From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>,
Sungbae Yoo <sungbae.yoo@samsung.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Smack: replace capable() with ns_capable()
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 09:59:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55B3C063.4090106@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1437738032.2190.2.camel@samsung.com>
On 7/24/2015 4:40 AM, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
> On pią, 2015-07-24 at 20:26 +0900, Sungbae Yoo wrote:
>> If current task has capabilities, Smack operations (eg. Changing own
>> smack
>> label) should be available even inside of namespace.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sungbae Yoo <sungbae.yoo@samsung.com>
For the reasons Lukasz outlines below.
Nacked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c
>> b/security/smack/smack_access.c
>> index 00f6b38..f6b2c35 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
>> @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap)
>> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
>> struct smack_onlycap *sop;
>>
>> - if (!capable(cap))
>> + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), cap))
>> return 0;
> It's not that easy.
>
> With this change Smack becomes completely insecure. You can change
> rules as an unprivileged user without any problems now.
> What you want is Smack namespace that was made to remedy exactly this
> issue (e.g. changing own labels inside a namespace).
>
>>
>> rcu_read_lock();
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index a143328..7fdc3dd 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -403,7 +403,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct
>> task_struct *tracer,
>> rc = 0;
>> else if (smack_ptrace_rule ==
>> SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
>> rc = -EACCES;
>> - else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
>> + else if (ns_capable(__task_cred(tracer)->user_ns,
>> + CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
>> rc = 0;
>> else
>> rc = -EACCES;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-25 16:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-24 11:26 [PATCH] Smack: replace capable() with ns_capable() Sungbae Yoo
2015-07-24 11:40 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-25 16:59 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2015-07-27 1:27 ` Sungbae Yoo
2015-07-27 8:52 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-28 14:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-28 15:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-28 16:11 ` Casey Schaufler
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