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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 13:36:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55A6C448.5050902@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1436989569-69582-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

On 7/15/2015 12:46 PM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> These are the first in a larger set of patches that I've been working on
> (with help from Eric Biederman) to support mounting ext4 and fuse
> filesystems from within user namespaces. I've pushed the full series to:
>
>   git://kernel.ubuntu.com/sforshee/linux.git userns-mounts
>
> Taking the series as a whole, the strategy is to handle as much of the
> heavy lifting as possible in the vfs so the filesystems don't have to
> handle weird edge cases. If you look at the full series you'll find that
> the changes in ext4 to support user namespace mounts turn out to be
> fairly minimal (fuse is a bit more complicated though as it must deal
> with translating ids for a userspace process which is running in pid and
> user namespaces).
>
> The patches I'm sending today lay some of the groundwork in the vfs and
> related code. They fall into two broad groups:
>
>  1. Patches 1-2 add s_user_ns and simplify MNT_NODEV handling. These are
>     pretty straightforward, and Eric has expressed interest in merging
>     these patches soon. Note that patch 2 won't apply cleanly without
>     Eric's noexec patches for proc and sys [1].
>
>  2. Patches 2-7 tighten down security for mounts with s_user_ns !=
>     &init_user_ns. This includes updates to how file caps and suid are
>     handled and LSM updates to ignore security labels on superblocks
>     from non-init namespaces.
>
>     The LSM changes in particular may not be optimal, as I don't have a
>     lot of familiarity with this code, so I'd be especially appreciative
>     of review of these changes and suggestions on how to improve them.

Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com> proposed
LSM support in user namespaces ([RFC] lsm: namespace hooks)
that make a whole lot more sense than just turning off
the option of using labels on files. Gutting the ability
to use MAC in a namespace is a step down the road of
making MAC and namespaces incompatible.



>
> Subsequent patches will update the vfs for id translation, handling
> various corner cases, giving privileges to the user namsepace which owns
> a superblock, and finally supporting user namespace mounts for ext4 and
> fuse.
>
> Thanks,
> Seth
>
> [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87mvz4yomp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
>
>
> Andy Lutomirski (1):
>   fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
>
> Eric W. Biederman (1):
>   userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling.
>
> Seth Forshee (5):
>   fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block
>   fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces
>   security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts
>   selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts
>   smack: Don't use security labels for user namespace mounts
>
>  fs/block_dev.c                 |  2 +-
>  fs/exec.c                      |  2 +-
>  fs/namei.c                     |  9 ++++++++-
>  fs/namespace.c                 | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>  fs/proc/root.c                 |  3 ++-
>  fs/super.c                     | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  include/linux/fs.h             |  9 +++++++++
>  include/linux/mount.h          |  1 +
>  include/linux/user_namespace.h |  8 ++++++++
>  kernel/user_namespace.c        | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  security/commoncap.c           |  4 +++-
>  security/security.c            | 10 +++++++++-
>  security/selinux/hooks.c       | 16 +++++++++++++++-
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c     | 12 ++++++++++--
>  14 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-07-15 20:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 117+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-07-15 19:46 [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  2:47   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-05 21:03     ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-05 21:19       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-06 14:20         ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 14:51           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-06 15:44             ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 16:11               ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-07 14:16                 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 14:32           ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 18:35             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-07 18:57               ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 21:48   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 21:50     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-15 22:35       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  1:14         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  1:23           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 13:06             ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  1:19         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  4:23           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  4:49             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  5:04               ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  5:15                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  5:44                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:13                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17  0:43                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-29 16:04                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-29 16:18                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-07-17  6:46   ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:23   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:02     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:14       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 20:25         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 20:40           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 13:57             ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 14:39               ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 15:36                 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 16:23                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-24 15:11                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 15:57                       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-30 16:24                         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] smack: Don't use security labels for " Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 20:43   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 20:36 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2015-07-15 21:06   ` [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 21:48     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 22:28       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  1:05         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  2:20           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:12           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-15 23:04       ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 22:39     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16  1:08       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  2:54         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16  4:47           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  0:09             ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-17  0:42               ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  2:47                 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-21 17:37                   ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22  7:56                     ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-22 14:09                       ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 16:52                         ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-07-22 17:41                           ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23  1:51                             ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-23 13:19                               ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 23:48                                 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-18  0:07                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-20 17:54             ` Colin Walters
2015-07-16 11:16     ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-17  0:10       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 10:13         ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-16  3:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:59   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 15:09     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 18:57       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 21:42         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 22:27           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 23:08             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 23:29               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17  0:45                 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-17  0:59                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 14:28                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-17 14:56                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-21 20:35                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22  1:52                       ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 15:56                         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 18:10                           ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 19:32                             ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23  0:05                               ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-23  0:15                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-23  5:15                                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 21:48                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-28 20:40                                 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 16:18                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 17:05                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 17:25                                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 17:33                                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 13:21           ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 17:14             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 15:59     ` Seth Forshee
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-07-30  4:24 Amir Goldstein
2015-07-30 13:55 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 14:47   ` Amir Goldstein
2015-07-30 15:33     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 15:52       ` Colin Walters
2015-07-30 16:15         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 13:57 ` Serge Hallyn
2015-07-30 15:09   ` Amir Goldstein
2015-07-31  8:11 Amir Goldstein
2015-07-31 19:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-01 17:01   ` Amir Goldstein

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