From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
To: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>, <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
<stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Riku Voipio" <riku.voipio@linaro.org>,
Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm/xen: Enable user access to the kernel before issuing a privcmd call
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2015 15:56:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55F2EBA6.6060008@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1441983304.3549.73.camel@citrix.com>
On 11/09/15 15:55, Ian Campbell wrote:
> On Fri, 2015-09-11 at 15:45 +0100, Julien Grall wrote:
>> On 11/09/15 15:29, Ian Campbell wrote:
>>> On Fri, 2015-09-11 at 15:16 +0100, Julien Grall wrote:
>>>> When Xen is copyin data to/from the guest it will check if the kernel
>>>
>>> "copying"
>>>
>>>> has the right to do the access. If not, the hypercall will return an
>>>> error.
>>>>
>>>> After the commit a5e090acbf545c0a3b04080f8a488b17ec41fe02 "ARM:
>>>> software-based priviledged-no-access support", the kernel can't
>>>> access
>>>
>>> "privileged"
>>>
>>>> anymore the user space by default. This will result to fail on every
>>>
>>> "any more" (or "any longer")
>>>
>>>> hypercall made by the userspace (i.e via privcmd).
>>>>
>>>> We have to enable the userspace access and then restore the correct
>>>> permission everytime the privmcd is used to made an hypercall.
>>>
>>> "every time" and "privcmd"
>>>
>>>> HYPERCALL1(tmem_op);
>>>> HYPERCALL2(multicall);
>>>>
>>>> -ENTRY(privcmd_call)
>>>> +ENTRY(__privcmd_call)
>>>
>>> arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h seems to contain uaccess_* macros
>>> which
>>> could be used right here directly I think? That would be preferable to
>>> wrapping I think.
>>
>> Looking to the uaccess_save macro:
>
> I was thinking more about uaccess_enable/disable.
Well, we can't assume that the function will be called with uaccess
disabled. So we have to save the state and restore it after issuing the
hypercall.
Regards,
--
Julien Grall
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-09-11 14:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-11 14:16 [PATCH] arm/xen: Enable user access to the kernel before issuing a privcmd call Julien Grall
2015-09-11 14:29 ` Ian Campbell
2015-09-11 14:45 ` Julien Grall
2015-09-11 14:55 ` Ian Campbell
2015-09-11 14:56 ` Julien Grall [this message]
2015-09-11 15:25 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2015-09-11 15:36 ` Julien Grall
2015-09-11 15:20 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2015-09-11 16:22 ` Julien Grall
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