Re: [PATCH v2] lzo: fix ip overrun during compress.

["Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer" <markus@oberhumer.com>]

Hi Yueyi,

yes, my LZO patch works for all cases.

The reason behind the issue in the first place is that if KASLR
includes the very last page 0xfffffffffffff000 then we do not have a
valid C "pointer to an object" anymore because of address wraparound.

Unrelated to my patch I'd argue that KASLR should *NOT* include the
very last page - indeed that might cause similar wraparound problems
in lots of code.

Eg, look at this simple clear_memory() implementation:

void clear_memory(char *p, size_t len) {
        char *end = p + len;
        while (p < end)
                *p++= 0;
}

Valid code like this will fail horribly when (p, len) is the very
last virtual page (because end will be the NULL pointer in this case).

Cheers,
Markus



On 2018-12-05 04:07, Yueyi Li wrote:
> Hi Markus,
> 
> Thanks for your review.
> 
> On 2018/12/4 18:20, Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> I don't think that address space wraparound is legal in C, but I
>> understand that we are in kernel land and if you really want to
>> compress the last virtual page 0xfffffffffffff000 the following
>> small patch should fix that dubious case.
> 
> I guess the VA 0xfffffffffffff000 is available because KASLR be
> enabled. For this case we can see:
> 
> crash> kmem 0xfffffffffffff000
>        PAGE               PHYSICAL      MAPPING       INDEX CNT FLAGS
> ffffffbfffffffc0        1fffff000 ffffffff1655ecb9  7181fd5  2 
> 8000000000064209 locked,uptodate,owner_priv_1,writeback,reclaim,swapbacked
> 
>> This also avoids slowing down the the hot path of the compression
>> core function.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Markus
>>
>>
>>
>> diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
>> index 236eb21167b5..959dec45f6fe 100644
>> --- a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
>> +++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c
>> @@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ int lzo1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
>>   
>>          while (l > 20) {
>>                  size_t ll = l <= (M4_MAX_OFFSET + 1) ? l : (M4_MAX_OFFSET + 1);
>> -               uintptr_t ll_end = (uintptr_t) ip + ll;
>> -               if ((ll_end + ((t + ll) >> 5)) <= ll_end)
>> +               // check for address space wraparound
>> +               if (((uintptr_t) ip + ll + ((t + ll) >> 5)) <= (uintptr_t) ip)
>>                          break;
>>                  BUILD_BUG_ON(D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t) > LZO1X_1_MEM_COMPRESS);
>>                  memset(wrkmem, 0, D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t));
> I parsed panic ramdump and loaded CPU register values,  can see:
> 
> -000|lzo1x_1_do_compress(
>      |    in = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000,
>      |  ?,
>      |    out = 0xFFFFFFFF2E2EE000,
>      |    out_len = 0xFFFFFF801CAA3510,
>      |  ?,
>      |    wrkmem = 0xFFFFFFFF4EBC0000)
>      |  dict = 0xFFFFFFFF4EBC0000
>      |  op = 0x1
>      |  ip = 0x9
>      |  ii = 0x9
>      |  in_end = 0x0
>      |  ip_end = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEC
>      |  m_len = 0
>      |  m_off = 1922
> -001|lzo1x_1_compress(
>      |    in = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000,
>      |    in_len = 0,
>      |    out = 0xFFFFFFFF2E2EE000,
>      |    out_len = 0x00000001616FB7D0,
>      |    wrkmem = 0xFFFFFFFF4EBC0000)
>      |  ip = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000
>      |  op = 0xFFFFFFFF2E2EE000
>      |  l = 4096
>      |  t = 0
>      |  ll = 4096
> 
> ll = l = in_len = 4096 in lzo1x_1_compress,  so your patch is working 
> for this panic case, but, I`m
> not sure, is it possible that in = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000 and  in_len < 4096?
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> Yueyi
> 

-- 
Markus Oberhumer, <markus@oberhumer.com>, http://www.oberhumer.com/