From: syzbot <syzbot+62f0f99d2f2bb8e3bbd7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Forwarded: [PATCH v3] nilfs2: reject CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl with out-of-range segment numbers
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 18:58:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <69f2b75e.170a0220.3c4978.0010.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <69ef7af9.050a0220.1eaaa4.0002.GAE@google.com>
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***
Subject: [PATCH v3] nilfs2: reject CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl with out-of-range segment numbers
Author: kartikey406@gmail.com
#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
Syzbot reported a hung task in nilfs_transaction_begin() where multiple
tasks performing chmod() on a nilfs2 mount blocked for over 143 seconds
waiting to acquire ns_segctor_sem for read:
INFO: task syz.0.17:5918 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Call Trace:
schedule+0x164/0x360
rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x6d9/0x940
down_read+0x99/0x2e0
nilfs_transaction_begin+0x364/0x710 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:221
nilfs_setattr+0x124/0x2c0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:921
notify_change+0xc1a/0xf40
chmod_common+0x273/0x4a0
do_fchmodat+0x12d/0x230
The writer holding ns_segctor_sem was a concurrent NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS
caller, stuck inside printk while emitting per-element warnings from
nilfs_sufile_updatev():
__nilfs_msg+0x373/0x450 fs/nilfs2/super.c:78
nilfs_sufile_updatev+0x21c/0x6d0 fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:186
nilfs_sufile_freev fs/nilfs2/sufile.h:93 [inline]
nilfs_free_segments fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1140 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1261 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x1f55/0x76c0
nilfs_clean_segments+0x3bd/0xa50
nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:922 [inline]
nilfs_ioctl+0x261f/0x2780
The root cause is that user-supplied segment numbers are not validated
before nilfs_clean_segments() begins doing work; the range check on
each segnum is performed deep inside the call chain by
nilfs_sufile_updatev(), which emits a nilfs_warn() per invalid entry
while still holding the segctor lock and the sufile mi_sem. Under load
(repeated invocations across multiple mounts saturating the global
printk path), the cumulative printk latency keeps ns_segctor_sem held
long enough to trip the hung_task watchdog, blocking concurrent
operations such as chmod() that need ns_segctor_sem for read.
Fix by validating the contents of kbufs[4] in nilfs_clean_segments()
immediately after acquiring ns_segctor_sem via nilfs_transaction_lock().
Holding ns_segctor_sem serializes the check against
nilfs_ioctl_resize(), which can modify ns_nsegments, so the validation
uses a consistent value. Out-of-range segment numbers are rejected
with -EINVAL before any segment-cleaning work begins, so the bad
entries never reach the per-element diagnostic path inside
nilfs_sufile_updatev().
Reported-by: syzbot+62f0f99d2f2bb8e3bbd7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62f0f99d2f2bb8e3bbd7
Fixes: 4f6b828837b4 ("nilfs2: fix lock order reversal in nilfs_clean_segments ioctl")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Move validation from nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments() into
nilfs_clean_segments(), under ns_segctor_sem held for write
by nilfs_transaction_lock(), to serialize against
nilfs_ioctl_resize() which can modify ns_nsegments
(Ryusuke Konishi)
- Introduce local variables segnumv and nfreesegs for readability,
rather than open-coding casts of kbufs[4] (Ryusuke Konishi)
- Emit nilfs_err() once on the first out-of-range segnum and bail
out, instead of nilfs_warn() per element (Ryusuke Konishi)
- Add bail_unlock label for the early-failure path, parallel to
the existing out_unlock structure (Ryusuke Konishi)
Changes in v2:
- Reuse existing 'n' loop variable instead of introducing a new
one (Slava Dubeyko)
- Add dedicated out_free_segnums label so the validation-failure
path falls through the existing cleanup ladder rather than
duplicating kfree(kbufs[4]) inline (Slava Dubeyko)
---
fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/segment.c b/fs/nilfs2/segment.c
index 1491a4d4b1e1..dc54643866ce 100644
--- a/fs/nilfs2/segment.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/segment.c
@@ -2512,12 +2512,33 @@ int nilfs_clean_segments(struct super_block *sb, struct nilfs_argv *argv,
struct nilfs_sc_info *sci = nilfs->ns_writer;
struct nilfs_transaction_info ti;
int err;
+ size_t i, nfreesegs = argv[4].v_nmembs;
+ __u64 *segnumv = kbufs[4];
if (unlikely(!sci))
return -EROFS;
nilfs_transaction_lock(sb, &ti, 1);
+ /*
+ * Validate segment numbers under ns_segctor_sem (held for write
+ * by nilfs_transaction_lock above) so the check is serialized
+ * against nilfs_ioctl_resize(), which can modify ns_nsegments.
+ * Rejecting bad input here, before any segment-cleaning work
+ * begins, avoids the per-element diagnostic path inside
+ * nilfs_sufile_updatev() that would otherwise run under this
+ * same lock and stall concurrent readers.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < nfreesegs; i++) {
+ if (segnumv[i] >= nilfs->ns_nsegments) {
+ nilfs_err(sb,
+ "Segment number %llu to be freed is out of range",
+ (unsigned long long)segnumv[i]);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto bail_unlock;
+ }
+ }
+
err = nilfs_mdt_save_to_shadow_map(nilfs->ns_dat);
if (unlikely(err))
goto out_unlock;
@@ -2558,6 +2579,7 @@ int nilfs_clean_segments(struct super_block *sb, struct nilfs_argv *argv,
sci->sc_freesegs = NULL;
sci->sc_nfreesegs = 0;
nilfs_mdt_clear_shadow_map(nilfs->ns_dat);
+ bail_unlock:
nilfs_transaction_unlock(sb);
return err;
}
--
2.43.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-30 1:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-27 15:04 [syzbot] [nilfs?] INFO: task hung in nilfs_transaction_begin (2) syzbot
2026-04-27 23:47 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] nilfs2: reject CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl with nsegs exceeding ns_nsegments syzbot
2026-04-28 0:31 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] nilfs2: reject CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl with out-of-range segment numbers syzbot
2026-04-30 1:58 ` syzbot [this message]
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