From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, miklos@szeredi.hu
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 08:34:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5582E4EA.3040405@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150618133254.12722.33339.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On 6/18/2015 6:32 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub
> discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
> the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.
Are you planning to do this for Smack, too?
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index ffa5a642629a..c5d893e2ff23 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3200,6 +3200,20 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
> *secid = isec->sid;
> }
>
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst,
> + const char *name, void *value,
> + size_t *size)
> +{
> + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
> + return 1; /* Discard */
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* file security operations */
>
> static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> @@ -5917,6 +5931,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
> .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
> .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
> .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
> + .inode_copy_up = selinux_inode_copy_up,
> + .inode_copy_up_xattr = selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr,
>
> .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
> .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-06-18 15:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-06-18 13:32 [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 1/8] overlay: Call ovl_drop_write() earlier in ovl_dentry_open() David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 2/8] overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay David Howells
2015-07-20 12:42 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-07-21 13:28 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 3/8] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 4/8] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling David Howells
2015-06-18 14:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 16:51 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:34 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 6/8] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2015-06-18 14:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:04 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 7/8] SELinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label David Howells
2015-06-18 14:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:13 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:32 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 8/8] SELinux: Check against union label for file operations David Howells
2015-06-19 7:20 ` [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support Al Viro
2015-06-19 7:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19 7:59 ` Al Viro
2015-06-19 8:11 ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19 8:29 ` Al Viro
2015-06-19 8:36 ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19 14:04 ` David Howells
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