From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "amit.shah@amd.com" <amit.shah@amd.com>,
"Kohler, Jon" <jon@nutanix.com>,
"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
"mtosatti@redhat.com" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
"nikunj@amd.com" <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/22] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 04:29:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <58010441d334fe400d292a6ec53cccb568f4e4c6.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260321000931.1947084-2-pbonzini@redhat.com>
On Sat, 2026-03-21 at 01:09 +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> From: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
>
> EPT exit qualification bit 6 is used when mode-based execute control
> is enabled, and reflects user executable addresses. Rework name to
> reflect the intention and add to EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK, which allows
> simplifying the return evaluation in
> tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending a pinch.
>
> Rework handling in __vmx_handle_ept_violation to unconditionally clear
> EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC until MBEC is implemented, as suggested by
> Sean [1].
>
> Note: Intel SDM Table 29-7 defines bit 6 as:
> If the “mode-based execute control” VM-execution control is 0, the
> value of this bit is undefined. If that control is 1, this bit is the
> logical-AND of bit 10 in the EPT paging-structure entries used to
> translate the guest-physical address of the access causing the EPT
> violation. In this case, it indicates whether the guest-physical
> address was executable for user-mode linear addresses.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aCJDzU1p_SFNRIJd@google.com/
>
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
> Message-ID: <20251223054806.1611168-2-jon@nutanix.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-25 4:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-21 0:09 [RFC PATCH 00/22] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 01/22] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-23 14:49 ` Jon Kohler
2026-03-25 4:29 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 02/22] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-25 4:29 ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: adjust MMIO generation bit allocation and allowed mask Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-24 3:48 ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-24 9:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: shuffle high bits of SPTEs in preparation for MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-25 4:35 ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 05/22] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_EPT_* Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-25 4:36 ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 06/22] KVM: x86/mmu: merge make_spte_{non,}executable Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-23 14:49 ` Jon Kohler
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 07/22] KVM: x86/mmu: rename and clarify BYTE_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 08/22] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce ACC_READ_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-23 14:49 ` Jon Kohler
2026-03-23 14:49 ` Jon Kohler
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 09/22] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 10/22] KVM: x86/mmu: split XS/XU bits for MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-24 10:45 ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-24 11:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-25 4:28 ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 11/22] KVM: x86/mmu: move cr4_smep to base role Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 12/22] KVM: VMX: enable use of MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-23 14:49 ` Jon Kohler
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 13/22] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for nested MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-23 14:49 ` Jon Kohler
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 14/22] KVM: nVMX: advertise MBEC to nested guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-23 14:49 ` Jon Kohler
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 15/22] KVM: nVMX: allow MBEC with EVMCS Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 16/22] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: propagate access mask from kvm_mmu_page to PTE Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 17/22] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce cpu_role bit for availability of PFEC.I/D Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 18/22] KVM: SVM: add GMET bit definitions Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 11:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-21 13:51 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 15:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-23 7:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-23 12:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-23 12:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-23 12:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-23 12:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-23 12:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 19/22] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for NPT GMET Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 20/22] KVM: SVM: enable GMET and set it in MMU role Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-25 9:25 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-25 9:29 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-25 9:39 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-25 10:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 21/22] KVM: SVM: work around errata 1218 Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 0:09 ` [PATCH 22/22] KVM: nSVM: enable GMET for guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-24 19:57 ` Jon Kohler
2026-03-25 5:22 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-25 12:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-03-21 13:54 ` [RFC PATCH 00/22] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
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