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[71.126.255.178]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id af79cd13be357-907b87c037esm10546985a.30.2026.05.07.15.16.58 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 07 May 2026 15:16:58 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 07 May 2026 18:16:57 -0400 Message-ID: <71f5ecc18e71e40093ddaf1b0dd1df2b@paul-moore.com> From: Paul Moore To: Linus Torvalds Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [GIT PULL] selinux/selinux-pr-20260507 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Linus, We've got five more SELinux patches to fix a few problems, quick summary below: - Allow for multiple opens of /sys/fs/selinux/policy Prevents a single process from blocking others from reading the SELinux policy loaded in the kernel. This does have the side effect of potentially allowing userspace to trigger additional kernel memory allocations as part of the open/read operation, but this is mitigated by requiring the SELinux security/read_policy permission. - Reduce the critical sections where the SELinux policy mutex is held This includes the patch to the policy loader code where we move the permission checks and an allocation outside the mutex as well as the the patch to checkreqprot which drops the code/lock entirely. While the checkreqprot code had effectively been dropped in an earlier release, portions of the code still remained that would have triggered the mutex to perform an IMA measurement. This pull request finally drops all of that while preserving the user visible behavior. - Eliminate potential sources of log spamming There were a few areas where processes could flood the system logs and hide other, more critical events. The previously disabled checkreqprot and runtime disable knobs in selinuxfs were two such areas that have now been greatly simplified and a pr_err() replaced with a pr_err_once(). The third such place is the /sys/fs/selinux/user file, which hasn't been used by a userspace release since 2020 and was scheduled for removal after 2025; this pull request effectively disables this functionality, but similar to checkreqprot, it is done in a way that should not break old userspace. Paul -- The following changes since commit 7fd2df204f342fc17d1a0bfcd474b24232fb0f32: Linux 7.1-rc2 (2026-05-03 14:21:25 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git tags/selinux-pr-20260507 for you to fetch changes up to 868f31e4061eca8c3cd607d79d954d5e54f204aa: selinux: shrink critical section in sel_write_load() (2026-05-05 16:02:28 -0400) ---------------------------------------------------------------- selinux/stable-7.1 PR 20260507 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Stephen Smalley (5): selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/disable selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/user selinux: allow multiple opens of /sys/fs/selinux/policy selinux: shrink critical section in sel_write_load() security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 196 ++++------------------------ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 125 ----------------- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 292 deletions(-) -- paul-moore.com