public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: mtk.manpages@gmail.com,
	Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] proc.5: Document /proc/[pid]/setgroups
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 08:57:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <54E83A55.9080408@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54DCB059.2020305@gmail.com>

Hi Eric,

Ping!

Cheers,

Michael


On 02/12/2015 02:53 PM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
> Hello Eric,
> 
> On 02/11/2015 02:51 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> writes:
>>
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> Ping!
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Michael
>>
>> My apologies.  You description wasn't wrong but it may be a bit
>> misleading, explanation below.  You will have to figure out how to work
>> that into your proposed text.
>>
>>> On 2 February 2015 at 16:36, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
>>> <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> [Adding Josh to CC in case he has anything to add.]
>>>>
>>>> On 12/12/2014 10:54 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>  man5/proc.5 | 15 +++++++++++++++
>>>>>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/man5/proc.5 b/man5/proc.5
>>>>> index 96077d0dd195..d661e8cfeac9 100644
>>>>> --- a/man5/proc.5
>>>>> +++ b/man5/proc.5
>>>>> @@ -1097,6 +1097,21 @@ are not available if the main thread has already terminated
>>>>>  .\"       Added in 2.6.9
>>>>>  .\"       CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
>>>>>  .TP
>>>>> +.IR /proc/[pid]/setgroups " (since Linux 3.19-rc1)"
>>>>> +This file reports
>>>>> +.BR allow
>>>>> +if the setgroups system call is allowed in the current user namespace.
>>>>> +This file reports
>>>>> +.BR deny
>>>>> +if the setgroups system call is not allowed in the current user namespace.
>>>>> +This file may be written to with values of
>>>>> +.BR allow
>>>>> +and
>>>>> +.BR deny
>>>>> +before
>>>>> +.IR /proc/[pid]/gid_map
>>>>> +is written to (enabling setgroups) in a user namespace.
>>>>> +.TP
>>>>>  .IR /proc/[pid]/smaps " (since Linux 2.6.14)"
>>>>>  This file shows memory consumption for each of the process's mappings.
>>>>>  (The
>>>>
>>>> Hi Eric,
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for this patch. I applied it, and then tried to work in
>>>> quite a few other details gleaned from the source code and commit
>>>> message, and Jon Corbet's article at http://lwn.net/Articles/626665/.
>>>> Could you please let me know if the following is correct:
>>
>> It is close but it may be misleading.
>>
>>>>     /proc/[pid]/setgroups (since Linux 3.19)
>>>>            This file displays the string "allow"  if  processes  in
>>>>            the  user  namespace  that  contains the process pid are
>>>>            permitted to employ the setgroups(2)  system  call,  and
>>>>            "deny"  if  setgroups(2)  is  not permitted in that user
>>>>            namespace.
>>
>> With the caveat that when gid_map is not set that setgroups is also not
>> allowed.
> 
> Okay -- Iadded that point.
> 
>>>>            A privileged process (one with the  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  capa‐
>>>>            bility in the namespace) may write either of the strings
>>>>            "allow" or "deny" to this file before writing a group ID
>>>>            mapping   for   this   user   namespace   to   the  file
>>>>            /proc/[pid]/gid_map.  Writing the string "deny" prevents
>>>>            any  process  in  the user namespace from employing set‐
>>>>            groups(2).
>>
>> Or more succintly.  You are allowed to write to /proc/[pid]/setgroups
>> when calling setgroups is not allowed because gid_map is unset.  This
>> ensures we do not have any transitions from a state where setgroups
>> is allowed to a state where setgroups is denied.  There are only
>> transitions from setgroups not-allowed to setgroups allowed.
> 
> And I've worked in the above point, rewording a bit along the way.
> So, how does the following look (only the first two paragraphs have
> changed)?
> 
>        /proc/[pid]/setgroups (since Linux 3.19)
>               This file displays the string "allow"  if  processes  in
>               the  user  namespace  that  contains the process pid are
>               permitted to employ the setgroups(2)  system  call,  and
>               "deny"  if  setgroups(2)  is  not permitted in that user
>               namespace.  (Note, however, that calls  to  setgroups(2)
>               are  also  not  permitted if /proc/[pid]/gid_map has not
>               yet been set.)
> 
>               A privileged process (one with the  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  capa‐
>               bility in the namespace) may write either of the strings
>               "allow" or "deny" to this file before writing a group ID
>               mapping   for   this   user   namespace   to   the  file
>               /proc/[pid]/gid_map.  Writing the string "deny" prevents
>               any  process  in  the user namespace from employing set‐
>               groups(2).  In other words, it is permitted to write  to
>               /proc/[pid]/setgroups so long as calling setgroups(2) is
>               not allowed because /proc/[pid]gid_map has not been set.
>               This  ensures  that  a  process cannot transition from a
>               state where setgroups(2) is allowed  to  a  state  where
>               setgroups(2)  is  denied;  a process can only trabsition
>               from setgroups(2) being disallowed to setgroups(2) being
>               allowed.
> 
>               The  default  value  of  this  file  in the initial user
>               namespace is "allow".
> 
>               Once /proc/[pid]/gid_map has been written to (which  has
>               the  effect  of enabling setgroups(2) in the user names‐
>               pace), it is no longer possible to deny setgroups(2)  by
>               writing to /proc/[pid]/setgroups.
> 
>               A  child user namespace inherits the /proc/[pid]/gid_map
>               setting from its parent.
> 
>               If the setgroups file has the  value  "deny",  then  the
>               setgroups(2) system call can't subsequently be reenabled
>               (by writing "allow" to the file) in this user namespace.
>               This  restriction also propagates down to all child user
>               namespaces of this user namespace.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Michael
> 
> 
> 


-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/

  reply	other threads:[~2015-02-21  7:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-11-29 17:26 [PATCH v2] userns: Disallow setgroups unless the gid_map writer is privileged Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 12:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 18:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 19:45     ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:13       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 20:25         ` [CFT][PATCH 1/3] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:28           ` [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:30             ` [CFT][PATCH 3/3] userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 21:05             ` [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 21:45               ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:17                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 23:07                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 23:17                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:06                       ` [CFT][PATCH 1/7] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:07                         ` [CFT][PATCH 2/7] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:11                           ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]                             ` <87h9x5ok0h.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-08 22:33                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:17                           ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-08 22:25                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:27                               ` Richard Weinberger
     [not found]                                 ` <874mt5ojfh.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-08 22:47                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:07                         ` [CFT][PATCH 3/7] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:08                         ` [CFT][PATCH 4/7] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:12                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:10                         ` [CFT][PATCH 5/7] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:15                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:11                         ` [CFT][PATCH 6/7] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:21                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:44                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:48                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 23:30                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 19:31                                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:36                                     ` [CFT][PATCH 1/8] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:38                                       ` [CFT][PATCH 2/8] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:49                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:39                                       ` [CFT][PATCH 3/8] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 23:00                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:39                                       ` [CFT][PATCH 4/8] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:41                                       ` [CFT][PATCH 5/8] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:41                                       ` [CFT][PATCH 6/8] userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:49                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:42                                       ` [CFT][PATCH 7/8] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:28                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]                                           ` <971ad3f6-90fd-4e3f-916c-8988af3c826d@email.android.com>
2014-12-10  0:21                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]                                               ` <87wq5zf83t.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
     [not found]                                                 ` <87iohh3c9c.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-12  1:30                                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]                                                   ` <8761dh3b7k.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
     [not found]                                                     ` <878uicy1r9.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-12 21:54                                                       ` [PATCH 1/2] proc.5: Document /proc/[pid]/setgroups Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-02 15:36                                                         ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11  8:01                                                           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 13:51                                                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-12 13:53                                                               ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-21  7:57                                                                 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) [this message]
2015-03-03 11:39                                                                 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-12-12 21:54                                                       ` [PATCH 2/2] user_namespaces.7: Update the documention to reflect the fixes for negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-02 15:37                                                         ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11  8:02                                                           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 14:01                                                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-12 10:11                                                               ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-02 21:31                                                         ` Alban Crequy
2015-03-04 14:00                                                           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-12-09 20:43                                       ` [CFT][PATCH 8/8] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-10 16:39                                       ` [CFT] Can I get some Tested-By's on this series? Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-10 22:48                                         ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-10 22:50                                           ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-10 23:19                                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-11 19:27                                               ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-12  6:56                                               ` Chen, Hanxiao
2014-12-13 22:31                                           ` serge
     [not found]                                           ` <87lhmcy2et.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
     [not found]                                             ` <20141212220840.GF22091@castiana.ipv6.teksavvy.com>
     [not found]                                               ` <8761dgze56.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-15 19:38                                                 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-15 20:11                                                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-15 20:49                                                     ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-16  2:05                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-16  9:23                                           ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-08 22:14                         ` [CFT][PATCH 7/7] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:26                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 20:58           ` [CFT][PATCH 1/3] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 21:26             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:09               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 22:48                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:56                   ` Andy Lutomirski

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=54E83A55.9080408@gmail.com \
    --to=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=josh@joshtriplett.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kenton@sandstorm.io \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-man@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=richard@nod.at \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox