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From: Dongsheng Yang <yangds.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
To: Josh Cartwright <joshc@ni.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	<linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Subodh Nijsure <snijsure@grid-net.com>,
	Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>,
	Brad Mouring <brad.mouring@ni.com>,
	Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>,
	Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>,
	Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] ubifs: Remove dead xattr code
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2015 09:00:32 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55DE6130.1060905@cn.fujitsu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150826141509.GJ8016@jcartwri.amer.corp.natinst.com>

On 08/26/2015 10:15 PM, Josh Cartwright wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 10:48:38AM +0800, Dongsheng Yang wrote:
>> On 08/20/2015 04:35 AM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>>> This is a partial revert of commit d7f0b70d30ffb9bbe6b8a3e1035cf0b79965ef53
>>> ("UBIFS: Add security.* XATTR support for the UBIFS").
>>
>> Hi Richard,
>> 	What about a full reverting of this commit. In ubifs, we
>> *can* support any namespace of xattr including user, trusted, security
>> or other anyone prefixed by any words. But we have a check_namespace()
>> in xattr.c to limit what we want to support. That said, if we want to
>> "Add security.* XATTR support for the UBIFS", what we need to do is
>> just extending the check_namespace() to allow security namespace pass.
>> And yes, check_namespace() have been supporting security namespace.
>
> Is this good enough?  Yes, it'd mean that the xattrs end up on disk, but
> then who's responsible for invoking the selected LSMs inode_init_security() hooks?
> AFAICT, we'd still need to invoke security_inode_init_security for newly
> created inodes (which, Richard's proposed commit still does).

OH, right. My bad!!!! I missed the security_inode_init_security().
Besides to allow security.* prefix in xattr, we still need to call
security_inode_init_security() in ubifs_create(). That's true.

So what we need to remove is only the ubifs_xattr_handlers.

Thanx Josh, you are right.

And Richard, sorry for my bad mind.

Reviewed-by: Dongsheng Yang <yangds.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>

Thanx
Yang
>
> Thanks,
>
>    Josh (who, admittedly, is neither a filesystem nor security module guy :)
>


      reply	other threads:[~2015-08-27  1:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-08-19 20:35 [PATCH 1/2] ubifs: Remove dead xattr code Richard Weinberger
2015-08-19 20:35 ` [PATCH 2/2] ubifs: Allow O_DIRECT Richard Weinberger
2015-08-20  3:00   ` Dongsheng Yang
2015-08-20  6:42     ` Richard Weinberger
2015-08-20  7:14       ` Dongsheng Yang
2015-08-20 11:31     ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-20 11:40       ` Richard Weinberger
2015-08-20 12:34         ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-24  7:18           ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-24  7:17             ` Dongsheng Yang
2015-08-24  7:20               ` Dongsheng Yang
2015-08-24  8:06               ` Christoph Hellwig
2015-08-20 20:49         ` Brian Norris
2015-08-24  7:13           ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-24  7:53             ` Christoph Hellwig
2015-08-24  8:02               ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-24  8:03                 ` Christoph Hellwig
2015-08-24  8:00                   ` Dongsheng Yang
2015-08-24  9:34                   ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-24  9:35                     ` Richard Weinberger
2015-08-24 16:18             ` Brian Norris
2015-08-24 17:19               ` Jeff Moyer
2015-08-24 23:46                 ` Dave Chinner
2015-08-25  1:28                   ` Chris Mason
2015-08-25 15:48                     ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-25 14:00                   ` Jeff Moyer
2015-08-25 14:13                     ` Chris Mason
2015-08-25 14:18                       ` Jeff Moyer
2015-08-20 11:29   ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-20  2:48 ` [PATCH 1/2] ubifs: Remove dead xattr code Dongsheng Yang
2015-08-20  6:42   ` Artem Bityutskiy
2015-08-20  6:45   ` Richard Weinberger
2015-08-26 14:15   ` Josh Cartwright
2015-08-27  1:00     ` Dongsheng Yang [this message]

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