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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Ismael Ripoll" <iripoll@upv.es>,
	"Hector Marco-Gisbert" <hecmargi@upv.es>,
	"Jan-Simon Möller" <dl9pf@gmx.de>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2015 12:49:04 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <54E257C0.9080304@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net>

On 02/14/2015 09:33 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> From: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
>
> The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit
> architectures due to an integer overflow.
>
> The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c":
>
> static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
> {
>           unsigned int random_variable = 0;
>
>           if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
>                   !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
>                   random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
>                   random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
>           }
>           return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
>           return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
> }
>
> Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since
> the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is
> 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
>
> random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
> "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the
> (22+12) result.
>
> These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
> Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One
> fourth of expected entropy).
>
> This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the
> operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size().
>
> The successful fix can be tested with:
> $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
> 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
> 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
> 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
> 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
> ...
>
> Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather
> than always being 7fff.
>
> CVE-2015-1593

Awesome.  So the vdso randomization *and* the stack randomization 
implementations were buggy.  Anyone want to check the mmap and brk 
randomization implementations?

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2015-02-16 20:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-02-14 17:33 [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems Kees Cook
2015-02-16 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2015-02-18  3:27   ` Kees Cook
2015-02-18  9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2015-02-18 20:11   ` Andrew Morton
2015-02-18 20:19     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-02-18 20:25       ` Borislav Petkov
2015-02-18 20:26         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-02-19 19:27 ` [tip:x86/urgent] x86, mm/ASLR: Fix " tip-bot for Hector Marco-Gisbert

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