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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	"Serge H. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/5] fuse: Restrict allow_other to uids already controlled by the user
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 07:58:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <543E8BB3.6040701@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1413296756-25071-4-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

On 10/14/2014 07:25 AM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
> allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed
> for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such
> cases allow_other should not allow users outside the user
> namespace to access the mount as doing so would give the
> unprivileged user the ability to manipulate processes it would
> otherwise be unable to manipulate.

What threat is this intended to protect against?  I think that, if this
is needed, tasks outside the userns or its descendents should be
blocked, even if the user ids match.  That is, I think you should check
the namespace, not the uid and gid.

--Andy

> 
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
> Cc: Serge H. Hallyn <serge.hallyn-GeWIH/nMZzLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  fs/fuse/dir.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> index 123db1e06c78..e3123bfbc711 100644
> --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> @@ -1089,12 +1089,20 @@ int fuse_reverse_inval_entry(struct super_block *sb, u64 parent_nodeid,
>   */
>  int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
>  {
> -	const struct cred *cred;
> +	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>  
> -	if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER)
> -		return 1;
> +	if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER) {
> +		if (kuid_has_mapping(fc->user_ns, cred->euid) &&
> +		    kuid_has_mapping(fc->user_ns, cred->suid) &&
> +		    kuid_has_mapping(fc->user_ns, cred->uid) &&
> +		    kgid_has_mapping(fc->user_ns, cred->egid) &&
> +		    kgid_has_mapping(fc->user_ns, cred->sgid) &&
> +		    kgid_has_mapping(fc->user_ns, cred->gid))
> +			return 1;
> +
> +		return 0;
> +	}
>  
> -	cred = current_cred();
>  	if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) &&
>  	    uid_eq(cred->suid, fc->user_id) &&
>  	    uid_eq(cred->uid,  fc->user_id) &&
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2014-10-15 14:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-10-14 14:25 [PATCH v4 0/5] fuse: Add support for mounts from pid/user namespaces Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 14:49   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 15:05     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 17:05       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 22:59         ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 23:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 23:24             ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] fuse: Restrict allow_other to uids already controlled by the user Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 14:58   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2014-10-15 15:11     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] fuse: Support privileged xattrs only with a mount option Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 18:12   ` [fuse-devel] " Michael j Theall
2014-10-14 20:01     ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-14 20:59       ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 21:13         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-14 21:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-14 21:29             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-15  7:39             ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 14:37               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-21 21:21                 ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-21 21:27                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-21 21:34                     ` Michael j Theall
2014-10-21 21:44                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-22  4:58                     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-23 18:32                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-23 21:24                         ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 14:58   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 15:20     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 23:08       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 23:07     ` Seth Forshee

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