From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] uaccess: Add minimum bounds check on kernel buffer size
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 22:27:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <63dd8a6b.170a0220.f5c98.9e65@mx.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6c728dfc-d777-4beb-b463-649704c81a5e@app.fastmail.com>
On Fri, Feb 03, 2023 at 10:23:13PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 3, 2023, at 20:35, Kees Cook wrote:
> > While there is logic about the difference between ksize and usize,
> > copy_struct_from_user() didn't check the size of the destination buffer
> > (when it was known) against ksize. Add this check so there is an upper
> > bounds check on the possible memset() call, otherwise lower bounds
> > checks made by callers will trigger bounds warnings under -Warray-bounds.
> > Seen under GCC 13:
> >
> > In function 'copy_struct_from_user',
> > inlined from 'iommufd_fops_ioctl' at
> > ../drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:333:8:
> > ../include/linux/fortify-string.h:59:33: warning: '__builtin_memset'
> > offset [57, 4294967294] is out of the bounds [0, 56] of object 'buf'
> > with type 'union ucmd_buffer' [-Warray-bounds=]
> > 59 | #define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset
> > | ^
> > ../include/linux/fortify-string.h:453:9: note: in expansion of macro
> > '__underlying_memset'
> > 453 | __underlying_memset(p, c, __fortify_size); \
> > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > ../include/linux/fortify-string.h:461:25: note: in expansion of macro
> > '__fortify_memset_chk'
> > 461 | #define memset(p, c, s) __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, s, \
> > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > ../include/linux/uaccess.h:334:17: note: in expansion of macro 'memset'
> > 334 | memset(dst + size, 0, rest);
> > | ^~~~~~
> > ../drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c: In function 'iommufd_fops_ioctl':
> > ../drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:311:27: note: 'buf' declared here
> > 311 | union ucmd_buffer buf;
> > | ^~~
> >
>
> Hi Kees,
>
> I started building with gcc-13.0.1 myself but ran into a lot of
> other -Warray-bounds warnings in randconfig builds, so I ended up
> turning it off once more with CONFIG_CC_NO_ARRAY_BOUNDS in order
> to keep building without warnings.
Understood. AFAIK, all the open bugs I (and you) filed with GCC 13 have
been fixed related to -Warray-bounds. The most recent was the misbehavior
between CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT and -Warray-bounds. (Though the shift checking
still exposes some warnings since it introduces an implicit bounds check
on the shift variable, but they're not _wrong_ any more.)
> Is there anything else I need to do to get to the point of
> just addressing actual issues instead of false positives?
> Do you already have a patch series for fixing the others?
I've been working through the list that I see when building with
-Warray-bounds and -fstrict-flex-arrays=3. Some are real bugs, as usual.
> > diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > index afb18f198843..ab9728138ad6 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> > @@ -329,6 +329,10 @@ copy_struct_from_user(void *dst, size_t ksize,
> > const void __user *src,
> > size_t size = min(ksize, usize);
> > size_t rest = max(ksize, usize) - size;
> >
> > + /* Double check if ksize is larger than a known object size. */
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ksize > __builtin_object_size(dst, 1)))
> > + return -E2BIG;
> > +
>
> WARN_ON_ONCE() may be a little expensive since that adds two
> comparisons and a static variable to each copy, but it's probably
> fine.
Yeah. IMO, copy_struct_from_user() is not fast path and having better
bounds checking when coming from userspace is well worth it.
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-03 22:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-03 19:35 [PATCH] uaccess: Add minimum bounds check on kernel buffer size Kees Cook
2023-02-03 21:23 ` Arnd Bergmann
2023-02-03 22:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2023-02-03 22:27 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-02-06 20:03 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2023-02-06 21:32 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAMuHMdXXSwYYoUMskhcgjF9SVjraZC-UsBT3sN+xkcUAYmJj4Q-2143@mail.gmail.com>
2023-02-07 9:06 ` Yann Droneaud
2023-02-07 23:28 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-08 5:48 ` Aleksa Sarai
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