From: "Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@openbsd.org>
To: jeffxu@chromium.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com, willy@infradead.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
usama.anjum@collabora.com, rdunlap@infradead.org,
jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, pedro.falcato@gmail.com,
dave.hansen@intel.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/4] Introduce mseal()
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 08:49:39 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <726.1705938579@cvs.openbsd.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240122152905.2220849-1-jeffxu@chromium.org>
Regarding these pieces
> The PROT_SEAL bit in prot field of mmap(). When present, it marks
> the map sealed since creation.
OpenBSD won't be doing this. I had PROT_IMMUTABLE as a draft. In my
research I found basically zero circumstances when you userland does
that. The most common circumstance is you create a RW mapping, fill it,
and then change to a more restrictve mapping, and lock it.
There are a few regions in the addressspace that can be locked while RW.
For instance, the stack. But the kernel does that, not userland. I
found regions where the kernel wants to do this to the address space,
but there is no need to export useless functionality to userland.
OpenBSD now uses this for a high percent of the address space. It might
be worth re-reading a description of the split of responsibility regarding
who locks different types of memory in a process;
- kernel (the majority, based upon what ELF layout tell us),
- shared library linker (the next majority, dealing with shared
library mappings and left-overs not determinable at kernel time),
- libc (a small minority, mostly regarding forced mutable objects)
- and the applications themselves (only 1 application today)
https://lwn.net/Articles/915662/
> The MAP_SEALABLE bit in the flags field of mmap(). When present, it marks
> the map as sealable. A map created without MAP_SEALABLE will not support
> sealing, i.e. mseal() will fail.
We definately won't be doing this. We allow a process to lock any and all
it's memory that isn't locked already, even if it means it is shooting
itself in the foot.
I think you are going to severely hurt the power of this mechanism,
because you won't be able to lock memory that has been allocated by a
different callsite not under your source-code control which lacks the
MAP_SEALABLE flag. (Which is extremely common with the system-parts of
a process, meaning not just libc but kernel allocated objects).
It may be fine inside a program like chrome, but I expect that flag to make
it harder to use in libc, and it will hinder adoption.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-22 15:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-22 15:28 [PATCH v7 0/4] Introduce mseal() jeffxu
2024-01-22 15:28 ` [PATCH v7 1/4] mseal: Wire up mseal syscall jeffxu
2024-01-22 15:28 ` [PATCH v7 2/4] mseal: add " jeffxu
2024-01-23 18:14 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-01-24 17:50 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-24 20:06 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-01-24 20:37 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-24 20:51 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-24 22:49 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-25 2:04 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-22 15:28 ` [PATCH v7 3/4] selftest mm/mseal memory sealing jeffxu
2024-01-22 15:28 ` [PATCH v7 4/4] mseal:add documentation jeffxu
2024-01-22 15:49 ` Theo de Raadt [this message]
2024-01-22 22:10 ` [PATCH v7 0/4] Introduce mseal() Jeff Xu
2024-01-22 22:34 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-23 17:33 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-01-23 18:58 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-24 18:56 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-24 18:55 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-24 19:17 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-29 22:36 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-01-31 17:49 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-31 20:51 ` Jonathan Corbet
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