Forwarded: [PATCH] ocfs2: validate xattr header in ocfs2_validate_inode_block

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***

Subject: [PATCH] ocfs2: validate xattr header in ocfs2_validate_inode_block
Author: kartikey406@gmail.com

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git for-kernelci

Add validation of inline xattr header fields when validating inode
blocks to catch corruption early before the inode is used by the
system. This prevents corrupted xattr counts from causing out-of-bounds
access and use-after-free bugs in xattr processing code.

The validation checks:
1. xattr_inline_size does not exceed block size
2. xattr_inline_size is large enough for header structure
3. xattr entry count does not exceed available space

This moves validation to the inode block validation stage, providing
comprehensive protection for all code paths that access inline xattrs.

Reported-by: syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ab0ad25088673470d2d9
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index fcc89856ab95..9d5342b8dbc6 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1458,6 +1458,47 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
 		goto bail;
 	}
+	if (di->i_dyn_features & cpu_to_le16(OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) {
+		struct ocfs2_xattr_header *header;
+		u16 xattr_inline_size;
+		u16 xattr_count;
+		size_t max_entries;
+
+		xattr_inline_size = le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size);
+
+		/* Validate inline size is within block bounds */
+		if (xattr_inline_size > sb->s_blocksize) {
+			mlog(ML_ERROR,
+			     "xattr inline size %u exceeds block size %lu in inode %llu\n",
+			     xattr_inline_size, sb->s_blocksize,
+			     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+			goto bail;
+		}
+		/* If there's xattr data, validate it */
+		if (xattr_inline_size > 0) {
+			/* Must be at least big enough for header */
+			if (xattr_inline_size < sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) {
+				mlog(ML_ERROR,
+				     "xattr inline size %u too small for header in inode %llu\n",
+				     xattr_inline_size,
+				     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+				goto bail;
+			}
+			header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *)
+				 ((void *)di + sb->s_blocksize - xattr_inline_size);
+			xattr_count = le16_to_cpu(header->xh_count);
+			max_entries = (xattr_inline_size -
+				       sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) /
+				       sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry);
+			if (xattr_count > max_entries) {
+				mlog(ML_ERROR,
+				     "xattr count %u exceeds maximum %zu in inode %llu\n",
+				     xattr_count, max_entries,
+				     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+				goto bail;
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Errors after here are fatal.
-- 
2.43.0