 100644
--- a/kernel/cpuset.c
+++ b/kernel/cpuset.c
@@ -365,13 +365,14 @@ static void cpuset_update_task_spread_flag(struct cpuset *cs,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (is_spread_page(cs))
- tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
+ task_set_spread_page(tsk);
else
- tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
+ task_clear_spread_page(tsk);
+
if (is_spread_slab(cs))
- tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
+ task_set_spread_slab(tsk);
else
- tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
+ task_clear_spread_slab(tsk);
}
/*
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-09-20 5:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-19 11:53 Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-19 22:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-09-20 5:55 ` Zefan Li [this message]
2014-09-20 10:40 ` [PATCH 3.17-rc5] Fix confusing PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS constant Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-20 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2014-09-20 14:30 ` Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics Peter Zijlstra
2014-09-20 17:15 ` Kees Cook
2014-09-20 18:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-09-20 17:28 ` Tejun Heo
2014-09-21 5:15 ` Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-22 2:15 ` Zefan Li
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