From: syzbot <syzbot+fb32afec111a7d61b939@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Forwarded: [PATCH] ext4: add bounds check in xattr_find_entry() to prevent use-after-free
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 00:52:24 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <699d66c8.050a0220.247d23.03d3.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <699b9b6f.a70a0220.2c38d7.0189.GAE@google.com>
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***
Subject: [PATCH] ext4: add bounds check in xattr_find_entry() to prevent use-after-free
Author: kartikey406@gmail.com
#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
xattr_find_entry() receives an 'end' pointer to mark the boundary of
the valid xattr region but never uses it to validate entries during
iteration. The IS_LAST_ENTRY() macro dereferences the entry pointer
by casting it to __u32 and reading 4 bytes, without first verifying
that the entry falls within bounds.
On a corrupted filesystem, inline xattr entries in the inode body can
have a bogus e_name_len field. EXT4_XATTR_NEXT() uses e_name_len to
compute the next entry offset, which can jump past the valid xattr
region into freed memory. The subsequent IS_LAST_ENTRY() call on this
out-of-bounds pointer triggers a use-after-free read.
Fix this by:
1. Checking that the entry pointer is within bounds before each
IS_LAST_ENTRY() dereference in the loop condition.
2. Validating that the next entry computed via EXT4_XATTR_NEXT()
also falls within bounds before advancing the loop.
Return -EFSCORRUPTED if entries overrun the valid xattr region.
Reported-by: syzbot+fb32afec111a7d61b939@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fb32afec111a7d61b939
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
index 7bf9ba19a89d..f38eef93e3f8 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -333,6 +333,12 @@ xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_entry **pentry,
name_len = strlen(name);
for (entry = *pentry; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry); entry = next) {
next = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
+ if ((void *)next + sizeof(__u32) > end) {
+ EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "corrupted xattr entry: e_name_len=%u",
+ entry->e_name_len);
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
if ((void *) next >= end) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "corrupted xattr entries");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
@@ -652,6 +658,13 @@ ext4_xattr_ibody_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode);
end = ITAIL(inode, raw_inode);
entry = IFIRST(header);
+
+ if ((void *)entry + sizeof(__u32) > end) {
+ EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "inline xattr region overflow");
+ error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
error = xattr_find_entry(inode, &entry, end, name_index, name, 0);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-24 8:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-23 0:12 [syzbot] [ext4?] KASAN: use-after-free Read in xattr_find_entry (2) syzbot
2026-02-24 8:36 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] ext4: add bounds check in xattr_find_entry() to prevent use-after-free syzbot
2026-02-24 8:52 ` syzbot [this message]
2026-03-26 14:50 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] ext4: fix bounds check in check_xattrs() to account for IS_LAST_ENTRY() read syzbot
2026-03-27 13:28 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] ext4: add debug printk to trace xattr validation path syzbot
2026-03-30 1:43 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] loop: block loop reconfiguration of offset/sizelimit on mounted device syzbot
2026-03-31 1:04 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] loop: block changing lo_offset/lo_sizelimit " syzbot
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