[PATCH man-pages v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

[PATCH man-pages v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

[Andy Lutomirski]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---

There was no v1.  I'm calling this v2 to keep it in sync with the kernel
patch versioning.

 man2/prctl.2        | 10 ++++++++++
 man7/capabilities.7 | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
index b352f6283624..5861e3aefe9a 100644
--- a/man2/prctl.2
+++ b/man2/prctl.2
@@ -949,6 +949,16 @@ had been called.
 For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
 .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
 .\"
+.TP
+.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
+Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
+then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
+fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
+inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
+is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
+from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_GET, then
+.BR prctl (2)
+will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.
 .SH RETURN VALUE
 On success,
 .BR PR_GET_DUMPABLE ,
diff --git a/man7/capabilities.7 b/man7/capabilities.7
index d75ec65de05b..dae62f0be3b7 100644
--- a/man7/capabilities.7
+++ b/man7/capabilities.7
@@ -697,13 +697,26 @@ a program whose associated file capabilities grant that capability).
 .IR Inheritable :
 This is a set of capabilities preserved across an
 .BR execve (2).
-It provides a mechanism for a process to assign capabilities
-to the permitted set of the new program during an
-.BR execve (2).
+Inheritable capabilities remain inheritable when executing any program,
+and inheritable capabilities are added to the permitted set when executing
+a program that has the corresponding bits set in the file inheritable set.
+When executing programs without file capabilities, ambient capabilities
 .TP
 .IR Effective :
 This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to
 perform permission checks for the thread.
+.TP
+.IR Ambient " (since Linux 4.2) :"
+This is a set of capabilities that are preserved across an
+.BR execve (2)
+of a program that does not have file capabilities.  The ambient capability
+set obeys the invariant that no capability can ever be ambient if it is
+not both permitted and inheritable.  Ambient capabilities are, with some
+exceptions, preserved in the permitted set and added to the effective
+set when
+.BR execve (2)
+is called.  The ambient capability set is modified using
+.BR prctl (2).
 .PP
 A child created via
 .BR fork (2)
@@ -785,10 +798,12 @@ the process using the following algorithm:
 .in +4n
 .nf
 
+P'(ambient) = (file has capabilities or is setuid or setgid) ? 0 : P(ambient)
+
 P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
-                (F(permitted) & cap_bset)
+                (F(permitted) & cap_bset) | P'(ambient)
 
-P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : 0
+P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : P'(ambient)
 
 P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable)    [i.e., unchanged]
 
@@ -1071,6 +1086,10 @@ an effective or real UID of 0 calls
 .BR execve (2).
 (See the subsection
 .IR "Capabilities and execution of programs by root" .)
+.TP
+.B SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
+Setting this flag disallows
+.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
 .PP
 Each of the above "base" flags has a companion "locked" flag.
 Setting any of the "locked" flags is irreversible,
@@ -1079,8 +1098,9 @@ corresponding "base" flag.
 The locked flags are:
 .BR SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED ,
 .BR SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED ,
+.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED ,
 and
-.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED .
+.BR SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
 .PP
 The
 .I securebits
-- 
2.1.0

Re: [PATCH man-pages v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

Hi Andy,

Thanks for this patch. There are some broken pieces though. Also,
I have some minor questions about the API design. See below.

On 05/15/2015 08:43 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> 
> There was no v1.  I'm calling this v2 to keep it in sync with the kernel
> patch versioning.
> 
>  man2/prctl.2        | 10 ++++++++++
>  man7/capabilities.7 | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
> index b352f6283624..5861e3aefe9a 100644
> --- a/man2/prctl.2
> +++ b/man2/prctl.2
> @@ -949,6 +949,16 @@ had been called.
>  For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
>  .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
>  .\"
> +.TP
> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
> +Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
> +then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
> +fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
> +inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
> +is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
> +from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_GET, then
> +.BR prctl (2)
> +will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.

Some API design questions:

1. We already have prctl() operations that work on some capability sets:
   PR_CAPBSET_READ and PR_CAPBSET_DROP. These don't use arg3; the operation 
   is directly encoded in the first argument of prctl(). Just to keep some
   consistency, why not do things the same way for these new operations?

   Also, you could opt for some consistency in the naming, so using "READ"
   rather than "GET", for example. On the other hand, both "READ" and "GET" 
   are suboptimal names: this is really a test operation. So, maybe a
   clean break to a good name, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, is best?

   Thus:

     prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_READ, cap, 0, 0, 0);  // or PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET?
     prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0, 0);
     prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, cap, 0, 0, 0);

2. In terms of the API design, would it be useful to have a prctl() operation
   that clears the entire ambient set?

     prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_ZERO, 0, 0, 0, 0);    // or PR_CAP_AMBIENT_EMPTY?

>  .SH RETURN VALUE
>  On success,
>  .BR PR_GET_DUMPABLE ,
> diff --git a/man7/capabilities.7 b/man7/capabilities.7
> index d75ec65de05b..dae62f0be3b7 100644
> --- a/man7/capabilities.7
> +++ b/man7/capabilities.7
> @@ -697,13 +697,26 @@ a program whose associated file capabilities grant that capability).
>  .IR Inheritable :
>  This is a set of capabilities preserved across an
>  .BR execve (2).
> -It provides a mechanism for a process to assign capabilities
> -to the permitted set of the new program during an
> -.BR execve (2).
> +Inheritable capabilities remain inheritable when executing any program,
> +and inheritable capabilities are added to the permitted set when executing
> +a program that has the corresponding bits set in the file inheritable set.
> +When executing programs without file capabilities, ambient capabilities

That last line is incomplete. Something needs adding/removing.

>  .TP
>  .IR Effective :
>  This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to
>  perform permission checks for the thread.
> +.TP
> +.IR Ambient " (since Linux 4.2) :"

Minor knit: s/ :/:/ for next version.

> +This is a set of capabilities that are preserved across an
> +.BR execve (2)
> +of a program that does not have file capabilities.  The ambient capability
> +set obeys the invariant that no capability can ever be ambient if it is
> +not both permitted and inheritable.  Ambient capabilities are, with some
> +exceptions, preserved in the permitted set and added to the effective
> +set when
> +.BR execve (2)
> +is called.  The ambient capability set is modified using
> +.BR prctl (2).

I think it would be helpful to add a couple of sentences here on why the
ambient set is useful (i.e., explain what deficiencies in the pre-existing
API are addressed by the addition of this set--a brief piece from your
1/2 patch, for example).

>  .PP
>  A child created via
>  .BR fork (2)
> @@ -785,10 +798,12 @@ the process using the following algorithm:
>  .in +4n
>  .nf
>  
> +P'(ambient) = (file has capabilities or is setuid or setgid) ? 0 : P(ambient)
> +
>  P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
> -                (F(permitted) & cap_bset)
> +                (F(permitted) & cap_bset) | P'(ambient)
>  
> -P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : 0
> +P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : P'(ambient)
>  
>  P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable)    [i.e., unchanged]
>  
> @@ -1071,6 +1086,10 @@ an effective or real UID of 0 calls
>  .BR execve (2).
>  (See the subsection
>  .IR "Capabilities and execution of programs by root" .)
> +.TP
> +.B SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
> +Setting this flag disallows
> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
>  .PP
>  Each of the above "base" flags has a companion "locked" flag.
>  Setting any of the "locked" flags is irreversible,
> @@ -1079,8 +1098,9 @@ corresponding "base" flag.
>  The locked flags are:
>  .BR SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED ,
>  .BR SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED ,
> +.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED ,
>  and
> -.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED .
> +.BR SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
>  .PP
>  The
>  .I securebits

Thanks,

Michael


-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/

Re: [PATCH man-pages v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:56 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
<mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> Thanks for this patch. There are some broken pieces though. Also,
> I have some minor questions about the API design. See below.
>
> On 05/15/2015 08:43 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>> ---
>>
>> There was no v1.  I'm calling this v2 to keep it in sync with the kernel
>> patch versioning.
>>
>>  man2/prctl.2        | 10 ++++++++++
>>  man7/capabilities.7 | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
>> index b352f6283624..5861e3aefe9a 100644
>> --- a/man2/prctl.2
>> +++ b/man2/prctl.2
>> @@ -949,6 +949,16 @@ had been called.
>>  For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
>>  .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
>>  .\"
>> +.TP
>> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
>> +Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
>> +then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
>> +fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
>> +inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
>> +is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
>> +from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_GET, then
>> +.BR prctl (2)
>> +will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.
>
> Some API design questions:
>
> 1. We already have prctl() operations that work on some capability sets:
>    PR_CAPBSET_READ and PR_CAPBSET_DROP. These don't use arg3; the operation
>    is directly encoded in the first argument of prctl(). Just to keep some
>    consistency, why not do things the same way for these new operations?

I'm torn.  On the one hand, consistency is nice.  On the other hand,
prctl is a mess and trying to organize new additions seems like a good
idea.

>
>    Also, you could opt for some consistency in the naming, so using "READ"
>    rather than "GET", for example. On the other hand, both "READ" and "GET"
>    are suboptimal names: this is really a test operation. So, maybe a
>    clean break to a good name, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, is best?

I like IS_SET.

>
>    Thus:
>
>      prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_READ, cap, 0, 0, 0);  // or PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET?
>      prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0, 0);
>      prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, cap, 0, 0, 0);
>
> 2. In terms of the API design, would it be useful to have a prctl() operation
>    that clears the entire ambient set?
>
>      prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_ZERO, 0, 0, 0, 0);    // or PR_CAP_AMBIENT_EMPTY?

Seems like a good idea.  How about _CLEAR?

>
>>  .SH RETURN VALUE
>>  On success,
>>  .BR PR_GET_DUMPABLE ,
>> diff --git a/man7/capabilities.7 b/man7/capabilities.7
>> index d75ec65de05b..dae62f0be3b7 100644
>> --- a/man7/capabilities.7
>> +++ b/man7/capabilities.7
>> @@ -697,13 +697,26 @@ a program whose associated file capabilities grant that capability).
>>  .IR Inheritable :
>>  This is a set of capabilities preserved across an
>>  .BR execve (2).
>> -It provides a mechanism for a process to assign capabilities
>> -to the permitted set of the new program during an
>> -.BR execve (2).
>> +Inheritable capabilities remain inheritable when executing any program,
>> +and inheritable capabilities are added to the permitted set when executing
>> +a program that has the corresponding bits set in the file inheritable set.
>> +When executing programs without file capabilities, ambient capabilities
>
> That last line is incomplete. Something needs adding/removing.

Whoops, will fix.

>
>>  .TP
>>  .IR Effective :
>>  This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to
>>  perform permission checks for the thread.
>> +.TP
>> +.IR Ambient " (since Linux 4.2) :"
>
> Minor knit: s/ :/:/ for next version.

Will fix.

>
>> +This is a set of capabilities that are preserved across an
>> +.BR execve (2)
>> +of a program that does not have file capabilities.  The ambient capability
>> +set obeys the invariant that no capability can ever be ambient if it is
>> +not both permitted and inheritable.  Ambient capabilities are, with some
>> +exceptions, preserved in the permitted set and added to the effective
>> +set when
>> +.BR execve (2)
>> +is called.  The ambient capability set is modified using
>> +.BR prctl (2).
>
> I think it would be helpful to add a couple of sentences here on why the
> ambient set is useful (i.e., explain what deficiencies in the pre-existing
> API are addressed by the addition of this set--a brief piece from your
> 1/2 patch, for example).

Will do.

--Andy

Re: [PATCH man-pages v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

Hi Andy,

On 05/19/2015 07:21 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:56 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
> <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Hi Andy,
>>
>> Thanks for this patch. There are some broken pieces though. Also,
>> I have some minor questions about the API design. See below.
>>
>> On 05/15/2015 08:43 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> There was no v1.  I'm calling this v2 to keep it in sync with the kernel
>>> patch versioning.
>>>
>>>  man2/prctl.2        | 10 ++++++++++
>>>  man7/capabilities.7 | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>>  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
>>> index b352f6283624..5861e3aefe9a 100644
>>> --- a/man2/prctl.2
>>> +++ b/man2/prctl.2
>>> @@ -949,6 +949,16 @@ had been called.
>>>  For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
>>>  .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
>>>  .\"
>>> +.TP
>>> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
>>> +Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
>>> +then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
>>> +fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
>>> +inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
>>> +is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
>>> +from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_GET, then
>>> +.BR prctl (2)
>>> +will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.
>>
>> Some API design questions:
>>
>> 1. We already have prctl() operations that work on some capability sets:
>>    PR_CAPBSET_READ and PR_CAPBSET_DROP. These don't use arg3; the operation
>>    is directly encoded in the first argument of prctl(). Just to keep some
>>    consistency, why not do things the same way for these new operations?
> 
> I'm torn.  On the one hand, consistency is nice.  On the other hand,
> prctl is a mess 

Agreed.

> and trying to organize new additions seems like a good
> idea.

Sure, but what is your organizing principle here? (I don't feel strongly
about it, but it's not clear to me what trumps the (mild) degree of 
consistency that I suggest.)


>>    Also, you could opt for some consistency in the naming, so using "READ"
>>    rather than "GET", for example. On the other hand, both "READ" and "GET"
>>    are suboptimal names: this is really a test operation. So, maybe a
>>    clean break to a good name, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, is best?
> 
> I like IS_SET.

Okay.

>>    Thus:
>>
>>      prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_READ, cap, 0, 0, 0);  // or PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET?
>>      prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0, 0);
>>      prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, cap, 0, 0, 0);
>>
>> 2. In terms of the API design, would it be useful to have a prctl() operation
>>    that clears the entire ambient set?
>>
>>      prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT_ZERO, 0, 0, 0, 0);    // or PR_CAP_AMBIENT_EMPTY?
> 
> Seems like a good idea.  How about _CLEAR?

Also good.

[...]

Thanks,

Michael

-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/

Re: [PATCH man-pages v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

Hi Andy,

Not that this has hit mainline, would you be willing to refresh this
man-pages patch?

Thanks,

Michael



On 15 May 2015 at 08:43, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
>
> There was no v1.  I'm calling this v2 to keep it in sync with the kernel
> patch versioning.
>
>  man2/prctl.2        | 10 ++++++++++
>  man7/capabilities.7 | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
> index b352f6283624..5861e3aefe9a 100644
> --- a/man2/prctl.2
> +++ b/man2/prctl.2
> @@ -949,6 +949,16 @@ had been called.
>  For further information on Intel MPX, see the kernel source file
>  .IR Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt .
>  .\"
> +.TP
> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT " (since Linux 4.2)"
> +Reads or changes the ambient capability set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
> +then the capability specified in arg3 is added to the ambient set.  This will
> +fail, returning EPERM, if the capability is not already both permitted and
> +inheritable or if the SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE securebit is set.  If arg2
> +is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, then the capability specified in arg3 is removed
> +from the ambient set.  If arg2 is PR_CAP_AMBIENT_GET, then
> +.BR prctl (2)
> +will return 1 if the capability in arg3 is in the ambient set and 0 if not.
>  .SH RETURN VALUE
>  On success,
>  .BR PR_GET_DUMPABLE ,
> diff --git a/man7/capabilities.7 b/man7/capabilities.7
> index d75ec65de05b..dae62f0be3b7 100644
> --- a/man7/capabilities.7
> +++ b/man7/capabilities.7
> @@ -697,13 +697,26 @@ a program whose associated file capabilities grant that capability).
>  .IR Inheritable :
>  This is a set of capabilities preserved across an
>  .BR execve (2).
> -It provides a mechanism for a process to assign capabilities
> -to the permitted set of the new program during an
> -.BR execve (2).
> +Inheritable capabilities remain inheritable when executing any program,
> +and inheritable capabilities are added to the permitted set when executing
> +a program that has the corresponding bits set in the file inheritable set.
> +When executing programs without file capabilities, ambient capabilities
>  .TP
>  .IR Effective :
>  This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to
>  perform permission checks for the thread.
> +.TP
> +.IR Ambient " (since Linux 4.2) :"
> +This is a set of capabilities that are preserved across an
> +.BR execve (2)
> +of a program that does not have file capabilities.  The ambient capability
> +set obeys the invariant that no capability can ever be ambient if it is
> +not both permitted and inheritable.  Ambient capabilities are, with some
> +exceptions, preserved in the permitted set and added to the effective
> +set when
> +.BR execve (2)
> +is called.  The ambient capability set is modified using
> +.BR prctl (2).
>  .PP
>  A child created via
>  .BR fork (2)
> @@ -785,10 +798,12 @@ the process using the following algorithm:
>  .in +4n
>  .nf
>
> +P'(ambient) = (file has capabilities or is setuid or setgid) ? 0 : P(ambient)
> +
>  P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
> -                (F(permitted) & cap_bset)
> +                (F(permitted) & cap_bset) | P'(ambient)
>
> -P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : 0
> +P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : P'(ambient)
>
>  P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable)    [i.e., unchanged]
>
> @@ -1071,6 +1086,10 @@ an effective or real UID of 0 calls
>  .BR execve (2).
>  (See the subsection
>  .IR "Capabilities and execution of programs by root" .)
> +.TP
> +.B SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
> +Setting this flag disallows
> +.BR PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
>  .PP
>  Each of the above "base" flags has a companion "locked" flag.
>  Setting any of the "locked" flags is irreversible,
> @@ -1079,8 +1098,9 @@ corresponding "base" flag.
>  The locked flags are:
>  .BR SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED ,
>  .BR SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED ,
> +.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED ,
>  and
> -.BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED .
> +.BR SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE .
>  .PP
>  The
>  .I securebits
> --
> 2.1.0
>



-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/

Re: [PATCH man-pages v2] capabilities.7, prctl.2: Document ambient capabilities

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Fri, Sep 11, 2015 at 1:28 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
<mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> Not that this has hit mainline, would you be willing to refresh this
> man-pages patch?

Absolutely.  I'll try to get to it over the next week or so.  I need
to refresh my util-linux patch, too.

--Andy