From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: mtk.manpages@gmail.com,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] proc.5: Document /proc/[pid]/setgroups
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2015 08:57:09 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <54E83A55.9080408@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54DCB059.2020305@gmail.com>
Hi Eric,
Ping!
Cheers,
Michael
On 02/12/2015 02:53 PM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
> Hello Eric,
>
> On 02/11/2015 02:51 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> writes:
>>
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> Ping!
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Michael
>>
>> My apologies. You description wasn't wrong but it may be a bit
>> misleading, explanation below. You will have to figure out how to work
>> that into your proposed text.
>>
>>> On 2 February 2015 at 16:36, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
>>> <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> [Adding Josh to CC in case he has anything to add.]
>>>>
>>>> On 12/12/2014 10:54 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> man5/proc.5 | 15 +++++++++++++++
>>>>> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/man5/proc.5 b/man5/proc.5
>>>>> index 96077d0dd195..d661e8cfeac9 100644
>>>>> --- a/man5/proc.5
>>>>> +++ b/man5/proc.5
>>>>> @@ -1097,6 +1097,21 @@ are not available if the main thread has already terminated
>>>>> .\" Added in 2.6.9
>>>>> .\" CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
>>>>> .TP
>>>>> +.IR /proc/[pid]/setgroups " (since Linux 3.19-rc1)"
>>>>> +This file reports
>>>>> +.BR allow
>>>>> +if the setgroups system call is allowed in the current user namespace.
>>>>> +This file reports
>>>>> +.BR deny
>>>>> +if the setgroups system call is not allowed in the current user namespace.
>>>>> +This file may be written to with values of
>>>>> +.BR allow
>>>>> +and
>>>>> +.BR deny
>>>>> +before
>>>>> +.IR /proc/[pid]/gid_map
>>>>> +is written to (enabling setgroups) in a user namespace.
>>>>> +.TP
>>>>> .IR /proc/[pid]/smaps " (since Linux 2.6.14)"
>>>>> This file shows memory consumption for each of the process's mappings.
>>>>> (The
>>>>
>>>> Hi Eric,
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for this patch. I applied it, and then tried to work in
>>>> quite a few other details gleaned from the source code and commit
>>>> message, and Jon Corbet's article at http://lwn.net/Articles/626665/.
>>>> Could you please let me know if the following is correct:
>>
>> It is close but it may be misleading.
>>
>>>> /proc/[pid]/setgroups (since Linux 3.19)
>>>> This file displays the string "allow" if processes in
>>>> the user namespace that contains the process pid are
>>>> permitted to employ the setgroups(2) system call, and
>>>> "deny" if setgroups(2) is not permitted in that user
>>>> namespace.
>>
>> With the caveat that when gid_map is not set that setgroups is also not
>> allowed.
>
> Okay -- Iadded that point.
>
>>>> A privileged process (one with the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capa‐
>>>> bility in the namespace) may write either of the strings
>>>> "allow" or "deny" to this file before writing a group ID
>>>> mapping for this user namespace to the file
>>>> /proc/[pid]/gid_map. Writing the string "deny" prevents
>>>> any process in the user namespace from employing set‐
>>>> groups(2).
>>
>> Or more succintly. You are allowed to write to /proc/[pid]/setgroups
>> when calling setgroups is not allowed because gid_map is unset. This
>> ensures we do not have any transitions from a state where setgroups
>> is allowed to a state where setgroups is denied. There are only
>> transitions from setgroups not-allowed to setgroups allowed.
>
> And I've worked in the above point, rewording a bit along the way.
> So, how does the following look (only the first two paragraphs have
> changed)?
>
> /proc/[pid]/setgroups (since Linux 3.19)
> This file displays the string "allow" if processes in
> the user namespace that contains the process pid are
> permitted to employ the setgroups(2) system call, and
> "deny" if setgroups(2) is not permitted in that user
> namespace. (Note, however, that calls to setgroups(2)
> are also not permitted if /proc/[pid]/gid_map has not
> yet been set.)
>
> A privileged process (one with the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capa‐
> bility in the namespace) may write either of the strings
> "allow" or "deny" to this file before writing a group ID
> mapping for this user namespace to the file
> /proc/[pid]/gid_map. Writing the string "deny" prevents
> any process in the user namespace from employing set‐
> groups(2). In other words, it is permitted to write to
> /proc/[pid]/setgroups so long as calling setgroups(2) is
> not allowed because /proc/[pid]gid_map has not been set.
> This ensures that a process cannot transition from a
> state where setgroups(2) is allowed to a state where
> setgroups(2) is denied; a process can only trabsition
> from setgroups(2) being disallowed to setgroups(2) being
> allowed.
>
> The default value of this file in the initial user
> namespace is "allow".
>
> Once /proc/[pid]/gid_map has been written to (which has
> the effect of enabling setgroups(2) in the user names‐
> pace), it is no longer possible to deny setgroups(2) by
> writing to /proc/[pid]/setgroups.
>
> A child user namespace inherits the /proc/[pid]/gid_map
> setting from its parent.
>
> If the setgroups file has the value "deny", then the
> setgroups(2) system call can't subsequently be reenabled
> (by writing "allow" to the file) in this user namespace.
> This restriction also propagates down to all child user
> namespaces of this user namespace.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Michael
>
>
>
--
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-02-21 7:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-11-29 17:26 [PATCH v2] userns: Disallow setgroups unless the gid_map writer is privileged Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 12:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 18:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 19:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 20:25 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/3] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:28 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 20:30 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/3] userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 21:05 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/3] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 21:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 23:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 23:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:06 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/7] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/7] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <87h9x5ok0h.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-08 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:17 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-08 22:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:27 ` Richard Weinberger
[not found] ` <874mt5ojfh.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-08 22:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:07 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/7] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:08 ` [CFT][PATCH 4/7] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:10 ` [CFT][PATCH 5/7] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:11 ` [CFT][PATCH 6/7] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 22:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-08 23:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 19:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:36 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/8] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:38 ` [CFT][PATCH 2/8] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:39 ` [CFT][PATCH 3/8] userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 23:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:39 ` [CFT][PATCH 4/8] userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:41 ` [CFT][PATCH 5/8] userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 20:41 ` [CFT][PATCH 6/8] userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-09 20:42 ` [CFT][PATCH 7/8] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-09 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <971ad3f6-90fd-4e3f-916c-8988af3c826d@email.android.com>
2014-12-10 0:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <87wq5zf83t.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <87iohh3c9c.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-12 1:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <8761dh3b7k.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <878uicy1r9.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-12 21:54 ` [PATCH 1/2] proc.5: Document /proc/[pid]/setgroups Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-02 15:36 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 8:01 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 13:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-12 13:53 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-21 7:57 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) [this message]
2015-03-03 11:39 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-12-12 21:54 ` [PATCH 2/2] user_namespaces.7: Update the documention to reflect the fixes for negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-02 15:37 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 8:02 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-11 14:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-02-12 10:11 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2015-02-02 21:31 ` Alban Crequy
2015-03-04 14:00 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-12-09 20:43 ` [CFT][PATCH 8/8] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-10 16:39 ` [CFT] Can I get some Tested-By's on this series? Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-10 22:48 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-10 22:50 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-10 23:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-11 19:27 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-12 6:56 ` Chen, Hanxiao
2014-12-13 22:31 ` serge
[not found] ` <87lhmcy2et.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <20141212220840.GF22091@castiana.ipv6.teksavvy.com>
[not found] ` <8761dgze56.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-12-15 19:38 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-15 20:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-15 20:49 ` Serge Hallyn
2014-12-16 2:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-16 9:23 ` Richard Weinberger
2014-12-08 22:14 ` [CFT][PATCH 7/7] userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-08 22:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 20:58 ` [CFT][PATCH 1/3] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 21:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-02 22:48 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-12-02 22:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
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