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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, miklos@szeredi.hu,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/8] SELinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 11:20:46 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5582E1CE.2010301@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <17513.1434640431@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On 06/18/2015 11:13 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> 
>>> +	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
>>> +		   (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
>>> +		*_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
>>> +	} else if (tsec->create_sid) {
>>
>> This doesn't quite match the logic in inode_init_security today, see its
>> checking of SBLABEL_MNT.
> 
> Fair point.  What does SBLABEL_MNT mean precisely?  It seems to indicate one
> of an odd mix of behaviours.  I presume it means that we *have* to calculate a
> label and can't get one from the underlying fs if it is not set.

It means the filesystem supports per-file labeling and you can use
setxattr(..."security.selinux") and setfscreatecon() for files on it.
You can see whether it is set on a filesystem by looking for the
seclabel option in cat /proc/mounts.  If it is not set, then we ignore
tsec->create_sid.  It is arguable as to whether it is correct to always
call security_transition_sid() there either, but that's another topic.

> 
> Also, in:
> 
> 	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
> 	if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
> 		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
> 
> should SE_SBINITIALIZED be set after SBLABEL_MNT?  And should there be a
> memory barrier in here somewhere before the setting of SE_SBINITIALIZED?

I believe that's all under sbsec->lock held by the caller, but that code
has changed a lot and been refactored significantly by others.




  reply	other threads:[~2015-06-18 15:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-06-18 13:32 [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 1/8] overlay: Call ovl_drop_write() earlier in ovl_dentry_open() David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 2/8] overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay David Howells
2015-07-20 12:42   ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-07-21 13:28     ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 3/8] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 4/8] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling David Howells
2015-06-18 14:44   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 16:51     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:34   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 6/8] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2015-06-18 14:54   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:04     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 7/8] SELinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label David Howells
2015-06-18 14:56   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:13     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:20       ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2015-06-18 15:32         ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:47           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:47           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 8/8] SELinux: Check against union label for file operations David Howells
2015-06-19  7:20 ` [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support Al Viro
2015-06-19  7:52   ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19  7:59     ` Al Viro
2015-06-19  8:11       ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19  8:29         ` Al Viro
2015-06-19  8:36           ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19 14:04     ` David Howells

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