Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts

[Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>]

On 7/15/2015 6:08 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 7/15/2015 2:06 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> writes:
>>> The first step needs to be not trusting those labels and treating such
>>> filesystems as filesystems without label support.  I hope that is Seth
>>> has implemented.
>> A filesystem with Smack labels gets mounted in a namespace. The labels
>> are ignored. Instead, the filesystem defaults (potentially specified as
>> mount options smackfsdef="something", but usually the floor label ("_"))
>> are used, giving the user the ability to read everything and (usually)
>> change nothing. This is both dangerous (unintended read access to files)
>> and pointless (can't make changes).
> I don't get it.
>
> If I mount an unprivileged filesystem, then either the contents were
> put there *by me*, in which case letting me access them are fine, or
> (with Seth's patches and then some) I control the backing store, in
> which case I can do whatever I want regardless of what LSM thinks.
>
> So I don't see the problem.  Why would Smack or any other LSM care at
> all, unless it wants to prevent me from mounting the fs in the first
> place?

First off, I don't cotton to the notion that you should be able
to mount filesystems without privilege. But it seems I'm being
outvoted on that. I suspect that there are cases where it might
be safe, but I can't think of one off the top of my head.

If you do mount a filesystem it needs to behave according to the
rules of the system. If you have a security module that uses
attributes on the filesystem you can't ignore them just because
it's "your data". Mandatory access control schemes, including
Smack and SELinux don't give a fig about who you are. It's the
label on the data and the process that matter. If "you" get to
muck the labels up, you've broken the mandatory access control.

> --Andy