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From: syzbot <syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Forwarded: [PATCH] mm: thp: Deny THP for guest_memfd and secretmem in file_thp_enabled()
Date: Mon, 09 Feb 2026 05:11:52 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6989dd18.a00a0220.34fa92.0045.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <697d115a.050a0220.1d61ec.0004.GAE@google.com>

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***

Subject: [PATCH] mm: thp: Deny THP for guest_memfd and secretmem in file_thp_enabled()
Author: kartikey406@gmail.com

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master


file_thp_enabled() incorrectly returns true for guest_memfd and secretmem
inodes because they use alloc_file_pseudo() which does not call
get_write_access(), leaving i_writecount at 0. Combined with S_ISREG being
true, these pseudo-filesystem inodes appear as read-only regular files when
CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled.

This allows khugepaged and MADV_COLLAPSE to create large folios in the
page cache via the TVA_COLLAPSE path, but their fault handlers do not
support large folios. For guest_memfd this triggers
WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio)) in kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping().

Introduce AS_NO_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS address_space flag to allow
filesystems to opt out of CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS. Set this flag
in both guest_memfd and secretmem inode setup. This flag can be easily
removed along with CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS when it goes away.

Reported-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33a04338019ac7e43a44
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <Kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
 include/linux/pagemap.h | 1 +
 mm/huge_memory.c        | 3 +++
 mm/secretmem.c          | 3 ++-
 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c  | 1 +
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/pagemap.h b/include/linux/pagemap.h
index ec442af3f886..23f559fc1a4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/pagemap.h
+++ b/include/linux/pagemap.h
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ enum mapping_flags {
 	AS_KERNEL_FILE = 10,	/* mapping for a fake kernel file that shouldn't
 				   account usage to user cgroups */
 	AS_NO_DATA_INTEGRITY = 11, /* no data integrity guarantees */
+	AS_NO_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS = 12,
 	/* Bits 16-25 are used for FOLIO_ORDER */
 	AS_FOLIO_ORDER_BITS = 5,
 	AS_FOLIO_ORDER_MIN = 16,
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 40cf59301c21..4bdda92ce01e 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ static inline bool file_thp_enabled(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 
 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
 
+	if (test_bit(AS_NO_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS, &inode->i_mapping->flags))
+		return false;
+
 	return !inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode);
 }
 
diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index edf111e0a1bb..56d93a74f5fc 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
 
 	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
 	mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping);
-
+	set_bit(AS_NO_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS, &inode->i_mapping->flags);
+	
 	inode->i_op = &secretmem_iops;
 	inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops;
 
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index fdaea3422c30..b93a324c81bd 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -597,6 +597,7 @@ static int __kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, loff_t size, u64 flags)
 	inode->i_size = size;
 	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
 	mapping_set_inaccessible(inode->i_mapping);
+	set_bit(AS_NO_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS, &inode->i_mapping->flags);
 	/* Unmovable mappings are supposed to be marked unevictable as well. */
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!mapping_unevictable(inode->i_mapping));
 
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-09 13:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-30 20:15 [syzbot] [kvm?] WARNING in kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping syzbot
2026-02-01  4:57 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] KVM: guest_memfd: Restrict to order-0 folios until large folio support is implemented syzbot
2026-02-01  5:48 ` syzbot
2026-02-01  7:48 ` syzbot
2026-02-01 11:08 ` syzbot
2026-02-02  8:34 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] KVM: guest_memfd: Reject large folios until " syzbot
2026-02-02 15:11 ` syzbot
2026-02-03 20:06 ` Forwarded: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: guest_memfd: Always use order 0 when allocating for guest_memfd syzbot
2026-02-04 17:01 ` [PATCH] KVM: guest_memfd: Disable VMA merging with VM_DONTEXPAND Ackerley Tng
2026-02-04 18:21   ` [syzbot] [kvm?] WARNING in kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping syzbot
2026-02-04 19:10   ` [PATCH] KVM: guest_memfd: Disable VMA merging with VM_DONTEXPAND Ackerley Tng
2026-02-04 21:37     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-02-04 21:45       ` David Hildenbrand (arm)
2026-02-04 23:17         ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-08 17:34           ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-09  3:40             ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 10:38             ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 18:24               ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-09 19:38                 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09  1:55 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] KVM: guest_memfd: Prevent THP collapse of guest_memfd pages syzbot
2026-02-09  2:02 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] mm: thp: Deny THP for guest_memfd and secretmem in file_thp_enabled() syzbot
2026-02-09 13:11 ` syzbot [this message]
2026-02-13 15:43 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] mm: thp: deny THP for files on anonymous inodes syzbot

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