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From: "PaX Team" <pageexec@freemail.hu>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	"axboe@kernel.dk" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>,
	David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2017 04:14:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5900026E.29602.1FC65392@pageexec.freemail.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJF0g7Yw+2PDw_woyv0GsCOrX61noMu00p-hSO4Thi65Q@mail.gmail.com>

On 25 Apr 2017 at 9:39, Kees Cook wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 4:26 AM, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> wrote:
> > INT_MAX threads would be needed when the leaking path is locked so
> > that it can only be exercised once and you'll need to get normal
> > (balanced) paths preempted just after the increment. if the leaking
> > path is lockless (can be exercised in parallel without bounds) then
> > 2 threads are enough where the one triggering the signed overflow
> > would have to be preempted while the other one does INT_MAX increments
> > and trigger the UAF. this is where the other mechanisms i talked about
> > in the past become relevant: preemption or interrupts can be disabled
> > or negative refcount values can be detected and acted upon (your blind
> > copy-pasting effort passed upon this latter opportunity by not
> > specializing the 'jo' into 'js' for the refcount case).
> 
> Well, it's not "blind" -- I'm trying to bring the code as-is to
> upstream for discussion/examination with as little functional
> differences as possible so it's easier to compare apples to apples.

you copied code from a version which is at least 2 major kernel revisions
behind (so much for those apples), you chose the one version which had a
bug that you didn't spot nor fix properly, you didn't realize the opportunity
that a special refcount type represents, you claimed refcount underflows
aren't exploitable but copied code that would detect signed underflow, you
didn't understand the limits and edge cases i explained above... need i go
on? doesn't leave one with great confidence in your ability to understand
and maintain this code...

  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-26  2:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-21 22:09 [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Kees Cook
2017-04-24  8:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-24  8:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-04-24  9:20     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-24 11:00   ` PaX Team
2017-04-24 11:15     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-24 13:08       ` PaX Team
2017-04-24 13:33         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-24 15:15           ` PaX Team
2017-04-24 20:40             ` Kees Cook
2017-04-24 22:01               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-24 22:37                 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-25  1:11                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2017-04-25  9:05                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-25 11:26                 ` PaX Team
2017-04-25 16:36                   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-24 20:33     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-25 11:26       ` PaX Team
2017-04-25 16:39         ` Kees Cook
2017-04-26  2:14           ` PaX Team [this message]
2017-04-26  4:42             ` Kees Cook
2017-04-24 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-24 10:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-24 20:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-24 10:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-24 20:21   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-25 10:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-04-25 11:26   ` PaX Team

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