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From: Scotty Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	wmealing@redhat.com,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] SROP Mitigation: Sigreturn Cookies
Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2016 15:36:49 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56FAF571.3040802@eng.utah.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUxfPBawXNvKZgOnxhkaesw-b4PqCFUZbkRdaaqpjqnPQ@mail.gmail.com>



On 03/29/2016 03:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 12:53 PM, Scott Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu> wrote:
>> Sigreturn-oriented programming is a new attack vector in userland
>> where an attacker crafts a fake signal frame on the stack and calls
>> sigreturn. The kernel will extract the fake signal frame, which
>> contains attacker controlled "saved" registers. The kernel will then
>> transfer control to the attacker controlled userland instruction pointer.
>>
>> To prevent SROP attacks the kernel needs to know or be able to dervive
>> whether a sigreturn it is processing is in response to a legitimate
>> signal the kernel previously delivered.
>>
>> Further information and test code can be found in Documentation/security
>> and this excellent article:
>> http://lwn.net/Articles/676803/
>>
>> These patches implement the necessary changes to generate a cookie
>> which will be placed above signal frame upon signal delivery to userland.
>> The cookie is generated using a per-process random value xor'd with
>> the address where the cookie will be stored on the stack.
>>
>> Upon a sigreturn the kernel will extract the cookie from userland,
>> recalculate what the original cookie should be and verify that the two
>> do not differ. If the two differ the kernel will terminate the process
>> with a SIGSEGV.
>>
>> This prevents SROP by adding a value that the attacker cannot guess,
>> but the kernel can verify. Therefore an attacker cannot use sigreturn as
>> a method to control the flow of a process.
>>
> 
> Has anyone verified that this doesn't break CRIU cross-machine (or
> cross-boot) migration and that this doesn't break dosemu?  You're
> changing the ABI here.
> 

I haven't yet I'll do that to verify it breaks -- I'm pretty sure under some
conditions it will break CRIU. That's why we added the sysctl to turn it off. 
Should I have mentioned this in the main commit that it possibly breaks CRIU/DOSEMU?
I went ahead and added that to the Documentation.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-03-29 21:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-29 19:53 [PATCH v4 0/4] SROP Mitigation: Sigreturn Cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 23:04   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-31 20:25   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-31 22:00     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-31 22:17       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-29 19:53 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] x86: SROP Mitigation: Implement Signal Cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] Sysctl: SROP Mitigation: Add Sysctl argument to disable SROP Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:59   ` Andi Kleen
2016-03-29 20:46     ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 20:53       ` Andi Kleen
2016-03-29 19:53 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] Documentation: SROP Mitigation: Add documentation for SROP cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 20:12   ` Brian Gerst
2016-04-24 16:27   ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-29 21:29 ` [PATCH v4 0/4] SROP Mitigation: Sigreturn Cookies Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 21:36   ` Scotty Bauer [this message]
2016-03-29 21:38     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 22:34       ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 23:14         ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-31 20:22           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-04-01 12:57             ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2016-03-29 22:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-04-24 16:14   ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-29 22:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 22:55   ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 23:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 23:11   ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 23:25     ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 23:34       ` Scotty Bauer

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