From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 13:36:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55A6C448.5050902@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1436989569-69582-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>
On 7/15/2015 12:46 PM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> These are the first in a larger set of patches that I've been working on
> (with help from Eric Biederman) to support mounting ext4 and fuse
> filesystems from within user namespaces. I've pushed the full series to:
>
> git://kernel.ubuntu.com/sforshee/linux.git userns-mounts
>
> Taking the series as a whole, the strategy is to handle as much of the
> heavy lifting as possible in the vfs so the filesystems don't have to
> handle weird edge cases. If you look at the full series you'll find that
> the changes in ext4 to support user namespace mounts turn out to be
> fairly minimal (fuse is a bit more complicated though as it must deal
> with translating ids for a userspace process which is running in pid and
> user namespaces).
>
> The patches I'm sending today lay some of the groundwork in the vfs and
> related code. They fall into two broad groups:
>
> 1. Patches 1-2 add s_user_ns and simplify MNT_NODEV handling. These are
> pretty straightforward, and Eric has expressed interest in merging
> these patches soon. Note that patch 2 won't apply cleanly without
> Eric's noexec patches for proc and sys [1].
>
> 2. Patches 2-7 tighten down security for mounts with s_user_ns !=
> &init_user_ns. This includes updates to how file caps and suid are
> handled and LSM updates to ignore security labels on superblocks
> from non-init namespaces.
>
> The LSM changes in particular may not be optimal, as I don't have a
> lot of familiarity with this code, so I'd be especially appreciative
> of review of these changes and suggestions on how to improve them.
Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com> proposed
LSM support in user namespaces ([RFC] lsm: namespace hooks)
that make a whole lot more sense than just turning off
the option of using labels on files. Gutting the ability
to use MAC in a namespace is a step down the road of
making MAC and namespaces incompatible.
>
> Subsequent patches will update the vfs for id translation, handling
> various corner cases, giving privileges to the user namsepace which owns
> a superblock, and finally supporting user namespace mounts for ext4 and
> fuse.
>
> Thanks,
> Seth
>
> [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87mvz4yomp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
>
>
> Andy Lutomirski (1):
> fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
>
> Eric W. Biederman (1):
> userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling.
>
> Seth Forshee (5):
> fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block
> fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces
> security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts
> selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts
> smack: Don't use security labels for user namespace mounts
>
> fs/block_dev.c | 2 +-
> fs/exec.c | 2 +-
> fs/namei.c | 9 ++++++++-
> fs/namespace.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
> fs/proc/root.c | 3 ++-
> fs/super.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> include/linux/fs.h | 9 +++++++++
> include/linux/mount.h | 1 +
> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 8 ++++++++
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> security/commoncap.c | 4 +++-
> security/security.c | 10 +++++++++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> 14 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-15 20:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 117+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-15 19:46 [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 2:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-05 21:03 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-05 21:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-06 14:20 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 14:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-06 15:44 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-07 14:16 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 14:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 18:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-07 18:57 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 21:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 21:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-15 22:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 1:14 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 13:06 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 4:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 4:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 5:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 5:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 5:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:13 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 0:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-29 16:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-29 16:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 6:46 ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:14 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 20:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 13:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 14:39 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 15:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 16:23 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-24 15:11 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 15:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-30 16:24 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] smack: Don't use security labels for " Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 20:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 20:36 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2015-07-15 21:06 ` [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 21:48 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 22:28 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 1:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 2:20 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-15 23:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 1:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 2:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 4:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 0:09 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-17 0:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 2:47 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-21 17:37 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 7:56 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-22 14:09 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 16:52 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-07-22 17:41 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 1:51 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-23 13:19 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 23:48 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-18 0:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-20 17:54 ` Colin Walters
2015-07-16 11:16 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-17 0:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 10:13 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-16 3:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:59 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 15:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 18:57 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 21:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 22:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 23:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 0:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-17 0:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 14:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-17 14:56 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-21 20:35 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 1:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 15:56 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 18:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 19:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 0:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-23 0:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-23 5:15 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 21:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-28 20:40 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 16:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 17:25 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 13:21 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 17:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 15:59 ` Seth Forshee
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-07-30 4:24 Amir Goldstein
2015-07-30 13:55 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 14:47 ` Amir Goldstein
2015-07-30 15:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 15:52 ` Colin Walters
2015-07-30 16:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 13:57 ` Serge Hallyn
2015-07-30 15:09 ` Amir Goldstein
2015-07-31 8:11 Amir Goldstein
2015-07-31 19:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-01 17:01 ` Amir Goldstein
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