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From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception for Secure TSC enabled guests
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2024 22:09:14 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <638034b7-5c1e-d261-058a-79d795580410@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241111155355.GDZzIok9eRWDPKnmS_@fat_crate.local>



On 11/11/2024 9:23 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 11:04:23AM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> The hypervisor should not be intercepting RDTSC/RDTSCP when Secure TSC is
>> enabled. A #VC exception will be generated if the RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions
>> are being intercepted. If this should occur and Secure TSC is enabled,
>> guest execution should be terminated as the guest cannot rely on the TSC
>> value provided by the hypervisor.
> 
> This should be in the comment below.

Same message in commit and the code comment ?

> 
>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
>> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c | 10 ++++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
>> index 71de53194089..c2a9e2ada659 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
>> @@ -1140,6 +1140,16 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb,
>>  	bool rdtscp = (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP);
>>  	enum es_result ret;
>>  
>> +	/*
>> +	 * RDTSC and RDTSCP should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
>> +	 * enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
>> +	 * This file is included from kernel/sev.c and boot/compressed/sev.c,
>> +	 * use sev_status here as cc_platform_has() is not available when
>> +	 * compiling boot/compressed/sev.c.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
>> +		return ES_VMM_ERROR;
>> +
>>  	ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code, 0, 0);
>>  	if (ret != ES_OK)
>>  		return ret;
>> -- 
>> 2.34.1
>>
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2024-11-11 16:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-28  5:34 [PATCH v14 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29 17:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-30  4:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-30 10:10       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29  8:41   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29  8:46     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-29  9:19       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 14:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 14:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-29 14:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 14:50           ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 15:03             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 15:14               ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 15:57                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 16:50                 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-29 17:05                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-30 11:55   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-01 16:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11  7:03     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11  8:46       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 10:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 11:23           ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 11:30             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 11:44               ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 13:42                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-12  8:43                   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 10:34       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-11-01 16:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11  7:06     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-11-11 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 16:39     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-11-11 17:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29  3:02   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29  3:56     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-29  9:15       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29  9:36         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28  5:34 ` [PATCH v14 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania

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