From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>,
mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>,
tytso@mit.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
dborkman@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [BUG/PATCH] kernel RNG and its secrets
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 11:56:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <550959EB.4000304@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1426675809.2143223.241946097.20888470@webmail.messagingengine.com>
On 03/18/2015 11:50 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 18, 2015, at 10:53, mancha wrote:
>> Hi.
>>
>> The kernel RNG introduced memzero_explicit in d4c5efdb9777 to protect
>> memory cleansing against things like dead store optimization:
>>
>> void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count)
>> {
>> memset(s, 0, count);
>> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(s);
>> }
>>
>> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR, introduced in fe8c8a126806 to protect crypto_memneq
>> against timing analysis, is defined when using gcc as:
>>
>> #define OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(var) __asm__ ("" : "=r" (var) : "0" (var))
>>
>> My tests with gcc 4.8.2 on x86 find it insufficient to prevent gcc from
>> optimizing out memset (i.e. secrets remain in memory).
>>
>> Two things that do work:
>>
>> __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : "=r" (var) : "0" (var))
>
> You are correct, volatile signature should be added to
> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR. Because we use an output variable "=r", gcc is
> allowed to check if it is needed and may remove the asm statement.
> Another option would be to just use var as an input variable - asm
> blocks without output variables are always considered being volatile by
> gcc.
>
> Can you send a patch?
>
> I don't think it is security critical, as Daniel pointed out, the call
> will happen because the function is an external call to the crypto
> functions, thus the compiler has to flush memory on return.
Just had a look.
$ gdb vmlinux
(gdb) disassemble memzero_explicit
Dump of assembler code for function memzero_explicit:
0xffffffff813a18b0 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff813a18b1 <+1>: mov %rsi,%rdx
0xffffffff813a18b4 <+4>: xor %esi,%esi
0xffffffff813a18b6 <+6>: mov %rsp,%rbp
0xffffffff813a18b9 <+9>: callq 0xffffffff813a7120 <memset>
0xffffffff813a18be <+14>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff813a18bf <+15>: retq
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) disassemble extract_entropy
[...]
0xffffffff814a5000 <+304>: sub %r15,%rbx
0xffffffff814a5003 <+307>: jne 0xffffffff814a4f80 <extract_entropy+176>
0xffffffff814a5009 <+313>: mov %r12,%rdi
0xffffffff814a500c <+316>: mov $0xa,%esi
0xffffffff814a5011 <+321>: callq 0xffffffff813a18b0 <memzero_explicit>
0xffffffff814a5016 <+326>: mov -0x48(%rbp),%rax
[...]
I would be fine with __volatile__.
Thanks a lot mancha, could you send a patch?
Best,
Daniel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-03-18 10:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-03-18 9:53 [BUG/PATCH] kernel RNG and its secrets mancha
2015-03-18 10:30 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-03-18 10:50 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-03-18 10:56 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2015-03-18 11:09 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-03-18 12:02 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-03-18 12:14 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-03-18 12:19 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-03-18 12:20 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-03-18 12:42 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-03-18 15:09 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-03-18 16:02 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-03-18 17:14 ` mancha
2015-03-18 17:49 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-03-18 19:09 ` mancha
2015-03-18 23:53 ` Cesar Eduardo Barros
2015-03-18 17:41 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-03-18 17:56 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-03-18 17:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-03-18 12:58 ` mancha
2015-04-10 13:25 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-04-10 14:00 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-04-10 14:09 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-04-10 14:22 ` mancha security
2015-04-10 14:33 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-04-10 20:09 ` mancha security
2015-04-10 14:26 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-04-10 14:36 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-04-10 14:45 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2015-04-10 14:46 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-04-10 14:50 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-04-10 14:54 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-04-27 19:10 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-04-27 20:34 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-04-27 20:41 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-04-27 20:53 ` Daniel Borkmann
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