From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751931AbbCJC23 (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Mar 2015 22:28:29 -0400 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:51344 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750933AbbCJC20 (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Mar 2015 22:28:26 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.11,371,1422950400"; d="scan'208";a="662836521" Message-ID: <54FE56C6.7000902@intel.com> Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 19:28:22 -0700 From: Dave Hansen User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.4.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Eric W. Biederman" , Kees Cook CC: Andrew Morton , "Theodore Ts'o" , Oleg Nesterov , LKML , Dave Hansen Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface References: <20150309204321.AAF412E0@viggo.jf.intel.com> <878uf5vmxo.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87h9ttrcpr.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> In-Reply-To: <87h9ttrcpr.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 03/09/2015 04:08 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > If the concern is to protect against root getting into the kernel the > "trusted_kernel" snake-oil just compile out the pagemap file. Nothing > else is remotely interesting from a mainenance point of view. The paper I linked to showed one example of how pagemap makes a user->kernel exploint _easier_. Note that the authors had another way of actually doing the exploit when pagemap was not available, but it required some more trouble than if pagemap was around. I mentioned the "trusted_kernel" stuff as an aside. It's really not the main concern.