* [PATCH] x86, traps: maps all IDTs to fixmap area.
@ 2015-02-26 7:06 Wang Nan
2015-02-26 15:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Wang Nan @ 2015-02-26 7:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: masami.hiramatsu.pt, rostedt
Cc: mingo, hpa, tglx, x86, luto, oleg, dave.hansen, linux-kernel,
lizefan
The reason why mapping idt_table to fixmap area should also be applied
to debug_idt_table and trace_idt_table. This patch does same thing for
all IDTs.
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
---
I believe trace_idt_table and debug_idt_table should be symmetrical with
idt_table. However, Like my previous patch 'x86, traps: install gates
using IST after cpu_init()', I'm not sure whether this is a practical
fix.
---
arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 13 +++++++++++--
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
index f80d700..79550f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_END = FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0 + MAX_IO_APICS - 1,
#endif
FIX_RO_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only IDT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only debug_idt_table */
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
+ FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only trace_idt_table */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
FIX_KMAP_BEGIN, /* reserved pte's for temporary kernel mappings */
FIX_KMAP_END = FIX_KMAP_BEGIN+(KM_TYPE_NR*NR_CPUS)-1,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
index 1c113db..296e130 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ atomic_t trace_idt_ctr = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
struct desc_ptr trace_idt_descr = { NR_VECTORS * 16 - 1,
(unsigned long) trace_idt_table };
-/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
+/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
gate_desc trace_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
static int trace_irq_vector_refcount;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index cf7898e..6d88c37 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
-/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
+/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
gate_desc debug_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
#else
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -998,9 +998,18 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
* Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
* "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
* to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
- * It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
+ * It will be reloaded in cpu_init()
+ */
__set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, __pa_symbol(debug_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+ debug_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
+ __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, __pa_symbol(trace_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+ trace_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT);
+#endif
/*
* Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
index adca9e2..1fd4a4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
@@ -1984,6 +1984,12 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
switch (idx) {
case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN:
case FIX_RO_IDT:
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ case FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT:
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
+ case FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT:
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
case FIX_WP_TEST:
# ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
--
1.8.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86, traps: maps all IDTs to fixmap area.
2015-02-26 7:06 [PATCH] x86, traps: maps all IDTs to fixmap area Wang Nan
@ 2015-02-26 15:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-26 16:45 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2015-02-26 15:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wang Nan, Kees Cook
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu, Steven Rostedt, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Thomas Gleixner, X86 ML, Oleg Nesterov, Dave Hansen,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Li Zefan
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 11:06 PM, Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> wrote:
> The reason why mapping idt_table to fixmap area should also be applied
> to debug_idt_table and trace_idt_table. This patch does same thing for
> all IDTs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> I believe trace_idt_table and debug_idt_table should be symmetrical with
> idt_table. However, Like my previous patch 'x86, traps: install gates
> using IST after cpu_init()', I'm not sure whether this is a practical
> fix.
It shouldn't matter, since we should never enter userspace with these
IDTs loaded.
--Andy
[patch kept below for Kees' benefit]
>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 6 ++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 13 +++++++++++--
> arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 6 ++++++
> 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
> index f80d700..79550f4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
> @@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
> FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_END = FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0 + MAX_IO_APICS - 1,
> #endif
> FIX_RO_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only IDT */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> + FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only debug_idt_table */
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
> + FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only trace_idt_table */
> +#endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
> FIX_KMAP_BEGIN, /* reserved pte's for temporary kernel mappings */
> FIX_KMAP_END = FIX_KMAP_BEGIN+(KM_TYPE_NR*NR_CPUS)-1,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
> index 1c113db..296e130 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
> @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ atomic_t trace_idt_ctr = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
> struct desc_ptr trace_idt_descr = { NR_VECTORS * 16 - 1,
> (unsigned long) trace_idt_table };
>
> -/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
> +/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
> gate_desc trace_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
>
> static int trace_irq_vector_refcount;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> index cf7898e..6d88c37 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
> #include <asm/proto.h>
>
> -/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
> +/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
> gate_desc debug_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
> #else
> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
> @@ -998,9 +998,18 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
> * Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
> * "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
> * to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
> - * It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
> + * It will be reloaded in cpu_init()
> + */
> __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
> idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> + __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, __pa_symbol(debug_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
> + debug_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT);
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
> + __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, __pa_symbol(trace_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
> + trace_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT);
> +#endif
>
> /*
> * Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
> index adca9e2..1fd4a4c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
> @@ -1984,6 +1984,12 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
> switch (idx) {
> case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN:
> case FIX_RO_IDT:
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> + case FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT:
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
> + case FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT:
> +#endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
> case FIX_WP_TEST:
> # ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
> --
> 1.8.4
>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86, traps: maps all IDTs to fixmap area.
2015-02-26 15:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2015-02-26 16:45 ` Kees Cook
2015-02-26 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2015-02-26 16:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Wang Nan, Masami Hiramatsu, Steven Rostedt, Ingo Molnar,
H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, X86 ML, Oleg Nesterov,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Li Zefan
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 7:17 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 11:06 PM, Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> wrote:
>> The reason why mapping idt_table to fixmap area should also be applied
>> to debug_idt_table and trace_idt_table. This patch does same thing for
>> all IDTs.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> I believe trace_idt_table and debug_idt_table should be symmetrical with
>> idt_table. However, Like my previous patch 'x86, traps: install gates
>> using IST after cpu_init()', I'm not sure whether this is a practical
>> fix.
>
> It shouldn't matter, since we should never enter userspace with these
> IDTs loaded.
>
> --Andy
>
> [patch kept below for Kees' benefit]
Is there a reason to use fixmap entries for these IDTs? Or rather, is
there a situation where these IDTs are ever visible to userspace? (The
reason to use the fixmap is to hide their "true" location from
userspace.)
-Kees
>
>>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 6 ++++++
>> arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c | 2 +-
>> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 13 +++++++++++--
>> arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 6 ++++++
>> 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>> index f80d700..79550f4 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>> @@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
>> FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_END = FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0 + MAX_IO_APICS - 1,
>> #endif
>> FIX_RO_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only IDT */
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> + FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only debug_idt_table */
>> +#endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>> + FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only trace_idt_table */
>> +#endif
>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>> FIX_KMAP_BEGIN, /* reserved pte's for temporary kernel mappings */
>> FIX_KMAP_END = FIX_KMAP_BEGIN+(KM_TYPE_NR*NR_CPUS)-1,
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>> index 1c113db..296e130 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>> @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ atomic_t trace_idt_ctr = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
>> struct desc_ptr trace_idt_descr = { NR_VECTORS * 16 - 1,
>> (unsigned long) trace_idt_table };
>>
>> -/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
>> +/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
>> gate_desc trace_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
>>
>> static int trace_irq_vector_refcount;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>> index cf7898e..6d88c37 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>> @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
>> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
>> #include <asm/proto.h>
>>
>> -/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
>> +/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
>> gate_desc debug_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
>> #else
>> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>> @@ -998,9 +998,18 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
>> * Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
>> * "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
>> * to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
>> - * It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
>> + * It will be reloaded in cpu_init()
>> + */
>> __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>> idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> + __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, __pa_symbol(debug_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>> + debug_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT);
>> +#endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>> + __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, __pa_symbol(trace_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>> + trace_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT);
>> +#endif
>>
>> /*
>> * Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>> index adca9e2..1fd4a4c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>> @@ -1984,6 +1984,12 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
>> switch (idx) {
>> case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN:
>> case FIX_RO_IDT:
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> + case FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT:
>> +#endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>> + case FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT:
>> +#endif
>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>> case FIX_WP_TEST:
>> # ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
>> --
>> 1.8.4
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Andy Lutomirski
> AMA Capital Management, LLC
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86, traps: maps all IDTs to fixmap area.
2015-02-26 16:45 ` Kees Cook
@ 2015-02-26 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-27 5:16 ` Wang Nan
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2015-02-26 18:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Wang Nan, Masami Hiramatsu, Steven Rostedt, Ingo Molnar,
H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, X86 ML, Oleg Nesterov,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Li Zefan
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 8:45 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 7:17 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 11:06 PM, Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> wrote:
>>> The reason why mapping idt_table to fixmap area should also be applied
>>> to debug_idt_table and trace_idt_table. This patch does same thing for
>>> all IDTs.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> I believe trace_idt_table and debug_idt_table should be symmetrical with
>>> idt_table. However, Like my previous patch 'x86, traps: install gates
>>> using IST after cpu_init()', I'm not sure whether this is a practical
>>> fix.
>>
>> It shouldn't matter, since we should never enter userspace with these
>> IDTs loaded.
>>
>> --Andy
>>
>> [patch kept below for Kees' benefit]
>
> Is there a reason to use fixmap entries for these IDTs? Or rather, is
> there a situation where these IDTs are ever visible to userspace? (The
> reason to use the fixmap is to hide their "true" location from
> userspace.)
There's also the F00F workaround, which IIRC we get for free by using
the fixmap, but that also shouldn't matter here.
>
> -Kees
>
>>
>>>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 6 ++++++
>>> arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c | 2 +-
>>> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 13 +++++++++++--
>>> arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 6 ++++++
>>> 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>>> index f80d700..79550f4 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>>> @@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
>>> FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_END = FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0 + MAX_IO_APICS - 1,
>>> #endif
>>> FIX_RO_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only IDT */
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>> + FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only debug_idt_table */
>>> +#endif
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>>> + FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only trace_idt_table */
>>> +#endif
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>>> FIX_KMAP_BEGIN, /* reserved pte's for temporary kernel mappings */
>>> FIX_KMAP_END = FIX_KMAP_BEGIN+(KM_TYPE_NR*NR_CPUS)-1,
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>>> index 1c113db..296e130 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>>> @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ atomic_t trace_idt_ctr = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
>>> struct desc_ptr trace_idt_descr = { NR_VECTORS * 16 - 1,
>>> (unsigned long) trace_idt_table };
>>>
>>> -/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
>>> +/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
>>> gate_desc trace_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
>>>
>>> static int trace_irq_vector_refcount;
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>> index cf7898e..6d88c37 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>> @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
>>> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
>>> #include <asm/proto.h>
>>>
>>> -/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
>>> +/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
>>> gate_desc debug_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
>>> #else
>>> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>>> @@ -998,9 +998,18 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
>>> * Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
>>> * "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
>>> * to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
>>> - * It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
>>> + * It will be reloaded in cpu_init()
>>> + */
>>> __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>>> idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>> + __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, __pa_symbol(debug_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>>> + debug_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT);
>>> +#endif
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>>> + __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, __pa_symbol(trace_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>>> + trace_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT);
>>> +#endif
>>>
>>> /*
>>> * Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>>> index adca9e2..1fd4a4c 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>>> @@ -1984,6 +1984,12 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
>>> switch (idx) {
>>> case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN:
>>> case FIX_RO_IDT:
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>> + case FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT:
>>> +#endif
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>>> + case FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT:
>>> +#endif
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>>> case FIX_WP_TEST:
>>> # ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
>>> --
>>> 1.8.4
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Andy Lutomirski
>> AMA Capital Management, LLC
>
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86, traps: maps all IDTs to fixmap area.
2015-02-26 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2015-02-27 5:16 ` Wang Nan
2015-02-27 17:41 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Wang Nan @ 2015-02-27 5:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski, Kees Cook
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu, Steven Rostedt, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Thomas Gleixner, X86 ML, Oleg Nesterov, Dave Hansen,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Li Zefan
On 2015/2/27 2:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 8:45 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 7:17 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 11:06 PM, Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> wrote:
>>>> The reason why mapping idt_table to fixmap area should also be applied
>>>> to debug_idt_table and trace_idt_table. This patch does same thing for
>>>> all IDTs.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> I believe trace_idt_table and debug_idt_table should be symmetrical with
>>>> idt_table. However, Like my previous patch 'x86, traps: install gates
>>>> using IST after cpu_init()', I'm not sure whether this is a practical
>>>> fix.
>>>
>>> It shouldn't matter, since we should never enter userspace with these
>>> IDTs loaded.
>>>
>>> --Andy
>>>
>>> [patch kept below for Kees' benefit]
>>
>> Is there a reason to use fixmap entries for these IDTs? Or rather, is
>> there a situation where these IDTs are ever visible to userspace? (The
>> reason to use the fixmap is to hide their "true" location from
>> userspace.)
>
> There's also the F00F workaround, which IIRC we get for free by using
> the fixmap, but that also shouldn't matter here.
>
What about a flaw module triggering the F00F bug in kernel space? Instead of
kernel panic, the system will hang. I think tis should be a case for which
my patch can help. However, the trigger condition is critical.
>>
>> -Kees
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 6 ++++++
>>>> arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c | 2 +-
>>>> arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 13 +++++++++++--
>>>> arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 6 ++++++
>>>> 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>>>> index f80d700..79550f4 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
>>>> @@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
>>>> FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_END = FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0 + MAX_IO_APICS - 1,
>>>> #endif
>>>> FIX_RO_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only IDT */
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>>> + FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only debug_idt_table */
>>>> +#endif
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>>>> + FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only trace_idt_table */
>>>> +#endif
>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>>>> FIX_KMAP_BEGIN, /* reserved pte's for temporary kernel mappings */
>>>> FIX_KMAP_END = FIX_KMAP_BEGIN+(KM_TYPE_NR*NR_CPUS)-1,
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>>>> index 1c113db..296e130 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tracepoint.c
>>>> @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ atomic_t trace_idt_ctr = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
>>>> struct desc_ptr trace_idt_descr = { NR_VECTORS * 16 - 1,
>>>> (unsigned long) trace_idt_table };
>>>>
>>>> -/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
>>>> +/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
>>>> gate_desc trace_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
>>>>
>>>> static int trace_irq_vector_refcount;
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>>> index cf7898e..6d88c37 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>>> @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
>>>> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
>>>> #include <asm/proto.h>
>>>>
>>>> -/* No need to be aligned, but done to keep all IDTs defined the same way. */
>>>> +/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */
>>>> gate_desc debug_idt_table[NR_VECTORS] __page_aligned_bss;
>>>> #else
>>>> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>>>> @@ -998,9 +998,18 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
>>>> * Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
>>>> * "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
>>>> * to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
>>>> - * It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
>>>> + * It will be reloaded in cpu_init()
>>>> + */
>>>> __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>>>> idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>>> + __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT, __pa_symbol(debug_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>>>> + debug_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT);
>>>> +#endif
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>>>> + __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT, __pa_symbol(trace_idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>>>> + trace_idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT);
>>>> +#endif
>>>>
>>>> /*
>>>> * Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>>>> index adca9e2..1fd4a4c 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
>>>> @@ -1984,6 +1984,12 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
>>>> switch (idx) {
>>>> case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN:
>>>> case FIX_RO_IDT:
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>>> + case FIX_RO_DEBUG_IDT:
>>>> +#endif
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
>>>> + case FIX_RO_TRACE_IDT:
>>>> +#endif
>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>>>> case FIX_WP_TEST:
>>>> # ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
>>>> --
>>>> 1.8.4
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Andy Lutomirski
>>> AMA Capital Management, LLC
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Kees Cook
>> Chrome OS Security
>
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86, traps: maps all IDTs to fixmap area.
2015-02-27 5:16 ` Wang Nan
@ 2015-02-27 17:41 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2015-02-27 17:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wang Nan
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Masami Hiramatsu, Steven Rostedt, Ingo Molnar,
H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, X86 ML, Oleg Nesterov,
Dave Hansen, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Li Zefan
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:16 PM, Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> wrote:
> On 2015/2/27 2:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 8:45 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 7:17 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 11:06 PM, Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> wrote:
>>>>> The reason why mapping idt_table to fixmap area should also be applied
>>>>> to debug_idt_table and trace_idt_table. This patch does same thing for
>>>>> all IDTs.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe trace_idt_table and debug_idt_table should be symmetrical with
>>>>> idt_table. However, Like my previous patch 'x86, traps: install gates
>>>>> using IST after cpu_init()', I'm not sure whether this is a practical
>>>>> fix.
>>>>
>>>> It shouldn't matter, since we should never enter userspace with these
>>>> IDTs loaded.
>>>>
>>>> --Andy
>>>>
>>>> [patch kept below for Kees' benefit]
>>>
>>> Is there a reason to use fixmap entries for these IDTs? Or rather, is
>>> there a situation where these IDTs are ever visible to userspace? (The
>>> reason to use the fixmap is to hide their "true" location from
>>> userspace.)
>>
>> There's also the F00F workaround, which IIRC we get for free by using
>> the fixmap, but that also shouldn't matter here.
>>
>
> What about a flaw module triggering the F00F bug in kernel space? Instead of
> kernel panic, the system will hang. I think tis should be a case for which
> my patch can help. However, the trigger condition is critical.
If it solves a real problem, I have no objection. I just wanted to be
sure we weren't trivially using up a fixmap entry.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2015-02-27 17:41 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2015-02-26 7:06 [PATCH] x86, traps: maps all IDTs to fixmap area Wang Nan
2015-02-26 15:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-26 16:45 ` Kees Cook
2015-02-26 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-27 5:16 ` Wang Nan
2015-02-27 17:41 ` Kees Cook
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