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From: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>,
	Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
	"Alison Schofield" <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] cxl/mbox: Fix CEL logic for poison and security commands
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2023 11:17:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6501fcc4e2c9_31df4629421@iweiny-mobl.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6500e8a179440_12747294a3@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch>

Dan Williams wrote:
> Ira Weiny wrote:
> > The following debug output was observed while testing CXL
> > 
> > cxl_core:cxl_walk_cel:721: cxl_mock_mem cxl_mem.0: Opcode 0x4300 unsupported by driver
> > 
> > opcode 0x4300 (Get Poison) is supported by the driver and the mock
> > device supports it.  The logic should be checking that the opcode is
> > both not poison and not security.
> > 
> > Fix the logic to allow poison and security commands.
> > 
> > Fixes: ad64f5952ce3 ("cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported")
> > Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> > Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> > ---
> >  drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 4 ++--
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> > index ca60bb8114f2..b315bdab9197 100644
> > --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> > +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> > @@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
> >  		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
> >  		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
> >  
> > -		if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) ||
> > -			     !cxl_is_security_command(opcode))) {
> > +		if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) &&
> > +		    !cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) {
> 
> Given that this is going to be a recurring pattern to add optional
> command support, I am not a fan of continuing to expand this boolean
> algebra eye exam.
> 
> How about the following to only do the validation check and enabling in
> one place:

I like it.

Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>

> 
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index ca60bb8114f2..4df4f614f490 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -715,24 +715,25 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
>  	for (i = 0; i < cel_entries; i++) {
>  		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
>  		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
> +		int enabled = 0;
>  
> -		if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) ||
> -			     !cxl_is_security_command(opcode))) {
> -			dev_dbg(dev,
> -				"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode);
> -			continue;
> -		}
> -
> -		if (cmd)
> +		if (cmd) {
>  			set_bit(cmd->info.id, mds->enabled_cmds);
> +			enabled++;
> +		}
>  
> -		if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode))
> +		if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) {
>  			cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&mds->poison, opcode);
> +			enabled++;
> +		}
>  
> -		if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode))
> +		if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) {
>  			cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(&mds->security, opcode);
> +			enabled++;
> +		}
>  
> -		dev_dbg(dev, "Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n", opcode);
> +		dev_dbg(dev, "Opcode 0x%04x %s\n", opcode,
> +			enabled ? "enabled" : "unsupported by driver");
>  	}
>  }
>  



  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-13 18:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-03 21:42 [PATCH] cxl/mbox: Fix CEL logic for poison and security commands Ira Weiny
2023-09-04 15:19 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-09-04 17:24 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-09-12 22:39 ` Dan Williams
2023-09-13 18:17   ` Ira Weiny [this message]
2023-09-13 19:45   ` Davidlohr Bueso

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