From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 11:51:09 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6258.1479901869@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu92VwUo=1Fh39r1WxNWo-mQRLx8sDby+rGcero8oyi-WA@mail.gmail.com>
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> > What I've changed the ARM and ARM64 things to is:
> >
> > #define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) ((efi_##f##_t *)sys_table_arg->runtime->f)(__VA_ARGS__)
> >
>
> Could we please instead fix the definition of efi_runtime_services_t,
> given that we have typedefs already for all its members?
Okay, I've pulled in your patch and removed the cast.
I would like to provide wrapper static inlines for things like
efi_get_variable() to get the parameter checking, but the sys_table_arg
behind-the-scenes parameter is tricky to deal with in that case.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-23 11:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-23 0:22 [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2] David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:34 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-23 11:51 ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-23 10:27 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:46 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:31 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 9:53 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:10 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:25 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:42 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:13 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 14:24 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:55 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-30 16:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:27 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:07 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:09 ` David Howells
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