From: syzbot <syzbot+7ea2f5e9dfd468201817@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: dingyihan@uniontech.com
Cc: dingyihan@uniontech.com, gnoack3000@gmail.com, gnoack@google.com,
jannh@google.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
mic@digikod.net, paul@paul-moore.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [kernel?] INFO: task hung in restrict_one_thread_callback
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2026 19:03:35 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <699d1507.a00a0220.121a60.00f2.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D0013EA515055145+3e08a07b-e384-4c08-ab17-f558f0130d30@uniontech.com>
> Hi Günther,
>
> Thank you for the detailed analysis! I completely agree that serializing the TSYNC
> operations is the right way to prevent this deadlock. I have drafted a patch using
> `exec_update_lock` (similar to how seccomp uses `cred_guard_mutex`).
>
> Regarding your proposal to split this into two patches (one for the cleanup
> path and one for the lock): Maybe combining them into a single patch is a better choice. Here is why:
>
> We actually *cannot* remove `wait_for_completion(&shared_ctx.all_prepared)`
> in the interrupt recovery path. Since `shared_ctx` is allocated on the local
> stack of the caller, removing the wait would cause a severe Use-After-Free (UAF) if the
> thread returns to userspace while sibling task_works are still executing and dereferencing `ctx`.
>
> By adding the lock, we inherently resolve the deadlock, meaning the sibling task_works
> will never get stuck. Thus, `wait_for_completion` becomes perfectly safe to keep,
> and it remains strictly necessary to protect the stack memory. Therefore, the "fix" for the
> cleanup path is simply updating the comments to reflect this reality, which is tightly coupled with the locking fix.
> It felt more cohesive as a single patch.
>
> I have test the patch on my laptop,and it will not trigger the issue.Let's have syzbot test this combined logic:
>
> #syz test:
"---" does not look like a valid git repo address.
>
> --- a/security/landlock/tsync.c
>
> +++ b/security/landlock/tsync.c
>
> @@ -447,6 +447,12 @@ int landlock_restrict_sibling_threads(const struct cred *old_cred,
>
> shared_ctx.new_cred = new_cred;
>
> shared_ctx.set_no_new_privs = task_no_new_privs(current);
>
>
>
> + /*
>
> + * Serialize concurrent TSYNC operations to prevent deadlocks
>
> + * when multiple threads call landlock_restrict_self() simultaneously.
>
> + */
>
> + down_write(¤t->signal->exec_update_lock);
>
> +
>
> /*
>
> * We schedule a pseudo-signal task_work for each of the calling task's
>
> * sibling threads. In the task work, each thread:
>
> @@ -527,14 +533,17 @@ int landlock_restrict_sibling_threads(const struct cred *old_cred,
>
> -ERESTARTNOINTR);
>
>
>
> /*
>
> - * Cancel task works for tasks that did not start running yet,
>
> - * and decrement all_prepared and num_unfinished accordingly.
>
> + * Opportunistic improvement: try to cancel task works
>
> + * for tasks that did not start running yet. We do not
>
> + * have a guarantee that it cancels any of the enqueued
>
> + * task works (because task_work_run() might already have
>
> + * dequeued them).
>
> */
>
> cancel_tsync_works(&works, &shared_ctx);
>
>
>
> /*
>
> - * The remaining task works have started running, so waiting for
>
> - * their completion will finish.
>
> + * We must wait for the remaining task works to finish to
>
> + * prevent a use-after-free of the local shared_ctx.
>
> */
>
> wait_for_completion(&shared_ctx.all_prepared);
>
> }
>
> @@ -557,5 +566,7 @@ int landlock_restrict_sibling_threads(const struct cred *old_cred,
>
>
>
> tsync_works_release(&works);
>
>
>
> + up_write(¤t->signal->exec_update_lock);
>
> +
>
> return atomic_read(&shared_ctx.preparation_error);
>
> }
>
> --
> 在 2026/2/23 23:16, Günther Noack 写道:
>> Hello!
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 23, 2026 at 07:29:56PM +0800, Ding Yihan wrote:
>>> Thank you for the detailed analysis and the clear breakdown.
>>> Apologies for the delayed response. I spent the last couple of days
>>> thoroughly reading through the previous mailing list discussions. I
>>> was trying hard to see if there was any viable pure lockless design
>>> that could solve this concurrency issue while preserving the original
>>> architecture.
>>>
>>> However, after looking at the complexities you outlined, I completely
>>> agree with your conclusion: serializing the TSYNC operations is indeed
>>> the most robust and reasonable path forward to prevent the deadlock.
>>>
>>> Regarding the lock choice, since 'cred_guard_mutex' is explicitly
>>> marked as deprecated for new code in the kernel,maybe we can use its
>>> modern replacement: 'exec_update_lock' (using down_write_trylock /
>>> up_write on current->signal). This aligns with the current subsystem
>>> standards and was also briefly touched upon by Jann in the older
>>> discussions.
>>>
>>> I fully understand the requirement for the two-part patch series:
>>> 1. Cleaning up the cancellation logic and comments.
>>> 2. Introducing the serialization lock for TSYNC.
>>>
>>> I will take some time to draft and test this patch series properly.
>>> I also plan to discuss this with my kernel colleagues here at
>>> UnionTech to see if they have any additional suggestions on the
>>> implementation details before I submit it.
>>>
>>> I will send out the v1 patch series to the list as soon as it is
>>> ready. Thanks again for your guidance and the great discussion!
>>
>> Thank you, Ding, this is much appreciated!
>>
>> I agree, the `exec_update_lock` might be the better solution;
>> I also need to familiarize myself more with it to double-check.
>>
>> —Günther
>>
>
next parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-24 3:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <D0013EA515055145+3e08a07b-e384-4c08-ab17-f558f0130d30@uniontech.com>
2026-02-24 3:03 ` syzbot [this message]
[not found] <7F45E41D790CD8A4+f1dcffc7-5b69-432f-8ad7-e96a3ef66219@uniontech.com>
2026-02-24 5:07 ` [syzbot] [kernel?] INFO: task hung in restrict_one_thread_callback syzbot
[not found] <F4E5EFD28BFB7AA6+108340fb-0592-4dd0-9f93-b7a2b760dc5d@uniontech.com>
2026-02-24 4:08 ` syzbot
[not found] <F1E9B1BEBD8867CA+092eea18-94c7-4c65-a466-95cd3628a88c@uniontech.com>
2026-02-21 7:11 ` syzbot
2026-02-20 11:11 syzbot
2026-02-23 13:40 ` Frederic Weisbecker
2026-02-23 15:15 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-24 0:10 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-24 3:05 ` syzbot
2026-02-24 10:00 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-25 5:10 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-25 10:22 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-25 12:21 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-25 22:32 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-26 2:19 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-26 10:04 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-27 0:03 ` Hillf Danton
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