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From: Dan Williams <djbw@kernel.org>
To: Alistair Francis <alistair23@gmail.com>
Cc: bhelgaas@google.com,  lukas@wunner.de,
	 rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org,  akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	 linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,  Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com,
	 linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 alex.gaynor@gmail.com,  benno.lossin@proton.me,
	 boqun.feng@gmail.com,  a.hindborg@kernel.org,  gary@garyguo.net,
	 bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com,  tmgross@umich.edu,  ojeda@kernel.org,
	 wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com,  aliceryhl@google.com,
	 Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 00/27] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 19:35:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <69e19c80b892b_fe0831000@djbw-dev.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKmqyKPyR165rACXRMJXgyUOp6OUdQqSsym-gfYVFnKLZ4ednQ@mail.gmail.com>

Alistair Francis wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 12, 2026 at 3:56 PM <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
[..]
> >
> > So this is where it will collide with TSM that also emits an
> > authenticated attribute. See Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci.
> >
> > The rough plan Lukas and I worked out is that switching between TSM and
> > CMA based authentication would use sysfs visibility to coordinate. I.e.
> > TSM to CMA conversion hides the TSM "authenticated" attribute and
> > unhides the CMA attribute of the same name.
> 
> That seems straightforward and is already documented upstream as well,
> so that's pretty easy.

Later in the thread I proposed an alternative that instead of supporting
2 flavors of uapi through "authenticated", instead implement CMA as
another TSM driver [1].

[1]: http://lore.kernel.org/69976d7d39c60_2f4a1009@dwillia2-mobl4.notmuch

> > The most significant unsolved point of contention between TSM and CMA is
> > the policy on when authentication is mandated and the driver probe
> > policy. The proposed model for enforcing device security for
> > Confidential Computing is make it completely amenable to userspace
> > policy. Draft details here [2] to be refreshed "soon" when I send out
> > the next version of that.
> >
> > [2]: http://lore.kernel.org/20250827035259.1356758-6-dan.j.williams@intel.com
> 
> CMA will eventually need to support some sort of drive probe policy as
> well, but that can wait until later and isn't going to be dealt with
> in this series.

Makes sense, and Greg wants to a see a more universal "device trust"
mechanism for this. This also means CMA as a TSM driver gets that
mechanism "for free" when the PCI/TSM effort moves it forward.

> > To be clear I am ok if there is an incremental option to have auto_cma
> > and/or auto_tsm that arranges for authentication or link encryption to
> > happen without asking. I take issue with auto_cma being the only hard
> > coded option.
> 
> I have been working through all of the comments and discussions and I
> think I have addressed everything, except for this one.
> 
> To summerise, is the high level issue is how do we know if we should
> use CMA or TSM?
> 
> Do you have any more thoughts on this?

So most of the thinking is in that [1] above, and the new mechanism
would just be to auto-connect to the first TSM driver that appears, or
auto-connect to the TSM driver with the most capbility. For example,
auto-connect to the CMA-TSM at initial discovery, switch to Platform-TSM
if the device additionally supports IDE.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-17  2:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 110+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-11  3:29 [RFC v3 00/27] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 01/27] rust: add untrusted data abstraction alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 02/27] X.509: Make certificate parser public alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 03/27] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 04/27] X.509: Move certificate length retrieval into new helper alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 05/27] certs: Create blacklist keyring earlier alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 06/27] rust: add bindings for hash.h alistair23
2026-02-19 14:48   ` Gary Guo
2026-03-02 16:18   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 07/27] rust: error: impl From<FromBytesWithNulError> for Kernel Error alistair23
2026-02-19 14:49   ` Gary Guo
2026-03-13  2:20     ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-13 10:35       ` Alice Ryhl
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 08/27] lib: rspdm: Initial commit of Rust SPDM alistair23
2026-03-02 17:09   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-13  3:44     ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 09/27] PCI/CMA: Authenticate devices on enumeration alistair23
2026-02-16  4:25   ` Aksh Garg
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 10/27] PCI/CMA: Validate Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 11/27] PCI/CMA: Reauthenticate devices on reset and resume alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 12/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_version alistair23
2026-02-11  4:00   ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-03 11:36   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-13  5:35     ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-13  5:53       ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-13  5:55         ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-16 17:16       ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 13/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_capabilities alistair23
2026-02-11  4:08   ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-03 12:09   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-03 18:07     ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-20  4:32     ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 14/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM negotiate_algorithms alistair23
2026-03-03 13:46   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 15/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_digests alistair23
2026-03-03 14:29   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 16/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_certificate alistair23
2026-03-03 14:51   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-31  2:37     ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-31 13:19       ` Gary Guo
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 17/27] crypto: asymmetric_keys - Load certificate parsing early in boot alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 18/27] KEYS: Load keyring and certificates " alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 19/27] PCI/CMA: Support built in X.509 certificates alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 20/27] crypto: sha: Load early in boot alistair23
2026-03-03 14:52   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 21/27] crypto: ecdsa: " alistair23
2026-03-03 14:54   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 22/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM certificate validation alistair23
2026-03-03 15:00   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-31  3:29     ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-31 10:11       ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-04-01  1:48         ` Alistair Francis
2026-04-01 10:37           ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 23/27] rust: allow extracting the buffer from a CString alistair23
2026-02-19 14:50   ` Gary Guo
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 24/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM challenge alistair23
2026-03-03 16:54   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 25/27] PCI/CMA: Expose in sysfs whether devices are authenticated alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 26/27] rust: add bindings for hash_info alistair23
2026-02-11  3:29 ` [RFC v3 27/27] rspdm: Multicast received signatures via netlink alistair23
2026-02-19 10:19   ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-12  5:56 ` [RFC v3 00/27] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM dan.j.williams
2026-02-18  2:12   ` Alistair Francis
2026-04-09  3:39   ` Alistair Francis
2026-04-13  5:42     ` Alistair Francis
2026-04-17  2:35     ` Dan Williams [this message]
2026-04-17  4:34       ` Lukas Wunner
2026-04-17  5:20         ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-17 23:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-18  2:17   ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-18 23:40     ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19  0:56       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19  5:05         ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19 12:41           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 14:15             ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 14:31               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 15:07                 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 17:39                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 20:07                     ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-20  8:30                     ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20 14:10                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-21 18:46                         ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-21 23:29                           ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-23 17:15                             ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-23 19:11                               ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-24 14:33                                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-05  4:17                                 ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-05 12:48                                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-05 19:49                                     ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-09 11:39                                       ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 12:31                                         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 15:33                                           ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 15:59                                             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 18:00                                               ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 20:40                                                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 23:11                                                   ` DanX Williams
2026-02-24 14:16                           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-24 15:54                             ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-25 14:50                               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 14:40               ` Greg KH
2026-02-20  7:46                 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20  9:14                   ` Greg KH
2026-02-20 11:45                     ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20 11:57                       ` Greg KH
2026-02-19  9:34         ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 12:43           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 18:48           ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19  9:13       ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 18:42         ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19 11:24   ` Jonathan Cameron

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