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From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>,
	olofj@chromium.org, alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
	javier.martinez@collabora.co.uk
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - Fix security issue
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 10:35:35 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56D883F7.6020002@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1456984736-19811-1-git-send-email-gwendal@chromium.org>

On 03/02/16 21:58, Gwendal Grignou wrote:
> Add a check to prevent memory scribbe when sending an ioctl with .insize

                                scribble

> set so large that memory allocation argument overflows.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
> ---
>  drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.c | 12 +++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.c b/drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.c
> index d45cd25..86d6373 100644
> --- a/drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.c
> @@ -131,13 +131,23 @@ static ssize_t ec_device_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buffer,
>  static long ec_device_ioctl_xcmd(struct cros_ec_dev *ec, void __user *arg)
>  {
>  	long ret;
> +	size_t data_size;
>  	struct cros_ec_command u_cmd;
>  	struct cros_ec_command *s_cmd;
>  
>  	if (copy_from_user(&u_cmd, arg, sizeof(u_cmd)))
>  		return -EFAULT;
>  
> -	s_cmd = kmalloc(sizeof(*s_cmd) + max(u_cmd.outsize, u_cmd.insize),
> +	/*
> +	 * Prevent mallicious attack where .inside is so big that amount

	           malicious               .insize

> +	 * kmalloc'ed rollover, allowing memcpy to write beyond the allocated
> +	 * space.
> +	 */
> +	data_size = max(u_cmd.outsize, u_cmd.insize);
> +	if (data_size + sizeof(*s_cmd) < data_size)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	s_cmd = kmalloc(sizeof(*s_cmd) + data_size,
>  			GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!s_cmd)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> 


-- 
~Randy

  reply	other threads:[~2016-03-03 18:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-01 20:33 Security hole in cros_ec_dev.c on 32bit chrome hosts Alan Cox
2016-03-03  5:58 ` [PATCH] platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - Fix security issue Gwendal Grignou
2016-03-03 18:35   ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2016-03-03 19:00     ` [PATCH v2] " Gwendal Grignou
2016-03-06 20:11       ` Olof Johansson
2016-03-08 17:02         ` Gwendal Grignou
2016-03-08 17:13           ` [PATCH v3] " Gwendal Grignou
2016-05-11 17:58             ` Olof Johansson

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