From: syzbot <syzbot+c7604c9fdd7580cca4e0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Forwarded: [PATCH] PCI/proc: validate user buffer before touching config space
Date: Fri, 01 May 2026 16:47:32 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <69f53b94.050a0220.312cd3.001b.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <69f3f165.170a0220.5f1b.0010.GAE@google.com>
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***
Subject: [PATCH] PCI/proc: validate user buffer before touching config space
Author: kartikey406@gmail.com
#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
proc_bus_pci_write() invokes __get_user() repeatedly without checking
its return value. When the user pointer faults, the extable fixup
leaves the destination indeterminate but the function still hands the
value to pci_user_write_config_*(), writing fixup state to PCI
configuration space.
syzbot triggers this with a writev() whose iov_base is NULL on
/proc/bus/pci/00/03.0 (the virtio-blk controller in the syzkaller VM).
Every __get_user() faults, val ends up as fixup-zero, and zero is
written to config space offsets 0..6 -- including the Command register
at offset 4, clearing Bus Master and Memory Space Enable. The disk
goes silent mid-flight, in-flight journal bios never complete, and
jbd2 hangs in wait_on_buffer() indefinitely:
INFO: task jbd2/sda1-8:4955 blocked in I/O wait for more than 143 seconds.
__wait_on_buffer fs/buffer.c:123
jbd2_journal_commit_transaction+0x388a/0x6870 fs/jbd2/commit.c:837
kjournald2 fs/jbd2/journal.c:201
proc_bus_pci_read() has the symmetric problem: an unchecked __put_user()
into a faulting user pointer silently drops config-space data.
Fix both by staging through a kernel buffer. The write path uses
memdup_user() to copy the user buffer up front; a bad user pointer now
returns -EFAULT before any device state is touched, and the function
no longer races a concurrent userspace mutation of the buffer across
successive __get_user()s. The read path collects config-space data
into a kmalloc'd buffer and copy_to_user()s it once at the end.
Reported-by: syzbot+c7604c9fdd7580cca4e0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c7604c9fdd7580cca4e0
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
drivers/pci/proc.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index ce36e35681e8..aa54c4e1445d 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -31,13 +31,14 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
struct pci_dev *dev = pde_data(file_inode(file));
unsigned int pos = *ppos;
unsigned int cnt, size;
+ void *kbuf;
+ u8 *kp;
/*
* Normal users can read only the standardized portion of the
* configuration space as several chips lock up when trying to read
* undefined locations (think of Intel PIIX4 as a typical example).
*/
-
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
size = dev->cfg_size;
else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS)
@@ -53,57 +54,61 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
nbytes = size - pos;
cnt = nbytes;
- if (!access_ok(buf, cnt))
- return -EINVAL;
+ kbuf = kmalloc(cnt, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kbuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ kp = kbuf;
pci_config_pm_runtime_get(dev);
if ((pos & 1) && cnt) {
- unsigned char val;
- pci_user_read_config_byte(dev, pos, &val);
- __put_user(val, buf);
- buf++;
+ pci_user_read_config_byte(dev, pos, kp);
+ kp++;
pos++;
cnt--;
}
if ((pos & 3) && cnt > 2) {
- unsigned short val;
+ u16 val;
pci_user_read_config_word(dev, pos, &val);
- __put_user(cpu_to_le16(val), (__le16 __user *) buf);
- buf += 2;
+ *(__le16 *)kp = cpu_to_le16(val);
+ kp += 2;
pos += 2;
cnt -= 2;
}
while (cnt >= 4) {
- unsigned int val;
+ u32 val;
pci_user_read_config_dword(dev, pos, &val);
- __put_user(cpu_to_le32(val), (__le32 __user *) buf);
- buf += 4;
+ *(__le32 *)kp = cpu_to_le32(val);
+ kp += 4;
pos += 4;
cnt -= 4;
cond_resched();
}
if (cnt >= 2) {
- unsigned short val;
+ u16 val;
pci_user_read_config_word(dev, pos, &val);
- __put_user(cpu_to_le16(val), (__le16 __user *) buf);
- buf += 2;
+ *(__le16 *)kp = cpu_to_le16(val);
+ kp += 2;
pos += 2;
cnt -= 2;
}
if (cnt) {
- unsigned char val;
- pci_user_read_config_byte(dev, pos, &val);
- __put_user(val, buf);
+ pci_user_read_config_byte(dev, pos, kp);
pos++;
}
pci_config_pm_runtime_put(dev);
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, kbuf, nbytes)) {
+ kfree(kbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ kfree(kbuf);
+
*ppos = pos;
return nbytes;
}
@@ -116,6 +121,8 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
int pos = *ppos;
int size = dev->cfg_size;
int cnt, ret;
+ const u8 *kp;
+ u8 *kbuf;
ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
if (ret)
@@ -129,56 +136,53 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
nbytes = size - pos;
cnt = nbytes;
- if (!access_ok(buf, cnt))
- return -EINVAL;
+ kbuf = memdup_user(buf, cnt);
+ if (IS_ERR(kbuf))
+ return PTR_ERR(kbuf);
+ kp = kbuf;
pci_config_pm_runtime_get(dev);
if ((pos & 1) && cnt) {
- unsigned char val;
- __get_user(val, buf);
- pci_user_write_config_byte(dev, pos, val);
- buf++;
+ pci_user_write_config_byte(dev, pos, *kp);
+ kp++;
pos++;
cnt--;
}
if ((pos & 3) && cnt > 2) {
- __le16 val;
- __get_user(val, (__le16 __user *) buf);
+ __le16 val = *(const __le16 *)kp;
pci_user_write_config_word(dev, pos, le16_to_cpu(val));
- buf += 2;
+ kp += 2;
pos += 2;
cnt -= 2;
}
while (cnt >= 4) {
- __le32 val;
- __get_user(val, (__le32 __user *) buf);
+ __le32 val = *(const __le32 *)kp;
pci_user_write_config_dword(dev, pos, le32_to_cpu(val));
- buf += 4;
+ kp += 4;
pos += 4;
cnt -= 4;
}
if (cnt >= 2) {
- __le16 val;
- __get_user(val, (__le16 __user *) buf);
+ __le16 val = *(const __le16 *)kp;
pci_user_write_config_word(dev, pos, le16_to_cpu(val));
- buf += 2;
+ kp += 2;
pos += 2;
cnt -= 2;
}
if (cnt) {
- unsigned char val;
- __get_user(val, buf);
- pci_user_write_config_byte(dev, pos, val);
+ pci_user_write_config_byte(dev, pos, *kp);
pos++;
}
pci_config_pm_runtime_put(dev);
+ kfree(kbuf);
+
*ppos = pos;
i_size_write(ino, dev->cfg_size);
return nbytes;
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-01 23:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-01 0:18 [syzbot] INFO: task jbd2/sda1-NUM:NUM blocked in I/O wait for more than NUM seconds syzbot
2026-05-01 14:48 ` [syzbot] [ext4?] " syzbot
2026-05-01 23:47 ` syzbot [this message]
2026-05-02 0:02 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] PCI/proc: check return value of __get_user() in proc_bus_pci_write() syzbot
2026-05-04 1:22 ` Forwarded: [PATCH v2] PCI/proc: check user access return values in proc_bus_pci_{read,write}() syzbot
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