From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Paul Osmialowski <p.osmialowsk@samsung.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: kdbus: credential faking
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 10:16:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <559FFDDF.2090302@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANq1E4Sdpb81PW9Ju+bnRjtZ=9HkGwGse-gstx1SjaEzmWiT-w@mail.gmail.com>
On 7/10/2015 9:26 AM, David Herrmann wrote:
> Hi
>
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 5:59 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> [...]
>> There are so many ways uids are being (miss/ab)used
>> on Linux systems these days that the idea of trusting a bus just
>> because its non-root uid is listed in a table somewhere (or worse,
>> coded in an API) is asking for exploits.
> Please elaborate on these possible exploits. I'd also like to hear,
> whether the same applies to the already used '/run/user/<uid>/bus',
> which follows nearly the same model.
Sorry, I'm not the exploit generator guy. If I where, I would
point out that the application expecting the uid to identify
a person is going to behave incorrectly on the system that uses
the uid to identify an application. I never said that I liked
/run/user/<uid>/bus. Come to think of it, I never said I like
dbus, either.
>
> Thanks
> David
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-10 17:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-09 18:26 kdbus: credential faking Stephen Smalley
2015-07-09 22:22 ` David Herrmann
2015-07-09 22:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-10 9:05 ` David Herrmann
2015-07-10 13:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-10 13:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-10 13:43 ` David Herrmann
2015-07-10 14:20 ` Martin Steigerwald
2015-07-10 14:25 ` Martin Steigerwald
2015-07-10 14:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-10 14:57 ` Alex Elsayed
2015-07-10 16:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-10 16:30 ` Alex Elsayed
2015-07-10 17:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-10 16:48 ` David Herrmann
2015-07-10 18:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-10 22:04 ` Greg KH
2015-07-10 15:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-10 16:26 ` David Herrmann
2015-07-10 17:16 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2015-07-10 18:02 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-07-10 18:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-10 18:39 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-07-11 11:30 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-07-11 11:02 ` Christoph Hellwig
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