public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com
Cc: michael.roth@amd.com, nikunj@amd.com, seanjc@google.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] x86/sev: Fix making shared pages private during kdump
Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 08:58:29 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <71aecbdd-aa6c-6136-7a5d-c8cdc9cafb30@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250506183529.289549-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>

On 5/6/25 13:35, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> 
> When the shared pages are being made private during kdump preparation
> there are additional checks to handle shared GHCB pages.
> 
> These additional checks include handling the case of GHCB page being
> contained within a huge page.
> 
> The check for handling the case of GHCB contained within a huge
> page incorrectly skips a page just below the GHCB page from being
> transitioned back to private during kdump preparation.
> 
> This skipped page causes a 0x404 #VC exception when it is accessed
> later while dumping guest memory during vmcore generation via kdump.
> 
> Correct the range to be checked for GHCB contained in a huge page.
> Also ensure that the skipped huge page containing the GHCB page is
> transitioned back to private by applying the correct address mask
> later when changing GHCBs to private at end of kdump preparation.
> 
> Fixes: 3074152e56c9 ("x86/sev: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

> ---
>  arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 11 +++++++----
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> index d35fec7b164a..30b74e4e4e88 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> @@ -1019,7 +1019,8 @@ static void unshare_all_memory(void)
>  			data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
>  			ghcb = (unsigned long)&data->ghcb_page;
>  
> -			if (addr <= ghcb && ghcb <= addr + size) {
> +			/* Handle the case of a huge page containing the GHCB page */
> +			if (addr <= ghcb && ghcb < addr + size) {
>  				skipped_addr = true;
>  				break;
>  			}
> @@ -1131,8 +1132,8 @@ static void shutdown_all_aps(void)
>  void snp_kexec_finish(void)
>  {
>  	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
> +	unsigned long size, addr;
>  	unsigned int level, cpu;
> -	unsigned long size;
>  	struct ghcb *ghcb;
>  	pte_t *pte;
>  
> @@ -1160,8 +1161,10 @@ void snp_kexec_finish(void)
>  		ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
>  		pte = lookup_address((unsigned long)ghcb, &level);
>  		size = page_level_size(level);
> -		set_pte_enc(pte, level, (void *)ghcb);
> -		snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)ghcb, (size / PAGE_SIZE));
> +		/* Handle the case of a huge page containing the GHCB page */
> +		addr = (unsigned long)ghcb & page_level_mask(level);
> +		set_pte_enc(pte, level, (void *)addr);
> +		snp_set_memory_private(addr, (size / PAGE_SIZE));
>  	}
>  }
>  

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-05-07 13:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-06 18:35 [PATCH v5] x86/sev: Fix making shared pages private during kdump Ashish Kalra
2025-05-07  9:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-13 12:02   ` Aithal, Srikanth
2025-05-07 13:58 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2025-05-13 18:07 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev: Make sure pages are not skipped " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=71aecbdd-aa6c-6136-7a5d-c8cdc9cafb30@amd.com \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=Ashish.Kalra@amd.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox