From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Remove some hardcoded SEV-SNP guest policy checks during guest launch
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 15:31:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <691a453e-768f-1302-1db7-225b1086391d@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <175079224437.515260.14294578957654984603.b4-ty@google.com>
On 6/24/25 14:38, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, 29 May 2025 16:17:58 -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> This series removes some guest policy checks that can be better controlled
>> by the SEV firmware.
>>
>> - Remove the check for the SMT policy bit. Currently, a check is made to
>> ensure the SMT policy bit is set to 1. However, there is no reason for
>> KVM to do this. The SMT policy bit, when 0, is used to ensure that SMT
>> has been disabled *in the BIOS.* As this does not require any special
>> support within KVM, the check can be safely removed to allow the SEV
>> firmware to determine whether the system meets the policy.
>>
>> [...]
>
> Applied to kvm-x86 svm. FWIW, I'm not entirely sure I love the idea of doing
> nothing, e.g. it'd be nice to enumerate support to userspace. But adding a
> bunch of code to regurgitate information that's likely available to userspace
> (or more likely, the platform admin/orchestrator) doesn't seem worthwile either.
>
> I'll make sure to flag this for Paolo's eyeballs.
Sounds good, thanks Sean!
Tom
>
> [1/2] KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy disallow running with SMT enabled
> https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/9f4701e05fae
> [2/2] KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy to specify SINGLE_SOCKET
> https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/24be2b7956a5
>
> --
> https://github.com/kvm-x86/kvm-unit-tests/tree/next
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-24 20:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-29 21:17 [PATCH 0/2] Remove some hardcoded SEV-SNP guest policy checks during guest launch Tom Lendacky
2025-05-29 21:17 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy disallow running with SMT enabled Tom Lendacky
2025-05-29 21:18 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: SVM: Allow SNP guest policy to specify SINGLE_SOCKET Tom Lendacky
2025-06-24 19:38 ` [PATCH 0/2] Remove some hardcoded SEV-SNP guest policy checks during guest launch Sean Christopherson
2025-06-24 20:31 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
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