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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, miklos@szeredi.hu,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/8] SELinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 11:47:59 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5582E82F.1040403@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <22798.1434641556@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On 06/18/2015 11:32 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> 
>>> Fair point.  What does SBLABEL_MNT mean precisely?  It seems to indicate one
>>> of an odd mix of behaviours.  I presume it means that we *have* to calculate a
>>> label and can't get one from the underlying fs if it is not set.
>>
>> It means the filesystem supports per-file labeling and you can use
>> setxattr(..."security.selinux") and setfscreatecon() for files on it.
>> You can see whether it is set on a filesystem by looking for the
>> seclabel option in cat /proc/mounts.  If it is not set, then we ignore
>> tsec->create_sid.  It is arguable as to whether it is correct to always
>> call security_transition_sid() there either, but that's another topic.
> 
> Okay, so how about the attached?
> 
> David
> ---
> static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct inode *dir,
> 					 const struct qstr *name,
> 					 const char *caller,
> 					 u16 tclass,
> 					 u32 *_new_isid)
> {
> 	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
> 	const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = dir->i_security;
> 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
> 
> 	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
> 	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
> 		*_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
> 	} else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
> 		   tsec->create_sid) {
> 		*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
> 	} else {
> 		return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
> 					       name, _new_isid);
> 	}
> 
> 	return 0;
> }

Except you can drop the caller argument now.



  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-06-18 15:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-06-18 13:32 [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 1/8] overlay: Call ovl_drop_write() earlier in ovl_dentry_open() David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 2/8] overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay David Howells
2015-07-20 12:42   ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-07-21 13:28     ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 3/8] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 4/8] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling David Howells
2015-06-18 14:44   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 16:51     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:34   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 6/8] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2015-06-18 14:54   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:04     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 7/8] SELinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label David Howells
2015-06-18 14:56   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:13     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:20       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:32         ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:47           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:47           ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 8/8] SELinux: Check against union label for file operations David Howells
2015-06-19  7:20 ` [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support Al Viro
2015-06-19  7:52   ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19  7:59     ` Al Viro
2015-06-19  8:11       ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19  8:29         ` Al Viro
2015-06-19  8:36           ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19 14:04     ` David Howells

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